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Abstract 
This thesis employs perspectives inspired by General Systems Theory to address 
issues in philosophy, including moral philosophy and philosophy of mind. I present an 
overview of a range of ideas from the study of physical systems that may be used to 
provide a firm physicalist foundation to explorations of some common questions in 
philosophy. I divide these topics into three categories: the Physical Category, the 
Relevance Category and the Signal Elements Category. 
I interpret concepts from General Systems Theory, including information and 
entropy, in a way that I believe facilitates their incorporation into philosophical 
discussion. I also explain various points arising from General Systems Theory, such as 
order and disorder, stability, complexity, and self-organisation, and show how ideas 
from these areas can be applied to certain philosophical problems. 
I explain relevance in terms of stability, in order to link these scientific 
perspectives to questions in moral philosophy. I suggest a possible physical foundation 
for a theory of morality, which takes the form of a variety of Utilitarianism, intended to 
balance the competing needs of open systems to manage entropy. Such a theory of 
morality must be capable of dealing with limitations arising from the physicality of 
information; I propose game theory as a solution to this problem. 
This thesis also covers issues connected to the above points regarding the nature 
of consciousness and communication. In particular, I examine the role of linguistic 
associations in consciousness; and some related features of language and other 
non-linear representational schemes. 
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“Unless the cold pierces through our bones once, how can 
we have the apricot blossoms perfuming the whole world?” 
 
Dōgen Zenji, Eihei Koroku §19 
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1. Introduction 
In “Energy systems and the unification of science”, the systems theorist Howard 
T. Odum wrote, “There has been for many years a crisis in Philosophy. Philosophy 
once claimed to be the most general of intellectual fields but lost that intellectual 
leadership of pure ideas, perhaps because its practitioners did not become quantitative 
or test their concepts against quantitative evaluations of the real world. General 
systems theories are a way of reuniting the fields that seek to generalize knowledge.” 
(1995:368). In this thesis, I propose to discuss some ideas taken from General Systems 
Theory in a way that makes them useful to certain questions in philosophy of 
consciousness, and morality. I hope thereby to help facilitate the rapprochement 
between science and philosophy that has been evident in recent years in areas such as 
neuroscience and physics. The main ideas that I will take from systems theory are the 
nature of complexity, stability and self-organisation, and the implications of the 
universe being a closed system. 
I will attempt to construct an explanatory scheme that starts from some of the 
most basic physical features of our universe and finishes with an approach to some 
abstract philosophical questions. Given the necessarily short length of this thesis, I will 
unfortunately be forced to sacrifice some detail in the description of the various 
elements of this scheme. However, these topics, which range from gravity to game 
theory, each have many hundreds of books devoted to them. I hope that brief 
explanations of each topic will therefore be sufficient as “signposts”, as I describe the 
overall shape of my approach to using systems theory to do philosophy. The intention 
is to point out some of the most useful topics in these subjects for doing philosophy. 
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1.1 What is General Systems Theory? 
General Systems Theory, as the name implies, is the study of the general features 
of systems. It is one way of studying how things interrelate. It looks at order and 
disorder, patterns, complexity, and change over time. 
Speaking generally, a system can be just about anything we can identify, analyse 
and discuss. A system is “any definable set of components.” (Maturana and Varela 
1980:138). The Internet is a system of computers connected together by cables, 
switches, and so forth; and all these elements can also be viewed independently as 
systems themselves. A glass bottle is a system made up of silicon dioxide molecules 
connected to form a certain shape; and a molecule can also be considered as a system. 
General Systems Theory (hereafter “systems theory”) provides mathematical and 
other conceptual frameworks for describing systems and their interaction. One 
common topic in systems theory is the way in which systems make use of energy to 
maintain themselves. 
“A system is a set of interrelated elements, each of which is related directly or 
indirectly to every other element, and no subset of which is unrelated to any other 
subset.” (Ackoff and Emery 1972:18). A collection of elements will be identified as a 
system in a particular context1, by specific observers. Language and behaviour both 
influence decisions on what to identify as a system. 
System theory has potential as a unifying scheme that is useful to those of us in 
other areas of knowledge because it provides ways to talk about the general features of 
how things interrelate. Systems theory has been applied to topics ranging from 
                                                     
1 The exception to the rule that systems are defined in a context is the largest possible system, which we 
call the universe. Although some physicists postulate the existence of a “multiverse”, containing many 
different universes (Smolin 1997, Rees 2001), I will not address such theories in this thesis, since they 
remain highly speculative. 
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cosmology to ecology to economics. The reason for this broad applicability, in my 
opinion, is that systems theory can quantify the fundamental physical features of our 
universe that we describe using terms such as energy, entropy, probability, and 
topology. This solid foundation in the physical gives systems theory great practical 
utility across many fields of study. 
1.2 A brief history of General Systems Theory 
Systems theory began as an attempt to better understand organic systems by 
applying ideas from physics and engineering, in the late 1920s. Over time, it was 
strongly influenced by the engineering discipline of control systems, as well as 
developments in thermodynamics and information theory, as well as topology. In 
recent years, systems theory has been much concerned with the nature of complex 
dynamical systems, including chaos theory and catastrophe theory. Systems theory has 
also been applied to economics, politics, sociology, psychology, management theory, 
and computing. 
The idea of open and closed systems was introduced in 1925 by the 
mathematician Alfred Lotka. However, it is the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy who 
is considered to be the “founder” of systems theory as a discipline (Kramer 1977:5). 
Other important names include inventor of the idea of homeostasis, physiologist 
Walter Cannon; cybernetics pioneer Norbert Wiener; Claude Shannon, who was one of 
the founders of information theory; H. T. Odum and Fritjof Capra in the field of 
ecology; and complexity theorist John H. Holland. More loosely associated writers 
include Noam Chomsky, who pioneered the idea of generative grammar; and 
self-organisation theorists James Lovelock, Stuart Kaufmann, and John von Neumann. 
Alan Turing’s writings on computability and morphogenesis have also been influential 
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in systems theory. Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
is also related to systems theory, emphasising the consequences of the physical aspects 
of the medium by which communication takes place. 
Systems theory is not a theory in the traditional sense of the word, as in “the 
theory of relativity”. Rather, it is a school of thought united by common concerns and 
tools of analysis, as are philosophy, sociology or psychology, for example. For that 
reason it is sometimes called “systems thinking” or “the systems approach”. The 
diverse writings on systems theory are united by the technique of using of concepts 
from thermodynamics, mathematics, and other “hard sciences” to provide rigour in 
other areas of investigation. In this thesis, I will not be offering any formal schemes 
such as ways of modelling dynamic processes, one common strategy of systems 
theorists. Rather, I will simply be trying to show connections between different ideas 
that fall within the rubric of systems theory, in order to draw attention their potential 
application to philosophical questions. 
1.3 A general overview of the structure of the thesis 
This thesis suggests a scheme involving three broad ways of categorising 
scientific and philosophical topics. The three categories are the Physical Category, the 
Relevance Category, and the Signal Elements Category. These three categories are not 
separate, but should be viewed as nested sets, with the Physical Category being the 
most comprehensive. Furthermore, the assignation of one topic or another to a 
particular category is to some extent a matter of personal preference. For example, 
information has a physical basis, but is also connected to topics that fall more naturally 
into the Relevance Category, since information can be relevant or irrelevant. The three 
categories will each be discussed in the next three chapters of this thesis. 
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This thesis, these three categories as concepts, and indeed systems theory itself, 
are classified in the Signal Elements Category. This leads to a certain degree of 
self-reference. I believe that it is a mistake to view this as problematic. Indeed, we 
should expect the issue of self-reference to arise many times in the course of this thesis, 
which is partly about the observation of observation. On the contrary, problems would 
be more likely to arise if we viewed this conceptual scheme as a “special case”, 
somehow qualitatively different from the other academic topics that it discusses. 
I will proceed to give a brief explanation of how these three categories are used. 
I will skip over various technical points rather quickly; the reader should proceed to 
the main text for further explanation. 
I should first make clear, although it may seem rather obvious, that this thesis is 
a linguistic construction intended to provide a useful way of addressing issues in 
philosophy and science. It is a form of communication in the traditional Western 
academic mode. However, this thesis includes discussion on the features of our 
subjective consciousness besides the linguistic. I wish to emphasise to the reader that 
the explanations that constitute this thesis are intended to be practical as well as 
conceptual, and to be applicable to understanding aspects of consciousness other than 
language and logic, although the thesis itself consists of nothing but language and 
logic. 
The problem of trying to discuss, through communication, the gap between 
communication and other aspects of consciousness is another example of 
self-reference. The topic of the apparent inability of communication to fully capture 
subjective experience will be one of the philosophical issues addressed in the course of 
this thesis. 
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1.3.1 The Physical Category 
The purpose of the Physical Category is to explore the consequences of the idea 
that the universe is a closed system; particularly the consequences for we observers 
within that closed system. Besides the consequences of inhabiting a closed system, the 
other major topic taken from systems theory in the discussion of the Physical Category 
is the idea of complexity. 
My explanation of the Physical Category is intended to be compatible with 
current cosmology, relativity theory, and quantum physics. It should also be 
compatible with theories of the “informational universe” as proposed by physicist 
John Wheeler and others. This compatibility is intended to provide a solid foundation 
for the later philosophical discussion. 
Two characteristics of closed systems that are important in the Physical 
Category are background independence (the absence of points of reference that are 
absolutely fixed for all observers), and the existence of limits to what an observer can 
know about the closed system that the observer inhabits. 
Perhaps the central idea of the Physical Category is the concept of probability. It 
is this emphasis on probability which allows the Physical Category to be compatible 
with quantum physics. I do not insist on what is known in quantum physics as 
“realism”, instead viewing reality as statistical, and my explanatory scheme therefore 
can cope with physicist John Bell’s discovery of reasons, stemming from what are 
known as “Bell’s Inequalities”, for thinking that quantum physics simply cannot be 
interpreted both realistically and as involving local causal determinism (Brooks 2007). 
Any philosophical scheme that hopes to incorporate the consequences of the universe 
being a closed system must be able to deal with problems of quantum uncertainty, 
which means incorporating probability as fundamental somewhere. 
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The description of the Physical Category starts with a probabilistic formulation 
of the concept of entropy, which is the general statistical tendency towards disorder, in 
systems for which probability is not significantly affected by gravity. The idea of 
entropy runs right through this thesis, touching on my discussion of stability in terms 
of probabilistic attractors; the nature of self-organisation; and the basis of morality. 
Entropy provides one of the main ways by which my physical explanations connect 
with my discussion of problems in philosophy. 
After entropy, my discussion of the Physical Category proceeds to the role of 
gravity, without the organising influence of which there could not be open systems 
(such as ourselves) within our closed-system universe. (An open system is one which 
takes in energy from its environment.) Although the concept of gravity is an important 
foundational one for the Physical Category, it is not directly related to issues in 
systems theory, and so is treated rather briefly. 
There follows a discussion of the concept of time, focussing particularly on the 
connection between observation in a closed system, and the arrow of time. Time 
obviously has an important correlation with the idea of probability, which is always 
assessed in a temporal context, being a way of specifying change. However, time, like 
gravity, is part of the background of the Physical Category, and is not discussed 
beyond the first chapter. 
The next section covers information, which I define as change measured by an 
observer at a particular location. Information can be relevant or irrelevant; but the 
basis of relevance cannot be fully explained until we reach the description of the 
Relevance Category. Information is a natural intersection of the Physical Category and 
Relevance Category, since while I agree with the systems-theory slogan “information 
is physical”, assessment of relevance of information depends on the situation of the 
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observer. This topic therefore looks ahead to some extent, to topics that will arise again 
in other contexts. The discussion of information mainly deals with the consequences 
of the closed-system universe: background independence, and horizons to knowledge 
for a given observer. 
The discussion of the Physical Category ends with a look at the origins of 
complexity. This section focuses on order and disorder, feedback and thresholds, 
nonlinearity, and the idea of stability.  
The discussion of stability begins with the concept of Self-Organised 
Criticalities (SOCs). SOCs arise in complex dynamic systems that contain many 
elements that bear some kind of threshold between different states, or in other words, 
elements that can move from one probabilistic attractor to another in what is known as 
“phase space”. These elements are arranged in a way that allows weak local feedback. 
The SOC system as a whole will tend to move back into a stable state after being 
disturbed: it lies within an attractor that allows metastability (stability where entropic 
probabilities have not yet been fully pursued, thanks to the existence of an open system 
at some point in the process by which the system was formed). An example is a 
mountainside prone to avalanches: having the right number of the right size rocks in 
the right proximity, etc. The threshold is provided by the coefficient of friction of 
individual rocks, while feedback is provided by physical contact. This is the simplest 
form of self-organisation. 
The next section covers more complex self-organisation, when different 
interacting subsystems are considered as elements of a larger system, which can 
achieve dynamic equilibriums. The interaction of the elements of this system allows it 
to remain stable, in a way that is more dynamic and robust than simple SOC systems. 
This provides the final foundation necessary to proceed to the Relevance Category. 
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1.3.2 The Relevance Category 
The central idea of the Relevance Category is stability, and particularly stability 
that arises from self-organisation. Most of the discussion in this chapter deals with the 
consequences of self-organisation. Self-organising systems are open systems, 
obtaining their energy ultimately from the effects of gravity, within the closed system 
of the universe as a whole. In this chapter, I give an outline of a way in which relevance 
as I have defined it, including game theory, can be used to provide a basis for a 
utilitarian system of morality which is compatible with a physical, closed-system 
universe. The Relevance Category begins with an examination of the connection 
between stability and relevance. 
The next section in the Relevance Category covers what I call entropy 
management, although this idea could equally be named “systems management”, 
“stability management”, or “probability management”. This discussion explains why 
entropy management is necessarily undertaken by all homeostatic systems, and the 
connection between entropy management and relevance. 
Complex dynamic systems allow for the possibility of game theory, the next 
topic in my description of the Relevance Category. Game theory results from a 
self-organising system recognising relevant information regarding other 
self-organising systems, in the course of competition for resources necessary for 
survival of the system. This permits the system to develop behaviour that improves its 
chances of survival. Game theory provides a way to quantify conflict and co-operation 
between processes that have different standards of relevance: the most important being 
immediate relevance to physical survival. 
I next discuss Dawkins’ idea of memes, which are subject to evolutionary 
pressures. I define memes as probabilistic attractors for behaviour, rather than as 
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abstract concepts linguistically expressed. One example of a meme is a word: but a 
specific word, such as “word”, is not a meme but an element within a wider 
behavioural system. Here again we run into issues of self-reference. The discussion of 
memes also continues in the next chapter. 
The final part of the Relevance Category chapter is an examination of some of 
the issues surrounding consciousness, which certainly has implications for the nature 
of observation as well as morality. 
1.3.3 The Signal Elements Category 
The Signal Elements Category is composed of particular types of memes 
(memes being behavioural attractors identified within an interconnected context) 
which are used for communication and other forms of expression by self-organising 
systems. I use the term “signal elements” to emphasise the point that any such form of 
communication, such as an English sentence, must exist as part of a broader system, 
from which it gains its meaning in a context of differentiation. The Signal Elements 
Category covers areas such as language, mathematics, logic, art, and music. I will 
begin discussion of this area with a brief explanation of the connections between 
memes, associations and grammar. 
The Signal Elements Category discussion also covers some of the limitations of 
language, with regard to dealing with complexity, the physical nature of information, 
and consciousness. For this third point, I take my cue from Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
The thesis concludes with some brief notes on possible applications to 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1963) and the Chinese Chan  禪  Buddhist literary 
tradition. 
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1.4 Geometry and topology 
Although I do not have the space to provide details in this thesis, the 
mathematical background of all of these ideas should be considered to be geometric, 
and in particular, topological. As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, Howard T. 
Odum sees systems theory as having an important role to play in unifying certain areas 
of knowledge. I certainly agree with this proposition, and it is the focus of this thesis. 
However, I believe geometry is the most basic technique by which these fields can be 
unified. This is because geometry explains the ways in which elements of systems can 
be connected or separated, and thereby the ways in which different systems can 
resemble each other, and is capable of maintaining this rigorous analysis for 
multi-dimensional systems that are extremely difficult to visualise. Geometrical 
mathematics can also provide a way of comparing the different classificatory schemes 
that systems theorists come up with. It is an important tool in constructing formal 
descriptions of nonlinear phenomena that resist such analysis due to their extreme 
complexity. 
If one abandons “realism” in quantum physics, observed reality is considered to 
be statistical, rather than absolute. Geometry, as a way of specifying possibilities, is 
able to cope with a statistical view of reality. It has therefore seen much use in quantum 
physics, and in particular, the attempt to reconcile quantum physics with relativity 
theory known as quantum gravity theory. One example is John Wheeler’s theory of 
geometrodynamics (Wheeler 1963), extended by physicist Christopher Isham into an 
attempt to do quantum gravity theory using topos theory, which grew out of topology 
(Matthews 2007). Geometry is important for loop quantum gravity and string theory, 
which make use of topos theory and knot theory (which is another aspect of topology) 
(Smolin 2000). 
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By incorporating probability, logic in topos theory is capable of dealing with 
horizons which limit the information that can be received by an observer at a given 
location (Smolin 2000:31). This is one topic found in my explanation of the Physical 
Category. Probability is also very significant in the discussion of order and disorder, 
feedback and nonlinearity, and metastability. 
Geometry is also important to the concept of multi-dimensional landscapes, 
which comes up many times in the course of this thesis, and which is a signature 
technique of systems theory. Examples include phase space (a geometric view of the 
possible states of a system), attractors (areas within phase space which direct probable 
change in a system, and which can allow a system to achieve stability), fitness 
landscapes (a geometric view of the game-theoretic competition of systems for 
survival), design space (a way of interrelating different functional strategies 
geometrically) and finally my explanation of the structured association of specific 
instances of behaviour involving memes used for communication (such as language 
and art). 
Although we visualise such abstract landscapes as two-dimensional surfaces 
with hills and valleys, in fact they have many more dimensions, often including a 
temporal dimension (the first three examples given have a temporal dimension, and 
the latter two do not). Topology can be used to describe possible movements across 
these multi-dimensional landscapes. 
1.4.1 Topology and topos theory 
Topology is one way of specifying what is possible and what is not for particular 
systems. As such, it has found practical use in areas as diverse as image compression 
and fluid dynamics. Topology is considered to have begun with Leonhard Euler’s 1736 
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answer to a mathematics problem known as “the Seven Bridges of Königsberg”. Two 
islands in a river are connected to the river banks and each other by seven bridges. 
Euler showed that it is not possible to walk a route across all seven of the Königsberg 
bridges that crosses each bridge only once. 
The exact shape of the islands and river banks is not relevant to this topological 
problem, although it would be relevant to determining the lengths of candidate paths. 
Topology deals with abstract maps that allow judgements of what is permitted by the 
connections or separations of elements in a system. For example, in topology a cube 
resembles a sphere, but a torus does not. If one imagines inflating the cube with air, it 
would become spherical; but inflating the torus with air would never result in a sphere. 
The cube is homeomorphic with the sphere: mathematical functions performed “on the 
surfaces” of the two shapes will be equivalent. The torus is not homeomorphic with the 
sphere. As it is inflated, the hole in the middle of the torus will become thinner, 
forming an infinitely thin singularity if the operation is performed using mathematics, 
rather than a rubber inner-tube. One could conceivably “cut the ends” of the singularity, 
and “patch them over”, creating a sphere. The mathematical process analogous to 
“filling shapes with air” is known as Ricci flow. 
Ordinary physical shapes are two-dimensional, in that we consider them in terms 
of surfaces. However, other systems can be made up of more than two dimensions, and 
topology can be applied to these systems also. One famous question in topology, 
known as the Poincaré conjecture, asked whether simple shapes in three dimensions 
were homeomorphic with a three-dimensional sphere, in the same way as for two 
dimensions. This question, which mathematicians have been working on for many 
decades, and for which a prize of one million dollars has been offered by the Clay 
Mathematics Institute, was recently answered in the affirmative (Mackenzie 2006). 
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Other questions involving possibility in topology include determining the 
minimum numbers of colours required to create maps showing the boundaries of 
distinct regions; and determining whether knotted loops can be untangled to form a 
simple circle, without cutting. A branch of topology known as Morse functions 
describes topological effects such as rising water turning two hills separated by a 
valley into separate islands. 
Topos theory is another way of determining what is possible for certain systems, 
but which focuses on sets or categories rather than shapes. It can therefore be used to 
unify topology with logic. Topos theory evolved out of set theory and forms part of 
category theory – toposes are different ways of specifying categories of sets. 
Mathematicians in the 1930s came to realise that many mathematical concepts could 
be described by using maps that preserved their basic structure (called morphisms), 
and that this enabled these concepts to be used independently from classical set theory. 
“Thus gradually arose the view that the essence of a mathematical structure is to be 
sought not in its internal constitution as a set-theoretical entity, but rather in the form of 
its relationship with other structures through the network of morphisms” (Bell 
1988:236). This enabled topos theory to be taken up in France by the structuralist 
Bourbaki school. John Bell goes on to say that “the category-theoretic meaning of a 
mathematical concept is determined only in relation to a ‘category of discourse’ which 
can itself vary. Thus the effect of casting a mathematical concept in category-theoretic 
terms is to confer a degree of ambiguity of reference on the concept” (Ibid:237). This 
gives mathematical concepts a kind of background independence, and Bell suggests 
that “the topos-theoretic interpretation of mathematical concepts bears the same 
relation to classical set theory as relativity theory does to classical physics” (Ibid:242). 
Indeed, as mentioned above, physicists such as Fotini Markopoulou and Chris Isham 
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use topos theory in their attempts to unify quantum physics with relativity theory (the 
latter having background independence). 
Although the mathematical details of geometry, topology and topos theory are 
not directly relevant to this thesis, I do wish to emphasise in this introduction that 
many of the ideas here have applicability to geometrical mathematics. I believe that 
this contributes to the solid physical foundation that is one of the advantages of using 
systems theory as a way of approaching philosophy. I should anticipate that a more 
thorough fleshing-out of the conceptual scheme that I present in this thesis would have 
recourse to these aspects of mathematics and logic. 
For example, besides the use of topology in determining possibilities of 
movement across multi-dimensional abstract landscapes such as phase space, I 
consider that topology has an important role to play in explaining the functional 
mapping we use to create abstract conceptual schemes such as the rules of a sport, or a 
satire, parody or caricature, or a computer game like a flight simulator. Guerino 
Mazzola undertakes an exhaustive study of the geometric logic of music theory and 
performance in his book “The Topos of Music” (2000). Topology can be used for 
transformations of one system into another with different dimensions, like Fourier 
transformations that allow the sounds of an orchestra to be represented in the groove of 
a record, or the “holographic theory” in cosmology, which postulates that it is not 
necessarily possible for an observer in a closed-system universe to be sure of how 
many dimensions that universe possesses (this is discussed in the next chapter). Indeed, 
the most important feature of geometric mathematics and logic, for my purposes, is 
that they are capable of dealing with the implications of the universe as a closed 
system, such as background independence and horizons to the propagation of 
information. 
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1.4.2 Topology and information flow 
Topology, as a way of exploring the implications of connectedness and 
separation of the elements that make up a system, provides a means for modelling the 
possibilities of information flow. (Information being defined in this thesis in terms of 
change.) Since it has become possible in recent years to use topology to do logic, one 
may also say that logic can be seen as a way of modelling information flow. 
In this thesis, I adopt the physicalist position that to say something exists implies 
that there is some physical foundation to that existence. For example, although I do not 
maintain that brain processes (such as neural activity) and consciousness (such as 
awareness of a speeding car) can usefully be described as identical, still I believe that 
consciousness of the speeding car is founded upon physical changes occurring within 
the nervous system. To put it another way, the existence, in good working order, of the 
physical system that we call the nervous system (and potentially other physical 
systems, such as muscle fibres and other aspects of the environment with which the 
system is connected) is sufficient for consciousness to arise; but that being said, the 
above-mentioned systems are things that we are aware of, on the basis of information 
transfer. The attempt to observe the faculty of observation runs into difficulties of 
self-reference. 
I hold that information is physical: information, according to my definition, 
involves change propagating through physical systems and being measured by an 
observer at a particular location. (I will provide details on this assertion below. Here I 
will note that “observer” does not necessarily mean “conscious observer”.) 
Propagation of change implies some form of connectedness. If two elements of a 
system or systems are not connected in any way, then it is obviously the case that they 
cannot influence each other. If the elements are connected, then it is possible (but not 
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necessary) that change in one can lead to change in the other. 
This is not to rule out the possibility of action at a distance, although I do not 
hold much hope for experimental proof of that phenomenon. Regardless, if change in 
one system can lead to change in another, then there must be some way in which the 
two are connected. Otherwise it makes little sense to talk of causation. This is an 
important principle for physicalism. 
The question of whether a tangled, interlaced loop of string can be transformed 
into a simple circular loop without cutting is a typical question in topology. One can 
characterise this question in terms of the physical possibilities of change to propagate 
through the system. But topology is not restricted to describing simple physical shapes. 
It can be used to analyse similarities in the possibilities of information flow among 
systems that are diverse in their physical shape, or in the number of dimensions that 
they inhabit. Topology can be used to abstract the possible courses of information flow 
without taking account of physical aspects of the system that go beyond connectedness 
and separation. This allows the possibility of simulation, or modelling, which is vitally 
important in game theory. 
Topology is accordingly also relevant in determinations of the extent to which 
two systems are independent of each other. If neither of two systems can influence the 
other, they can be considered independent. For example, solar systems existing in 
regions that have been out of contact since the Big Bang would be completely 
independent. Two anthills on either side of the Earth should be independent for all 
practical purposes, although the two physical systems (made up of ants and dirt) would 
experience a tiny amount of mutual gravitational attraction. 
One could also perhaps make a case that the topological properties of connection 
and separation provide a physical basis for instantiating binary integers (bits) of 
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information: the answer to a “yes or no” question, for example. This is an important 
concept in information theory. 
1.4.3 The meaning of “statistical” 
This thesis often uses the words “statistical” and “statistical mechanics”. These 
terms should be taken as referring to the presence of probability in any kind of change. 
Statistical mechanics derives from the physicality of information (propagation of 
information requires change). 
Topology describes certain aspects of the possibility of change, while probability 
refers to the likelihood of certain specific changes occurring. Probability is the 
characterisation of the combined effects of many physical changes influencing each 
other, according to their topology, including physical factors like gravity and other 
forces.2 
It is possible for systems to get into states where the combined physical 
probabilities of the system lead to stability. Rather like a leaf on a stream being pulled 
into a vortex, a certain range of similar states of the system may tend to persist. This 
may lead to disorder, such as the dispersal of a cloud of gas. Indeed, disorder is 
(generally speaking) more probable within the closed-system universe than order, 
according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics: if one threw a hundred dice, one 
would be surprised if they all came up with the same number. 
However, other attractors are possible, in which there is a higher degree of order. 
A cloud of gas in outer space will tend to contract through the action of gravity. A 
person sitting on a well-made chair, experiencing steady gravity, will probably not fall 
                                                     
2 One way of describing this is the idea known as quantum decoherence. This refers to the interaction of 
the statistical probabilities of particles, rather like many ripples inter-combining on a pond. (Albrecht 
2001). This is one way of solving the famous problem of “Schrödinger’s cat” (Zurek 2003). 
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over. A brick wall will tend to stay in its well-ordered state. Except for the example of 
gas contracting under gravity, these unlikely states will tend to have been arrived at by 
the creation of greater disorder elsewhere. They are called open systems, because 
energy is entering into them from the outside, which is permitting alteration of 
probabilities. The smaller the system, however, the more likely the appearance of 
order at random. It is not so unusual to throw two dice and get doubles. 
To give another example, it is statistical mechanics that makes the game of golf 
possible. A long shot will be more difficult to direct precisely than a short shot, 
generally speaking. The influence of wind and other factors adds up over time, and 
small initial errors in the trajectory or spin of the ball become progressively larger. If 
statistical mechanics did not apply, and somehow the ball always entered the hole in 
one shot, no-one would play golf; indeed, the game never would have been invented. 
Human activity is necessarily aimed at managing probability, in some respect. If 
probability cannot or need not be managed, there is no motive for action. 
When the terms “statistical” or “statistical mechanics” appear in this thesis, this 
is the general intention of those terms. I am referring to the emergence of probability 
for the system in question from the combined effects of changes in the system and its 
environment. These terms should not be taken as implying the exclusion of models 
that do not use points; statistical mechanics is possible using waves or fields, for 
example. No absolute background is required for statistical mechanics, as I intend the 
term. This is required for full compatibility with relativity theory and quantum field 
theory (which use fields instead of points). 
1.4.4 Quantum Darwinism 
Some ideas in this philosophical scheme are similar to those in the recent school 
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of thought known as “Quantum Darwinism”. (See for example Blume-Kohout and 
Zurek 2006, 2007). However, I have arrived at a position similar to Quantum 
Darwinism by starting from a philosophical perspective, rather than a quantum 
mechanical one. I only became aware of this similarity in the final stages of this thesis, 
after its content had been finalised. However, I had been influenced by some of the 
earlier writings on quantum decoherence of the main proponent of Quantum 
Darwinism Wojciech Zurek, former student of John Wheeler (one of the founders of 
quantum physics). 
Quantum decoherence uses the idea of einselection, short for “superselection by 
the environment”. Superselection, in this interpretation, is the transition from quantum 
probabilities to classical probabilities (the issue highlighted by the thought experiment 
“Schrödinger’s cat”). “The principle of superposition applies only when the quantum 
system is closed. When the system is open, interaction with the environment results in 
an incessant monitoring of some of its observables. As a result, pure states turn into 
mixtures that rapidly diagonalize in the einselected states… Their predictability is key 
to the effective classicality” (Zurek, 2003:729). 
Quantum Darwinism takes the principles of statistical mechanics down to the 
quantum level. “To exist, a state must, at the very least, persist or evolve predictably in 
spite of the immersion of the system in its environment. Predictability is the key to 
einselection” (Zurek 2007:24). This selection can be compared with the genetic 
algorithms used in biology. “Some quantum states are resilient to decoherence. This is 
the basis of einselection. Using Darwinian analogy, one might say that [einselected] 
states are most ‘fit’. They survive monitoring by the environment to leave 
‘descendants’ that inherit their properties… Save for classical dynamics, (almost) 
nothing happens to these einselected states, even though they are immersed in the 
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environment.” (Zurek 2003:718). 
My approach defines some terms differently. For example, Zurek follows 
information theory conventions that define information in terms of order and entropy 
in terms of loss of information to disorder. In this thesis, I define information as change 
measured at a location by an observer, without reference to the level of order of that 
change; and entropy as change in a system according to statistical mechanics, which 
will be a tendency towards disorder, broadly speaking, discounting the effects of 
gravity. I further divide information into relevant and irrelevant information for the 
observer: ordered information will tend more towards relevance than disordered 
information, in a functional context. (For example, speech tends more to relevance 
than white noise, in most situations.) Details on the concept of relevance are given in 
the next chapter. My definition of objectivity is also slightly different to Zurek’s: I 
define objectivity in terms of functionality, while Zurek uses agreement among 
independent observers. The two definitions are quite similar, however, and I am 
pleased to have found some support for my way of thinking in Quantum Darwinism, 
albeit at a late stage in writing this thesis. I will return to the topic of objectivity below. 
1.4.5 Classification of topics on a topological basis 
My three categories of the Physical Category, Relevance Category and Signal 
Elements Category can be considered as sets of ideas defined according to the aspects 
of systems theory that each addresses. 
The Physical Category is mostly concerned with explaining the physical basis of 
probability and the flow of information, and so mostly contains ideas relating to 
physics in some way. These ideas are also connected with explanations of how 
complexity comes about in the first place. The Physical Category also covers the 
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mathematics of order and disorder (the right balance of the two being necessary for 
complexity), thresholds (the edges of attractors that move a system from one phase to 
another) , feedback and nonlinearity. 
The Relevance Category is for ideas that relate to the consequences of stability, 
especially metastability (the persistence of a system that is relatively unlikely in terms 
of the degree of order of its components, like a table or a whirlpool; being due to the 
action of an open system, or possibly chance, for very small systems). Of examples of 
metastability, the Relevance Category is particularly concerned with homeostatic 
systems. Homeostatic systems are self-organising systems that are robustly stable due 
to the combined interaction of many sub-systems. Homeostatic systems are 
necessarily so large that they must always owe their order to their being open systems. 
There is no possibility of a homeostatic system arriving fully formed through chance. 
It will either arise from evolution of some kind, or be arranged by another open system 
(for example, a computer programmer creating a homeostatic simulation of the ups 
and downs of fox and rabbit populations). The Relevance Category also covers game 
theory, which is a way of looking at the interactions of stable systems as they compete 
for resources to achieve various goals. 
The Signal Elements Category covers the relationship between the structure of 
stable systems and communication between them. I take the position that 
communication per se first arose in a game-theoretic context of functional strategies in 
the course of evolutionary survival. Through homeomorphism, it is possible for 
organisms to model systems in the environment abstractly, in many different ways, and 
to use relevant information from those models to direct their behaviour. These abstract 
systems of representation can be used for communication in a game-theoretic context, 
but they are not necessarily tied to whatever it is they were first used to represent, and 
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their structure can evolve independently through association and extrapolation in the 
context of their own internal logic. This is especially true for we humans, whose 
consciousness is very much concerned with collation of different modes of 
representation. 
Different formal schemes can interact and enter into a feedback relationship: and 
formal schemes and practical goals can also develop feedback, with the evolution of a 
formal scheme resulting in changes in practical goals, and vice versa. For example, 
scattering of photons from objects provides a flow of detailed information on the 
current disposition of the environment. It is often relevant to be able to distinguish 
different wavelengths of light, leading to recognition of colour in the course of 
biological evolution. (The Signal Elements Category is a subset of the Relevance 
Category.) There may then follow an evolutionary process that results in organisms 
using the ability to recognise colour to signal danger or suitability for mating, or to 
send other relevant information. As colour develops its own system of associations, a 
shade of blue might come to represent for the right observer a particular era of French 
interior design; and for a synaesthetic person, the grammar of colour association may 
interact with that of numbers, enabling great feats of mental calculation 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard 2003). 
Formal schemes within the Signal Elements Category are capable of nonlinearity, 
which is essential for useful description of the nonlinear phenomena when constantly 
encounter. For example, an infinite number of different sentences could theoretically 
be constructed using a language with a finite number of words. However, perfect 
description of physical phenomena is rendered impossible by the nature of information, 
due to factors such as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and the extreme complexity 
of nonlinear, multidimensional systems. 
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As mentioned above, this thesis falls into the Signal Elements Category. 
However, I will leave further discussion of this point until that chapter is reached. 
1.4.6 Specific relation to other areas of philosophy 
Topics discussed in the Physical Category will be of interest primarily to 
metaphysicians. Those in the Relevance Category relate to mainly to philosophy of 
morality, and philosophy of mind. Topics in the Signal Elements Category (including 
the self-referential topic of “what is it to classify topics?”) are relevant to a number of 
branches of philosophy, including logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of art, 
philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of music, and philosophy of science. 
One aim of this thesis is to begin to explain a way of unifying these diverse areas 
of philosophy with each other and with science. Philosophy that takes relativity theory, 
quantum physics and systems theory into account ought to thereby gain robustness and 
explanatory power. For example, a philosophy of time that can incorporate the concept 
of space-time ought to be more useful than one that cannot. Having a good theory of 
how complexity works helps understand and explain the physical basis of the topics in 
the Relevance Category and Signal Elements Category. 
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2. The Physical Category 
Physics doesn’t tell us how nature is; it only tells us what we can say about 
nature. 
Markus Aspelmeyer (Brooks 2007:33) 
 
The Physical Category contains topics such as entropy, probability, order and 
disorder, gravity, time, information and complexity. Of these topics, perhaps only time 
is a traditional topic of philosophy, at least from the Classical period to the end of the 
nineteenth century. But the middle of the nineteenth century saw two developments 
that were to revolutionise science: thermodynamics and the theory of evolution by 
natural selection. Thermodynamics permitted relativity and quantum physics, while 
Darwin’s theory led to modern biology, as well as to other applications of the basic 
principle, such as game theory and expert systems (neural networks and other control 
systems capable of learning). Systems theory attempts to incorporate both of these 
branches of modern science, by basing principles of organisation on a physical 
foundation. Using systems theory to do philosophy means accepting some form of 
physicalism, although one need not adopt what Daniel Dennett pejoratively labels 
“greedy reductionism” (1995). 
One of the most important foundations of the Physical Category is that the 
universe is a closed system; and that our existence within that system should be taken 
account of when attempting to explain both direct observation and formal models. 
This allows the Physical Category to include topics in relativity theory and quantum 
physics. 
Indisputable proof that the universe is a closed system is difficult to find. 
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Physicist Lee Smolin, one of the founders of Loop Quantum Gravity, speaks plainly: 
he defines the universe as “all there is”, then says that “the first principle of cosmology 
must be ‘There is nothing outside the universe’” (Smolin 2000:17). He goes on to say, 
“This first principle means that we take the universe to be, by definition, a closed 
system. It means that the explanation for anything in the universe can only involve 
other things that also exist in the universe”. There is more to the question of whether 
the universe is a closed system than Smolin lets on, but in the end I agree with his 
formulation. 
In relativity theory, things are much simpler if the topology of the universe is 
finite, yet unbounded (as the surface of a ball is, for example), as Einstein pointed out 
as early as 1917 in “Cosmological Considerations on the General Theory of 
Relativity”. However, the global topology of the universe is undetermined in general 
relativity theory: “…since the Einstein gravitational field equations are differential 
equations, they only constrain the local properties of space-time but not the global 
structure of the Universe at large” (Aurich 2005:1). The overall topology of the 
universe “depends on the way the total energy density of the Universe may 
counterbalance the kinetic energy of the expanding space” (Luminet 2006:107). There 
are three possibilities: we may live in a flat universe; it may curve like a sphere or a 
similar shape such as a dodecahedron (this is called a closed universe, not to be 
confused with the closed system universe); or it may be hyperbolic, as is a saddle with 
a saddlehorn (this is called an open universe, but likewise does not imply an open 
system). Of the three possibilities, only the closed universe need be finite. In terms of 
geometry, “flat (Euclidean) or negatively curved (hyperbolic) spaces can have finite or 
infinite volumes, depending on their degree of connectedness” (Luminet 2006:108). 
Scientific research based on astronomical data has not given a conclusive result as to 
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the topology of the universe, although if it is curved positively or negatively, it seems 
the curvature is not strong. According to some cosmologists, the wavelengths of 
density fluctuations in the temperature of the cosmic microwave background radiation, 
as measured by the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP), are not 
compatible with an infinite universe (Luminet et. al 2003). 
If the universe is finite, we can be confident that it is a closed system, with no 
energy entering or leaving. If infinite, the question becomes more difficult: perhaps the 
regress that arises in observing observation might somehow cease to be a problem. But 
in any case, our universe is effectively finite for observers within it. The observable 
universe is finite, given the relativistic constraint that information has only had a 
limited amount of time to propagate since the Big Bang.3 Going beyond the observable 
universe, it seems that a finite, unbounded universe is the most likely, from 
astronomical observation; but regardless, for we observers the universe is certainly a 
closed system, and so Smolin’s formulation is acceptable. 
The closed system universe has various implications. An observer within a 
closed system, who is part of the system being observed, can never completely 
describe the whole system. The universe is always observed from a particular context. 
Knowledge requires physical propagation of change from an event to an observer, 
which takes time. Formal models can serve as guides to observation, but we should 
remember that such systems can include assumptions of perfect knowledge that are not 
in fact possible. Smolin gives two further principles: “that every observable in a theory 
of cosmology should be measurable by some observer inside the universe, and all 
mathematical constructions necessary to the formulation of the theory should be 
                                                     
3  Some cosmologists believe it is possible that the observable universe is larger than the universe itself 
(Luminet et. al 2003). This could be the case if parts of a finite universe have had time to cover its whole 
volume, like an ant walking around a soccer ball and arriving back where it began. 
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realizable in a finite time by a computer that fits inside the universe” (2000a). These 
formulations for cosmology are compatible with the idea in information theory that 
“information is physical”, as described for example by Rolf Landauer (1991). Physical 
constraints on information propagation are one way in which the closed nature of the 
universe has consequences for observation. 
This approach can be traced back to Hugh Everett’s idea of the relative state 
(1957), which led to the “many worlds” interpretation of quantum physics (1957). It 
has been further developed by physicists such as Carlo Rovelli in his relational 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (1996) and Wojciech Zurek in his explanation of 
quantum decoherence (2003), as well as appearing in the approach to quantum gravity 
theory of Smolin and associates such as Chris Isham (2000). 
These constraints placed upon observation by the closed system universe will 
recur throughout this thesis. 
2.1 Entropy 
Much as we expect that, under normal circumstances, when we drop a stone it 
will fall downwards, so we also expect that if we drop a hot stone into a bowl of cold 
water, the stone will cool down, and the surrounding water will heat up. As descent of 
the stone is due to gravity, so the warming of the water is thanks to entropy: that is to 
say, entropy is the term that scientists use when measuring such processes. The term 
was coined by the physicist Rudolf Clausius in 1865, the rise of steam power in the 
nineteenth century having increased scientific interest in the dissipation of heat. 
The first step on the road to the scientific concept of entropy was Gottfried 
Leibniz’s investigation in the late seventeenth century into what was later called the 
conservation of kinetic energy, for which he used the term “vis viva”, or living force. 
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These theories were refined over the years, and vis viva was replaced by the term 
“energy” early in the nineteenth century. Although the term “energy” is difficult to 
define in a concrete way (for example, one can define energy with reference to work, 
and then define work with reference to energy), it came to be a useful component of 
scientific theory through the discovery that there is a measurable property (called 
“energy”) that remains constant when any change occurs. The two broadest categories 
of energy are kinetic energy, which is associated with movement, and potential energy, 
which is associated with the distance between things that are connected by a force such 
as gravity. (The general theory of relativity succeeds in bringing overall unity to these 
seemingly disparate concepts of energy.) Dropping a stone starts a conversion of 
potential energy to kinetic energy. One might define energy as the capacity to cause 
change. 
By the 1840s, these investigations had resulted in what came to be called the first 
law of thermodynamics, that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. To return to 
my earlier example of a stone heating water, first the stone must itself be heated, 
perhaps by burning wood, which has stored energy in the course of its growth, 
essentially from the sun, which itself owes its energy to gravity. In the course of this 
process, no energy is created nor destroyed. However, energy is constantly being 
dissipated. That is to say, the transfer of energy is never perfectly efficient. We make 
use of this dissipation in warming the cold water with the hot stone; but when we 
earlier heated the stone on the wood fire, a great deal of the energy of the fire would 
have been dissipated into the cold air, and hence unavailable for our purpose of heating 
the water. Study of this inefficiency, spurred by the demands of steam power, 
eventually led to the introduction and acceptance of the term “entropy”. 
At around the same time as the conservation of energy and the inefficiency of 
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energy transfer were pinned down scientifically, it was discovered that heat is a kinetic 
process, related to the movement of the molecules. This meant that the dissipation of 
energy into heat (which is to say, increasing disorder following entropic probability) 
could be described in terms of statistical mechanics, and entropy came to be much 
better understood, its definition became much broader, and entropy became applicable 
to topics outside of the behaviour of heat. 
This is not to say that one can unquestioningly rely on traditional statistical 
mechanics concepts like “temperature is mean kinetic energy”. That formulation is 
useful at a particular scale: it is very suitable for purposes such as building steam 
engines. In the philosophical scheme which I am outlining here, “statistical 
mechanics” is ultimately founded on the idea of quantum decoherence. (For an 
excellent overview of the connection, please see Zurek 2003.) 
2.1.1 Measuring entropy 
The abstract nature of the concept of energy might be seen as a potential problem. 
It seems to have a certain vagueness about its definition, which seems also to be the 
case for the definitions of entropy and information. All are defined in different ways in 
different scientific disciplines, yet this lack of consensus does not seem to cause any 
practical disadvantage in any of the three cases. In fact, the vagueness in all three 
definitions results from butting up against limitations inherent in the process or 
activity of measurement. Energy was discovered as a constant figure that was 
conserved through various changes in measured phenomena. When measured, it is 
always abstracted from some actual phenomenon. Energy might be said to be a 
behavioural characteristic of what is being measured. It must have a context, and a 
measurement of its level at a particular instant (translated into arbitrary units) is useful 
31 
for many purposes, but not wholly descriptive of that context. Much the same can be 
said for entropy and information, as I will mention later. In this thesis, I will not be 
focussing on the measurement and mathematics of these concepts, but rather I will be 
looking at contexts and consequences. 
In my view, a formula represents a mathematical perspective with many hidden 
assumptions. That is not to say formulae are useless. Indeed, “a useless formula” is 
probably an oxymoron. Formulae always have specific uses, even if only as elements 
in larger theories, or as a provisional way of getting at some ill-understood 
phenomenon. That is precisely why a formula represents a certain perspective, and the 
assumptions of that perspective are often hidden and hard to extract. For example, one 
definition of entropy is heat over temperature. That definition is very useful in 
calculating heat flow, but threatens a very long and unproductive diversion if one were 
to fully describe the perspective it represents. 
2.1.2 Entropy and probability 
That said, I do wish to make use of one formula straight away, because the 
perspective that it represents is useful to my argument. 
It was Ludwig Boltzmann who first had the insight that entropy was related to 
probability. One of his best known formulae (it is carved on his tombstone) is S = k log 
W. S stands for entropy, and W stands for the number of ways a system can be arranged. 
k is a tiny constant to balance out W, which is usually an enormous number, thanks to 
the complexity of most actual systems. The log is required because S is additive while 
W is multiplicative (see von Baeyer 2004:96), but I have a suspicion that the log may 
be related to what is known as the Bekenstein Bound, the association of entropy with 
surface area that is used in the physics of black holes (I will return to this topic in 
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section 2.4.5.2.7). 
What this means is that in the case of the hot stone in cold water, at the system 
formed by the boundary of the stone and the water, there are a lot more ways for the 
system to have an even temperature than to have an extreme difference of temperature, 
much in the way that seven is the most likely number to total when throwing two dice. 
Ways where the system loses heat (energy of molecule movement) on the cold side and 
gains it on the hot side are even fewer. Therefore, over time, the stone and the water 
will tend to come to an equilibrium, with no obvious heat difference, barring outside 
interference. Hence the second law of thermodynamics: the entropy of a closed system 
tends to increase towards a maximum. 
Note the immediate entry of the term “time” into the discussion. Entropy and 
time are closely related, as I will discuss in section 2.3.1. Entropy can be measured in 
various units (even bits, the unit of information), but it is always measured in a 
physical and temporal context. The concept of entropy shares with energy and 
information a necessity for a specific context of measurement, and this limits the 
philosophical usefulness of the diverse techniques for measuring entropy numerically. 
Entropy is not a thing, but a tendency, or, as I put it in the case of energy, a behavioural 
characteristic of what is being measured. 
The probabilistic nature of entropy means that the second law of 
thermodynamics is not quite as iron-clad as the first. Given a very small system, it is 
possible for entropy to decrease spontaneously. But for the overwhelming majority of 
systems, the chances of entropy spontaneously decreasing are so incredibly small as to 
make the law inviolable for all practical purposes. 
Boltzmann’s formula is an idealisation. The number of ways a system can be 
arranged is another way of referring to the “phase space” of the system. But what is 
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clear in mathematics is not so clear in the physical world. We can detail the phase 
space of a mathematical model of a system, but if we try to write down all the states of 
an actual physical system, we will run into limits such as quantum uncertainty. The 
phase space of a physical system is always an abstraction: not only are some possible 
phases never instantiated physically, but we cannot be absolutely sure which phases 
have been instantiated, and therefore if it makes sense to talk of “instantiation” at all. Is 
that not giving undue priority to the model over the physical? 
2.1.3 Entropy and order 
Entropy can be characterised in terms of increased disorder, at least when the 
action of gravity on the system is sufficiently small. When a hot stone is dropped into 
cold water, creating a system with one area of very high heat and one area of very low 
heat, that system was more ordered than as it will end up after being left for an hour. 
And in classical information theory, entropy is associated with signal noise, which can 
be seen as a form of disorder (although noise and disorder are not identical, in my 
view), and information is measured as the log of signal to noise, in bits. 
We know order when we see it: a child would say that a brick wall was more 
ordered than a clutter of strewn bricks. But how do we describe it in technical terms? 
And what is the connection between probability and order? A brick wall is more likely 
to become a pile of bricks as time passes, rather than the opposite: hence our efforts to 
preserve historic buildings.  
When we see order, we can make an assumption that somehow the second law of 
thermodynamics is being circumvented. In other words, that energy has entered or is 
entering the system from the outside. When we see a brick wall, we can assume that 
someone built it, and when we see a snowflake, we also look for energy coming in and 
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being put to work through some process (self-organisation, in that case). 
The best way to describe order is in terms of patterning. Patterning is one of the 
major topics of this thesis. Here I will simply say that pattern is related to the ease of 
describing the relationship among a given set of elements. 
Ease of description is another way of putting the idea of informational 
compressibility. This compressibility is of great practical utility to living things, and 
has an important role in many inanimate processes, also. 
Order is less likely than disorder, for systems where the effect of gravity can be 
ignored, and also barring outside interference. As the heat of the stone dissipates into 
the water, the system loses its simple pattern of a hot area surrounded by a cold area, it 
becomes more disordered, and we know less about the precise situation of the 
molecules making up the system. Conversely, few of the possible ways of arranging a 
pile of bricks result in a wall. If the wall is extremely well-ordered in its construction, 
with every brick edge aligned with many others, there are even fewer ways the bricks 
could be arranged. 
To put the point in more abstract terms: If one assumes a system made up of 
many individual elements, which are randomly shuffled at regular intervals, over time 
there will be relatively few states that are relatively easy to describe. Disorder will be 
more common than regular patterning. Therefore, when we see order, we are fairly 
safe in making the assumption that energy has entered the system somehow, and has 
been used to alter this probability. 
We can also assume that, when we see order, it has been obtained at the expense 
of creating disorder elsewhere. The workers putting up the wall will have eaten food 
and given off heat in the course of their labours. As with heating a stone in a fire, the 
35 
transfer of energy is always inefficient. Given that the universe is a closed system, its 
overall entropy should be increasing towards a maximum. Nonetheless, within a 
limited area the second law of thermodynamics has been circumvented, since we are 
looking at an open system rather than a closed one. This localised management of 
entropy is the basis of life. 
2.1.4 Conceptual problems with entropy 
When Boltzmann formulated his concept of entropy in terms of the number of 
ways a system can be arranged, he also associated entropy with our lack of knowledge 
of the state of a system. It appeared to Boltzmann that the more we know about a 
system, the more we know what will happen to it, and that this reduces the number of 
ways in which the system can be arranged. As we come to know more about a system, 
the entropy of that system would therefore decrease. 
This approach is also found in classical information theory, in which maximum 
entropy implies minimum information. If we identify information with order and 
entropy with disorder, the noisier a signal becomes, the less information it can convey 
to us. As noise increases, we know less about what is going on. 
This element of subjectivity raises serious problems for information theory. How 
can a property of a system go up or down according to our knowledge of it? And if we 
are investigating noise on a signal line, and send an arbitrary, regular signal pulse and 
pay attention to the noise surrounding it, has noise magically become information and 
information become noise? If the noise is ordered in some way (perhaps chaotically), 
is it still noise? Can noise have its own noise if its ordering is not perfectly regular? 
The classical definition of information in terms of communication of meaningful 
signals, originally proposed by one of the founders of modern information theory, 
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Claude Shannon, has been superseded by broader, more useful definitions. It is much 
too simplistic to identify information with order, and to view entropy (the tendency 
towards disorder in closed systems) as its enemy. In my view, both aspects of this 
problem of subjectivity arise from putting too much faith in numerical measurement. 
Entropy should not be thought of as a property, but as a tendency within a specific 
context. The above problems directly relate to the nature of information and 
observation. I will look at limitations due to the nature of information later in this 
thesis. 
2.1.5 Summary 
A hot stone is dropped into cold water. As time passes, the overall state of the 
system tends towards a uniform-temperature equilibrium, thanks to statistical 
mechanics. The system becomes more disordered and harder to describe, because 
information describing the system cannot be so easily compressed. A group of workers 
assembles a wall. If we choose to look at the system consisting of the bricks, then we 
observe a system moving farther from equilibrium, becoming more ordered. The wall 
is in a “metastable” state, with its components arranged with a degree of order that is 
extremely unlikely to have been arrived at randomly. 
This is how things behave in our universe, and the reasons for this behaviour are 
to be found in cosmology. The essential points that I wish to emphasise at this juncture 
are the relationship between entropy, probability and disorder; and the relationship 
between order, patterning and informational compressibility. 
If energy can be defined as the capacity to cause change, then entropy might be 
defined as the greater probability for that change to result in disorder, in a closed 
system, with caveats on the influence of gravity. However, living things and inanimate 
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processes often increase order within limited boundaries, although in the wider context 
order will be sacrificed elsewhere. The ultimate reason that order increases in parts of 
our universe is to be found in the nature of patterning, and the source of the energy that 
permits it is gravity. 
2.2 Gravity 
Gravity has been identified by Albert Einstein as the curvature of space-time. As 
the physicist John Wheeler famously put it, “Matter tells space how to curve, space 
tells matter how to move”, which may perhaps bring to mind the division of energy 
into the broad categories of potential energy and kinetic energy. In quantum field 
theory, gravity can also be explained in terms of the action of theoretical particles 
called gravitons. However, this explanation breaks down at very small distances, and 
there are currently at least three competing theories addressing the subsequent 
problem of quantum gravity. In this thesis I will not venture very deeply into scientific 
explanations of gravity, but rather look at the connections between gravity and 
entropy. 
Does a cloud of gas floating in space have high entropy or low entropy? On the 
one hand, it is disordered: the molecules are randomly distributed, and detailing their 
arrangement on a fine scale would take a lot of information, more than a system of the 
same size consisting of a regular lattice of gold atoms, for which the description could 
be more easily compressed. One might therefore say it has a high entropy. On the other 
hand, the gas has a uniform temperature, and on this broader scale is therefore easy to 
describe. As for the ways in which it can be arranged, over time it will be acted upon 
by gravity, and become more ordered, perhaps even becoming a cluster of stars. It is 
therefore not in equilibrium (it is likely to change its arrangement) and one might say it 
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has a low entropy for that reason. 
In most examples, such as the hot stone in cold water, we can simply leave 
gravity out of the picture, since its influence on small systems is so weak. At larger 
scales, it becomes more significant, which has consequences for numerical 
measurement of entropy in the course of scientific investigation. We could therefore 
redefine entropy for gravitating systems, with a disordered state being seen as low 
entropy, and a denser, more ordered state as high entropy. 
There seems to be some theoretical confusion here, but this is just another 
example of the effect of choices made when deciding what properties of a system to 
take into account. The ways in which a system is likely to become arranged (its 
entropic tendency) are vitally dependent on the specific properties of the system under 
consideration, but for practical purposes the gravitational properties of many systems 
can be ignored. When we find we must take gravity into account, since it has a 
significant influence on the ways a system is likely to become arranged, our 
conception of entropy must take account of that. 
Scientists know from observation that the cosmic microwave background 
radiation left over from the Big Bang is in equilibrium (maximum entropy), if gravity 
is ignored. However, when gravity is included, the consensus among physicists such as 
Roger Penrose (1979) and Paul Davies (1999:62) is that one should say the universe 
began in a state of low entropy. This preserves the second law of thermodynamics: the 
action of gravity has not decreased the entropy of the closed system of the universe, 
but increased it. The reasons for this initial low-entropy state are debated. 
We know that order in the universe has increased since the Big Bang, with 
gravity creating stars from gas, and we know that the universe is a closed system, no 
energy having entered from the outside, at least not since the Big Bang, and perhaps 
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not even then. Earlier, I said that when we see an increase in order, we can assume that 
energy has entered the system, but gravity provides an exception to this assumption. 
The reason for this exception is that gravity has what is known as negative energy. The 
negative energy of gravity balances out the positive energy of the contents of the 
universe, quite possibly adding up to zero. 
A stone an infinite distance from the Earth would have zero gravitational 
potential energy: it would not be affected by gravity from the Earth at all. Yet, a stone 
on the top of a mountain has more potential energy than one in a valley – to move a 
stone away from the Earth, by lifting or throwing it, requires an input of positive 
energy. The only way to reconcile these two points is to say that the gravitational 
potential energy well of the earth represents negative energy. It is the interplay of the 
negative energy of gravity, and the positive energy of matter and radiation, that 
produces the order we observe in astrophysical phenomena such as stars and galaxies. 
Assuming Alan Guth’s theory of the inflationary universe (1997), since “[t]he 
cosmological expansion is a manifestation of the gravitational activity of the 
universe” (Davies 2005), the matter and radiation of the universe become an open 
system within a larger closed system. This is one way of visualising the ability of 
gravity to permit an apparent decrease in entropy, if entropy is identified with disorder. 
However, when it comes to picturing the inflation of the universe, we must take great 
care that we do not oversimplify things by relying on metaphors of expanding balloons 
and rising cakes. The “inflationary universe” is also a mathematical perspective with 
hidden assumptions. 
The point at issue is covered by Wheeler’s pithy aphorism quoted above, 
“Matter tells space how to curve, space tells matter how to move”. The way matter 
moves under the influence of gravity is to group together. The way space curves means 
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that this attraction is stronger at shorter distances. The effect of gravity is to provide 
ways (Boltzmann’s term W) in which systems can become more ordered, and this 
results in a difference from the typical entropic paths we see in systems where gravity 
can be ignored. While the self-organisational process seen in snowflake formation (for 
example – self organisation will be covered in a later chapter) also provides ways in 
which a system can become more ordered, the difference with gravity is that its 
characteristic negative energy makes it a “free lunch” in terms of the ultimately closed 
system that is our universe, whose total energy remains probably at zero. 
The role of gravity in creating order, for example by condensing a cloud of gas, 
has consequences for talking about “an increase in entropy” in numerical units. Under 
my definition, entropy is a consequence of probabilities and outcomes in statistical 
mechanics. It is convenient to talk about an increase in disorder as being an “increase 
in entropy”, since gravity can usually be discounted, being a relatively weak force (it is 
easier to fly than to split the atom). And of course the effects of gravity do not always 
result in an increase in order! But ideally, entropy should not be used as a synonym for 
disorder. One should say “an increase in disorder”, even though that disorder results 
directly from the entropic state at that time (the probabilities due to statistical 
mechanics). 
I cannot give a more compact account of the relationship between gravitation 
and order than Paul Davies, and so I will quote him in full. 
“Looking at the universe as a whole, the initially smooth distribution of gas 
coughed out at the big bang slowly turned into splodges of hotter and cooler 
gas, and eventually arranged itself into shining proto-galaxies surrounded 
by empty space. The proto-galaxies in turn formed glowing stars. The 
expansion of the universe assisted the escalating thermal contrast: as the 
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universe expanded, its background temperature dropped, and the hot stars 
were then able to radiate more vigorously into the cold space. The upshot of 
these gravitational processes was that an entropy gap opened up in the 
universe, a gap between the actual entropy and the maximum possible 
entropy. The flow of starlight is one process that is attempting to close the 
gap, but in fact all sources of free energy, including the chemical and thermal 
energy inside the Earth, can be attributed to that gap. Thus all life feeds off 
the entropy gap that gravitation has created. The ultimate source of 
biological information and order is gravitation.” (Davies 1999:64) 
A large part of this thesis concerns how arrangements that are relatively 
improbable for a randomly changing system become more probable in both theory and 
everyday lived reality: in other words, how patterns arise. When we see order around 
us, we should be able to trace back to gravity the energy needed to get the probabilities 
moving in that way, in the face of the general tendency towards disorder. (One other 
source of energy that could potentially be used in establishing order is dark energy. But 
since it is not well understood, and could even be an error introduced by a mistaken 
assumption as to the curvature of the universe, I will not discuss dark energy here.) In 
most or perhaps all cases of order on Earth, we can trace the energy input that allows 
the second law of thermodynamics to be circumvented either to the Sun, or to the 
internal energy of the Earth, both of which are directly attributable to the action of 
gravity. 
The concept of gravity will not itself be prominent in this thesis. But for the sake 
of establishing a sound foundation for my arguments, it is important to note at the 
outset that there is an identifiable energy source that enables the manipulation of 
entropy, the latter being one of my major themes. 
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I said earlier that scientific formulae and their terms include assumptions that are 
often hidden. This is no less true for gravity, and I will touch on a theory that suggests 
the existence of gravity may be a matter of perspective in section 2.4.5.2.7. 
2.3 Time 
The next in this set of four interrelated concepts is time. Our understanding of 
time has been greatly advanced by relativity theory. As physicist Lee Smolin puts it, 
“Neither space nor time has any existence outside the system of evolving relationships 
that comprises the universe” (2000:24). Time and space are not independent in 
relativity theory. Spacetime curvature is a kind of energy (capacity for change), and 
thus a kind of mass, and the relationship between spacetime curvature and physical 
bodies is nonlinear. 
We naturally divide time up into the past, the present and the future. However, in 
our normal usage of these terms we ignore the implications of relativity theory. (In 
relativity theory, two events that occur simultaneously as measured by one observer 
will not be simultaneous for another observer moving relatively to the first, for 
example.) 
Our common-sense idea of the present is particularly problematic. I will address 
the problems with our understanding of the present below, in my discussion of 
consciousness.  
If time is identified with change, then it should be seen why time shares a certain 
vagueness about its definition with entropy, gravity and information. Time is not a 
thing, but becomes apparent only through observing the behaviour of things. 
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2.3.1 Arrows of time 
It seems to us that time moves from the past to the future, and that this process is 
irreversible. The cosmologist Gerald Whitrow identified three arrows of time (1972): 
cosmological, historical, and thermodynamic. These are three ways of looking at the 
same thing, this phenomenon of temporal irreversibility. Here I am particularly 
concerned with the historical arrow of time, which is specified in terms of the nature of 
information, and the thermodynamic arrow of time, which is concerned with entropy. 
The cosmological arrow of time (which looks at the relationship of time with the 
expansion of the universe) is not directly relevant to my argument, except insofar as 
one can view cosmological expansion as permitting the existence of entropy, as I have 
already briefly mentioned, and therefore the thermodynamic arrow of time. 
2.3.1.1 The thermodynamic arrow of time 
The thermodynamic arrow of time can be stated as follows: the probability of the 
entire universe reverting to a state that is identical to an instantaneously previous state 
is infinitesimal. The idea of an “identical state” is problematic, given limitations to 
measurement, not to mention the impossibility of measuring things if time were to run 
backwards. Nonetheless, insofar as the relationships between matter and radiation 
move from one state to another in our expanding universe, there is essentially no 
chance of this process reversing. 
Time is intimately related to probability, to the ways in which things can happen 
in the future, and therefore to entropy. Given an instantaneous state of the universe as 
extrapolated from information received at a point in space-time (there being no 
“instantaneous state of the universe” except as measured from a frame of reference), 
there are many possible states of the next instant, each with a certain probability. One 
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way of looking at time is as the roll of the dice to determine what state comes up (with 
a total of seven being more likely for two dice than a total of twelve). Having the 
thermodynamic arrow of time reverse would be as if one threw an unimaginably large 
number of dice, vastly more than could be manufactured using all the matter in the 
universe, and every single one came up with the same number, and that were to happen 
over and over again. It is essentially forbidden by statistical mechanics. 
The various probabilities of the states of a system can be pictured as what is 
known as “phase space”. One way of imagining this space is as a landscape, with 
points “downhill” from the current point being more likely (a point represents the 
entire state of a given system at a particular time), although this is a simplification of 
the dimensions that are actually involved. Deep holes in the landscape are attractors. 
One might imagine a leaf on the surface of a turbulent river: there are locations where, 
if the leaf strays too close, it will be unlikely to escape. Another example might be the 
solar system, with the space-time curvature resulting from the gravity of the Sun, the 
planets, the asteroids, and so on, representing attractors. If phase space is visualised as 
a landscape, time can be interpreted as distance on that landscape, and movement as 
change in the system. 
Earlier, I gave an example of an abstract closed system, changing arbitrarily 
from one moment to the next. I said that regular (compressible) patterns of the system 
elements at a given moment would be rarer than irregular ones. With the introduction 
of phase space, new patterns become discernible; patterns across time appear, in 
addition to patterns representing the spatial arrangement of the elements of the system 
at a given moment. If an incompressible pattern happens to turn up twice in succession, 
it has become part of a regular pattern across time. 
Regular patterns across time will be relatively rare if the next state of a system is 
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in no way determined by the previous state. However, if change in the system from 
moment to moment is not arbitrary, but deterministic in some way, then there will be 
attractors for the system that do result in regularity over time, even for a closed system. 
For now, I will simply note that time provides an extra dimension for patterning, but I 
will return to the discussion of patterns below. 
If one were to say that time is the observed resolution of probability, and that 
entropy describes the ways in which a system is likely to change, the connection 
between entropy and the arrow of time should be clear. To return to my earlier example 
of a hot stone in cold water, time appears in the action of entropy, which in this case is 
the probabilistic dissipation of heat into the water. Time is the same thing as the change 
in the relationships among the elements of the system, which follows probability. 
Change is governed by statistics, and I will look at some of the implications of 
statistical mechanics for the nature of time in the next section. 
2.3.1.2 The historical arrow of time 
The historical arrow of time conceives of irreversibility in terms of the 
accumulated effects of information received. Thanks to statistical mechanics (the 
specific flow of entropy, in other words), change in one part of a system causes a 
cascade of further changes through time and space, under most circumstances. This 
cascade of change is identical, in my view, with the transmission of information, and 
this is why information is not the opposite of disorder, nor of entropy, which are two 
common, related misunderstandings. (I will focus on the nature of information in 
section 2.4.) 
If one looks at the surface of a table, it will normally be seen to have suffered 
dents, nicks, abrasions, and so forth, by random impacts over time. In some sense, it 
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carries a record of certain changes within the system made up of the table and its 
environment. A police detective might even use a given dent to reconstruct an event 
that took place during a crime. The surface of the table tells us a little bit about the past, 
but we can only guess what will happen to it in the future. This is an example of the 
historical arrow of time: information accumulates over time. 
One can use some features of the nature of information to make a case that the 
arrow of time is (to coin a phrase) computationally inevitable for any observer (as we 
normally understand the term). 
The detective examines the surface of the desk, and finds the graze of a bullet. 
Changes in the system have resulted in the detective gaining information about 
previous events. How sure can the detective be that the graze occurred in the course of 
the crime she is investigating? She will assign a probability to the truth of her 
conclusions, based on a variety of evidence, and indeed truth must always be 
probabilistic for any observer. The flow of entropy (the thermodynamic arrow of time, 
in other words) means that the past cannot be perfectly reconstituted and examined 
afresh. And while we assume that when we look at things, we observe them as they are 
now, as Lee Smolin puts it, “…when you look around you do not see space - instead, 
you are looking back through the history of the universe. What you are seeing is a slice 
through the history of the world.” (2000:64). The delay caused by the time that 
information takes to reach us, in many cases, is just noise: it does not significantly 
affect us. But nonetheless, information is always information about the past. 
What about the future? Will there be another bullet-graze in the desk tomorrow? 
It seems fairly unlikely, under normal circumstances, but we can’t be sure. The 
universe is just too complex for us to predict the future state of the desk with absolute 
certainty. And besides the brute complexity of the situation we find ourselves in, there 
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are other limitations to predicting what will happen that mean predictions of the future 
state of the universe can never be perfect. I will briefly outline some of those 
limitations in the following four sections. 
2.3.1.2.1 Self-organised criticality 
One special example of complexity is what is known as a “self-organised 
criticality”, a term coined in Bak et al. (1987). Thanks to the landscape of phase space, 
and its attractors, many systems have thresholds where they experience large amounts 
of change over relatively short periods of time. For example, take a stone on a hillside. 
With the heating and cooling of the day, a stone that has sat in the same place for a year 
might suddenly come loose and roll away. Now, in a system where many such 
threshold-bearing elements are able to interact and transfer information from one to 
another, it becomes exponentially harder to predict the extent that any one change will 
propagate through the system. The more stones on the hillside, the more difficult it is 
to predict how big an avalanche that falling stone will result in. It may stop soon, or it 
may bring the whole hillside down. We can say that small avalanches are more 
common than big ones (the distribution will follow a power law), but in a given case 
we cannot predict the pattern beforehand. 
The flow of entropy that accompanies the process of measurement, which 
inevitably results in errors, coupled with the incredible complexity of such systems 
means that they are impossible for us to model. The phase space is just too 
complicated, incredibly spiky in many dimensions. We cannot gather information to a 
degree of accuracy that permits prediction of the future of the system, which is a real 
problem in guessing the extent of the next earthquake, forest fire, traffic jam, or market 
crash, for example. 
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2.3.1.2.2 Chaos 
Another special example of complexity that cuts us off from the future is chaos. 
(Chaos, as the term is used in this thesis, refers to deterministic aperiodic systems, 
rather than simple disorder.) If a system has the right number of elements, and 
furthermore if changes are fed back as input into the system, then what are known as 
“strange attractors” can arise within the phase space of that system. The system is 
deterministic: its previous state determines its current state. However, if it falls into a 
strange attractor, it will never return to any previous state, and so is aperiodic: it never 
gets back to a previous point in its phase space, and so never repeats its path, even if it 
never leaves the attractor. Strange attractors were first discovered in study of the solar 
system, and then of the weather. They have since been found in many other places, 
such as signal noise and turbulence. 
The nature of entropy means that we cannot predict the future of chaotic systems. 
Imagine a small moon orbiting a system also containing two large planets, the moon 
having fallen into a strange attractor, and moving aperiodically (this is known as the 
“three body problem”). If one takes a slice of the phase space of the system (known as 
a Poincaré section), the point at which the trajectory of the moon intersects that slice 
will jump from one place to another with no regularity. Due to the shape of the strange 
attractor in phase space, a small error in measurement will result in a large error in 
predicting where the moon will next appear on the Poincaré section. This is the case 
even though the system is deterministic, and the trajectory keeps passing through the 
slice in the moon’s peregrinations around the strange attractor. So chaotic systems, of 
which there are many actual examples in the world, defeat accurate prediction. 
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2.3.1.2.3 Quantum physics 
Quantum physics looks at phenomena such as radiation, space and even time as 
being made up of indivisible units called quanta. Quantum theory began in the course 
of investigations by Albert Einstein (among others) into Boltzmann’s conception of 
entropy in terms of probability. (Smolin 2000:100) 
One revolutionary feature of quantum physics is that the observer is considered 
to be part of the system being measured. This has the great advantage of representing 
what is actually the case when a scientist measures some feature of the universe, 
although it does create difficulties that do not exist in classical theories. 
There is a sense in which the way an observer measures an everyday property 
such as length determines what answer is found, since all measurement takes place in a 
specific context of use. As Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked, “the meaning of the word 
“length” is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length” 
(1953:225). But the situation of the observer has greater consequences at the quantum 
level. There is an unavoidable uncertainty when measuring interrelated aspects of 
systems of this scale, such as the position and momentum of an electron, although the 
exact reason for this uncertainty is debated. The greater the accuracy in measuring one 
value, the lower the possible accuracy of measuring the other. The degree of 
uncertainty is determined by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The level of 
uncertainty is negligible for systems of everyday size, but not at the quantum scale. 
To get around this uncertainty, in order to test quantum physics experimentally, 
the physicist Erwin Schrödinger invented the idea of the wave function. The wave 
function is a representation of information about a system in terms of probabilities, and 
bears a resemblance to phase space, although it differs in the details of its mathematics. 
When its position is measured, an electron could be found at any point in its phase 
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space, although it has a higher probability of being found near its previous position. 
The detective in the example above could only give a probability that the 
bullet-graze on a desk had happened in the course of a crime, but at least she could be 
sure that if she was not right, then she was wrong, in common-sense terms. At the 
quantum level, according to the most common interpretation of quantum physics, 
there is no such thing as being right or wrong about what is going on with a particle 
such as an electron, if both guesses are covered by the wave function, until a specific 
measurement is made of one of its properties. Its situation is simply “undetermined” 
until measured. 
While we think of measurements as being made by an observer, one can also 
speak of the environment as “measuring” the state of a quantum system when the 
system comes in to contact with that environment. The wave function describing the 
probabilities of the system gets “lost” as it merges with the wave function of the (much 
larger) environment, as ripples from a stone dropped into the sea are lost among the 
waves. This is known as quantum decoherence. The process follows statistical rules, 
through the operation of entropy, and the smaller wave function is lost in the larger 
very quickly. This is a way of explaining why we do not observe wave functions with 
undetermined values in systems of everyday size. In this way quantum processes 
connect with the thermodynamic arrow of time, through the operation of probability in 
statistical mechanics. “Decoherence is caused by the interaction with the environment 
which in effect monitors certain observables of the system, destroying coherence 
between the pointer states corresponding to their eigenvalues. This leads to 
environment-induced superselection or einselection, a quantum process associated 
with selective loss of information.” (Zurek 2003: 715). 
One could update a well-known question as follows: If a tree falls in the woods, 
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and there is no-one there to witness, does quantum decoherence still apply? This is a 
way of looking at the uncertainty principle. The answer is: It depends how you look at 
it. From the point of view of measurement, there is quantum decoherence. From a 
point of view other than measurement, well, is there such a thing as a point of view 
other than measurement? 
I will touch on the uncertainty principle again in section 2.4.5.2.7. For the time 
being, I will note that as far as we can tell, there are definite limits to the accuracy of 
measurement of very small systems. According to Heisenberg, such limits would 
apply even in the hypothetical case involving measuring instruments with an 
arbitrarily high level of accuracy. We can only speak in terms of probabilities, at the 
quantum scale. This constitutes another limit on our prediction of the future, since we 
cannot specific the state of the present with perfect accuracy. 
2.3.1.2.4 Inevitability of the historical arrow of time 
Is the universe deterministic or not? Is anything truly random, or is randomness 
just a sign of missing information? Scientists disagree, and there are good arguments 
on both sides. But even if the universe is deterministic, and nothing is “really” random, 
it seems that entropy, and the flow of information, must impose an arrow of time on 
any observer. A deterministic universe would provide hope of overcoming quantum 
uncertainty, if only in theory. But the closed nature of the universe would seem to 
preclude a perfect simulation of its progress being created within its boundaries, since 
the simulation would have to include itself and its effects, creating a paradox. And 
relativistic limits to the speed of information transfer, which no current scientific 
theory has challenged, would seem to impose practical limits on perfect simulation of 
even a limited area of the universe, even if obstacles such as quantum uncertainty 
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could somehow be overcome. The prediction could not keep up with the phenomenon 
being simulated. 
The future and the past are closed to us, in varied ways. The different reasons 
why the arrow of time is inevitable have much in common, however. They derive from 
the nature of entropy, or in other words, the probabilistic flow of change according to 
statistical mechanics. Here we see the first connection between entropy and our status 
as observers of the changing state of the universe. 
Mentioning the possibility of a deterministic universe naturally leads to the topic 
of free will. (See for example Merali 2006.) In my view, there is no difference between 
seeming to have free will, and actually having free will. The distinction between “real” 
free will and “apparent” free will is spurious. Furthermore, the existence of 
randomness in the universe would seem to have little applicability to freedom. I also 
believe that free will has only incidental relevance to morality, and I will return to this 
topic in the section dealing with morality. 
For the time being, we can say that within the inevitable perspective of the arrow 
of time, we can introduce energy into systems and thereby change their entropy flow, 
altering probabilities - that is, we can act. Furthermore, we cannot predict the future 
with perfect accuracy (which is a precondition of the arrow of time), although we 
certainly predict it with imperfect accuracy, thanks to the presence of probability in the 
flow of entropy. Without the connection between probability and entropy, 
consciousness and indeed observation or measurement of any kind could not exist, 
since everything would change arbitrarily from one moment to another, and regularity 
would be extremely rare. One could say that we have free will thanks to our ignorance 
of precisely what will happen in the future, along with our ability to guess what may 
happen, which together permit choice. But this ignorance would apply to an observer 
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within a completely deterministic universe, thanks to constraints on the processing and 
flow of information that come along with entropy and the arrow of time. 
I should note that saying the arrow of time is inevitable for observers does not 
imply that in fact “time is really frozen, it just seems to flow for us”. We are familiar 
with the idea of something being frozen in time, such as a statue that has not changed 
for millennia. But it is potentially misleading to apply this (as a metaphor) to time as a 
whole, particularly if time is defined in terms of change! We should be wary of any 
such formulation that views things “from the point of view of the universe”, since the 
universe does not have a point of view. 
2.3.1.3 Conclusions regarding the arrow of time 
Here I particularly wish to highlight the connection between the arrow of time, 
entropy and probability. Entropy and probability have recurred at every stage of the 
above discussion, which is to be expected since time (in relativity theory) is equated 
with change in spatial relationships, and change inevitably has an associated 
probability. 
When the probabilities of change in the many elements of the universe are 
brought together through statistical mechanics, it becomes inevitable for an observer 
within the closed system of the universe to experience an arrow of time, as that 
observer receives and processes information arriving from elsewhere and from the 
past (those two terms being understood in terms of relativity theory). 
The progress of statistical mechanics follows specific rules, which result in 
varied phenomena such as chaos and self-organisation. The ultimate origin of patterns 
is found in this specific action of statistical mechanics. It so happens that regular 
patterning can arise and be sustained in our universe, thanks to its expansion and its 
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other specific properties, such as the existence of both positive and negative energy. 
Furthermore, this regularity follows certain rules that give rise to various “genera” of 
regularity. However, according to cosmologists, universes are theoretically possible 
that cannot support regular patterning (although they do not use the term patterning, to 
my knowledge). 
2.3.2 Vahe Gurzadyan and negative curvature 
Why should systems tend towards increased disorder? If one adds up the 
possible states that a closed system can move into, the ordered states will be fewer than 
the disordered ones, if gravity is negligible. Statistical mechanics will drive things 
towards disorder. But why are things set up this way? 
One intriguing explanation is given by cosmologist Vahe Gurzadyan 
(Gurzadyan and Torres 1997, Allahverdyan and Gurzadyan 2002). There are three 
possible shapes for the universe, depending on the average density of its contents. It 
can be flat, like a sheet of paper, or closed, like a soccer ball, or open. If the universe is 
open, having negative curvature, then its local geometry is hyperbolic. One can 
visualize this in two dimensions by imagining a shape rather like a saddle. “In a 
universe with negative curvature, every point in space is bent up in one direction and 
down in another, like the mid-point of a saddle” (Gefter 2005). This topology would 
result in particles tending to diverge and mix, resulting in a tendency towards disorder, 
and thus providing a foundation for the thermodynamic arrow of time. 
The scientific consensus is that the universe is flat. But Gurzadyan’s hypothesis 
does explain some anomalies in measurements of the cosmic microwave background 
radiation, as well as providing a mechanism for the particular flow of entropy we 
observe. The debate is not over yet. 
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2.4 Information 
I have said above that information is not order, and entropy is not disorder. 
Entropy is the direction of change in a system according to probability, and is therefore 
associated with time.4 For systems where gravity is a discernible factor, like a large 
cloud of gas in space, disorder represents less entropy than order. In this case, disorder 
is a relatively unlikely state, and the system will change over time to become more 
ordered as it contracts. (It seems our universe began in a disordered, low-entropy 
state.) And even for systems where gravity can be discounted, disorder is only more 
likely than order, without outside interference. Four gas molecules bouncing around a 
closed box could be found in a position delineating a square, each equidistant from two 
others: but other configurations are much more likely. 
If entropy is not the same thing as disorder, then what is information, if indeed it 
is not the same thing as order? Imagine you are walking to the supermarket, hurrying 
to get there before it closes. As you approach, you see the lights of the supermarket 
extinguished. From this, you know you are too late, you know you will have no milk 
for your breakfast, you know the proprietor is on her way home, and many other things. 
You have received some information, at the speed of light, as the interruption in the 
flow of photons reaches your position. 
Now, when a light is switched on, it is in a relatively low-entropy state, since 
gravity is not a factor in its operation, unlike the Sun. Energy is going into creating 
order, changing the flow of probability, with photons thereby being generated by the 
light-source. When it is turned off, disorder increases, and the system has moved 
towards equilibrium. You have received information through an increase in disorder. 
                                                     
4 Usually, entropy refers to the tendency towards disorder in a closed system. However, I wish to define 
this term more broadly. 
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How then could information be the same thing as order? 
It is better to characterise information as the measurement of change through a 
system, at a particular location. (Even an instantaneous measurement of a 
never-before-observed phenomenon involves capturing a change, as the information 
reaches us, though we might not know what we would have recorded a moment before. 
The definition of location I will leave vague until section 2.4.5.2.) 
Noise (which can be relatively ordered or disordered) is therefore a form of 
information, although it is by definition useless information, which gets in the way of 
our accomplishing our purposes. Fog which prevented our telling if the supermarket 
lights had been extinguished would be an example of noise, although seeing that fog 
would provide useful information for a criminal deciding whether to rob the 
supermarket owner as she leaves. Useful information can also be relatively ordered or 
disordered. The distinction between usefulness and uselessness is made by the 
observer. It is quite possible for noise to have more order than the useful information it 
is getting in the way of. 
One could view the increase in disorder of the extinguishing of the supermarket 
lights as order, in a broader context. It could be seen as the “zero” in a pattern of ones 
and zeroes, with “one” representing the lights being on. One measurement of 
information is in terms of the answers to yes or no questions, in terms of binary 
integers, usually called bits, that can have a value of one or zero. But it is clearer to say 
(with reference to the wider context that takes into account the possibility of the light 
being on) that information is being carried by a pattern, rather than saying that 
information and order are the same thing. Patterns naturally reside on a spectrum of 
regularity. 
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2.4.1 Information and patterns 
It will be remembered that patterns have the possibility of regularity, or in other 
words, a certain degree of order, which is the same thing as compressibility. Indeed, 
order is simply a term used to describe this feature of patterns, and is defined in that 
context. (Even when we talk about law and order, we mean imposing regularity, or 
greater predictability, within a society.) Ordered information, in the form of relatively 
regular patterns, has greater potential for usefulness than disordered information. 
The broadest definition of information is measurement of change propagating 
through a system, over time and space. Disordered change can propagate through a 
system, but its usefulness is relatively limited. When information is compressible, new 
possibilities of propagation become available. Compressing a digital photo makes it 
quicker and cheaper for you to send it to a friend, who can then decompress the picture 
to a state that is very similar to its original state on your computer. Painting a picture on 
canvas, then having it delivered by courier, takes more effort and is more expensive. 
Of course, it should always be remembered that order is a relative term, due to its 
nature as compressibility. Some patterns are more compressible than others. 
Compressibility can result in a loss of useful information, and increase in noise, when 
a pattern of change is altered as it propagates. But that very loss of useful information 
might itself be useful for some other purpose, say, in testing an algorithm for 
compressing digital photos. 
Living things, and many other long-lived systems, make use of regularity in 
patterns in both their reception and processing of information in the course of 
sustaining themselves, and they also use the possibility of decreasing order. (Chewing 
and digesting food increases disorder, while bringing chemicals to a cell increases 
order.) This is thanks to the relationship of order and disorder as relative terms on a 
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spectrum of compressibility. 
The great usefulness of compressibility in propagating change is one reason for 
the misunderstanding that information is the same thing as order. On the surface of the 
Earth, where the influence of gravity as a spontaneous movement towards order can 
usually be discounted, it is certainly possible to call information “order”, call entropy 
“disorder”, and set them up as enemies, for many purposes, without running into 
difficulty. After all, an ordered signal such as a telephone conversation is degraded by 
disorder as it propagates, and entropy is causing that disorder, thanks to the actual flow 
of probability in the system. We put in energy (using our voice, the electrical signal on 
the line, and perhaps even computerised error correction) to sustain order, and defeat 
the noise on the line. But it is much better to speak of information as propagation of 
change, and entropy as the flow of probability. This allows us to separate out 
subjective and local judgements from such descriptions. 
2.4.2 Measuring information 
Change and compressibility can both be measured in various ways and assigned 
numerical values, and this is of great use in the pursuit of theoretical and applied 
science. Once again we must acknowledge the implications of the undoubted need to 
sample a particular property at a particular point, without reference to its context, in 
the course of scientific investigation. 
In classical information theory, one can measure the extinguishing of the 
supermarket lights as one bit of information, answering the question, “is the 
supermarket open?” But it seems that that bit, which is an absence and not a presence, 
can tell us a great deal besides that, such as the probability of no milk for breakfast. A 
stranger to the town (who does not know what the light belongs to) might not learn 
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anything at all, except that she is no longer able to see light from that location. And 
what are we to say of the changes propagating through the eye, optic nerve, and brain, 
which result from the loss of light, and are so much more complicated than that one bit 
that the absence of light represents in terms of yes or no questions asked by an 
observer? 
When talking about change, the very least we can say is “something has 
changed” or “something has not changed”, without any reference to how things have 
changed, or the context or implications of that change. This is the process of measuring 
information in terms of bits, and indeed the only yes or no question that one bit can 
answer is, “Change?” That one bit representing “something has changed” requires a 
much larger context if it is to result in a person realising that the supermarket has 
closed. We must know a great deal about that supermarket, about supermarkets in 
general, about those lights, and about lights in general, and many other things. That 
one bit results in all sorts of new propagation in the systems that observe it, these 
systems having been laboriously constructed through a long history of dealing with 
such events. 
Information being closely related to change of spatial relationships, or in other 
words, space-time, context must always be taken into account if we are not to be 
misled by the process of measurement of information in numerical terms. This applies 
to other ways of quantifying information, such as the method of identifying 
information with “surprise value” and thereby connecting information content to 
entropy (surprise, or unpredictability, being related to disorder). 
The question of how to measure information numerically is not centrally at issue 
in this thesis, which discusses the nature of information more broadly, and so I will not 
pursue this topic any further. However, I will discuss the definition of measurement at 
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the start of chapter two. 
2.4.3 Information and noise 
Earlier I defined noise as irrelevant information. Absence of change is not noise. 
Noise is a form of change, and therefore information. The everyday usage of 
“information”, as in “that newspaper is very informative”, or “I have no information 
regarding his whereabouts” takes relevance for granted. If one wanted to try to give all 
the information one had, and said, “I don’t know exactly where he is, but he doesn’t 
have the money to get into outer space, so look on the Earth first”, one would give 
more information, but in most cases this extra information would not be useful, any 
more than if one had uttered nonsense syllables instead. 
What then determines relevance and irrelevance? The broadest way to put it is to 
say “relevance to the perpetuation of certain structures”, whether helping or hindering. 
The position of water molecules on the surface of a snowflake is relevant to the way 
the snowflake grows. In a maximally ordered state, there is no change, and so no such 
thing as relevance. In a minimally ordered state, there is constant change, but no 
relevance, because structures cannot persist over time. In between the two extremes, 
there are states where structures can arise and persist through self-organisation. Of 
course, we inhabit just such a state: the surface of a planet with a protective 
atmosphere and a friendly star. 
We cannot identify noise without identifying a purpose, even if only the 
metaphorical “purpose” of a snowflake forming. What is relevant information for one 
purpose will often be noise for another. I will return to this topic in the chapter on 
morality. 
The difference between relevance and irrelevance is key to the difference in 
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usage between Shannon entropy, which is measured in bits, and thermodynamic 
entropy, measured as heat over temperature. Data in computer memory is usually 
measured in terms of Shannon entropy, which only takes account of the different 
possibilities of arranging the data. The chip that contains the data however, has an 
associated thermodynamic entropy, according to the number of possible arrangements 
of its atoms. The two are “conceptually equivalent”, but their use is determined by the 
scientific fields in which they turn up (Bekenstiein 2003). 
The term “observer”, in its broadest sense, could be defined as the persisting, 
relatively ordered system for which information is relevant or irrelevant. In this sense, 
a snowflake is an observer of its environment, although the information that is relevant 
to its persistence is very limited indeed. Although very many snowflake patterns are 
possible, these patterns arise from small variations into the input of a system of very 
simple rules, as a computer simulation of snowflake formation shows. 
2.4.4 Information and relativity 
Time is connected to information. In relativity theory, one’s past is the whole 
four-dimensional region of space-time from which one can receive information, one’s 
future is the whole four-dimensional region of space-time to which one can send 
information, and the present is the point in space-time where information arrives with 
one (which is obviously quite a different understanding of the present from the 
common sense view of “whatever is happening now, everywhere”). 
This places another limit to information. The highest possible speed of 
information transfer being the speed of light, we cannot know anything about areas 
further away in light years than the age of the universe, since change cannot yet have 
reached us from those areas. As the universe ages, the area from which we can have 
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gained information increases in size. Statements about events beyond this horizon are 
neither true nor false, but undetermined (this may well bring to mind the nature of 
quantum indeterminacy). The mathematics for quantum theory, relativity, and 
cosmology must take account of the physical limitations of information transfer 
(Smolin 2000:30). 
2.4.5 Information is physical 
The constraint that the speed of light places on the transfer of information is a 
hint that “information is physical”. This is the title of a landmark paper by physicist 
Rolf Landauer, in which he speculates, “Information handling is limited by the laws of 
physics and the number of parts available in the universe; the laws of physics are, in 
turn, limited by the range of information processing available” (1991). 
Information can be thought of as the particular changes that occur over time in 
the universe, as measured from a specific location. The universe is a system (the 
largest possible system) with a specific physical nature, and what we identify as “the 
laws of physics” are generalised from, and are applied to, situations within that system. 
Any change that occurs necessarily happens within the physical universe, and this fact 
needs to be taken into account when discussing the nature of information. For example, 
besides being saddled with a “speed limit” (the speed of light) information is also 
affected by the probabilistic character of entropy. Entropy cuts off our knowledge of 
the past and future, ensuring that an observer of change in the universe will experience 
an arrow of time. Physical limits are informational limits, and physical laws are 
affected by the specific flow of information (we have seen that the second law of 
thermodynamics, for example, is only probabilistic). 
Space consists of separate elements that are related, and those relationships 
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change over time, which is the source of information. Is a relationship physical? 
Because relationships are always between elements of the physical universe, we must 
answer in the affirmative. If this answer seems counter-intuitive, it is better to fix that 
problem by rethinking what we mean by “physical”. 
What are these undefined “elements” that permit the existence of space and 
time? How can the term “element” be defined so vaguely as to cover all relationships, 
from the relationships between quarks to the relationships between countries? What 
exactly can we say about these “elements” that is not expressed in terms of 
relationships, given that any given element will be made up of other elements, unless it 
is at the bottom of the chain, where we have great difficulty in seeing clearly? Why do 
we tend to think that these elements are physical, while the relationships between them 
are not, even when (say) a country is essentially defined in terms of the interrelation of 
its components, and by its relationship with its geographical context? Is there anything 
to physicality beyond relationships? 
As for the question of the most fundamental, minimal definition of what an 
“element” could be, this is the subject of particle physics, and I cannot give a 
comprehensive answer here. That said, I will briefly address an idea that is becoming 
influential in information theory, cosmology and physics, for which I will use the term 
“the informational universe”. One might sum up this school of thought as 
championing the role of relationships over elements. As we continue to investigate the 
particles that make up matter and radiation, they seem to become more and more 
abstract, while the relationships that they delineate take on greater importance. This is 
a “vision of information as the stuff the world is made of” (Bekenstein 2003). 
If one were to trace this school of thought to one founder, that person would be 
John Wheeler, pioneer of quantum physics and colleague of Einstein, who coined the 
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phrase “it from bit” (the physical universe as arising from information). Much of the 
work in this field has been pushed along by the demands of unifying quantum physics 
with relativity. This battle is mostly fought in the arena of “quantum gravity” – that is, 
in giving a description of gravity in discrete units, or quanta, but which also fits with 
Einstein’s field explanation of gravity, which has had great experimental success. 
The point of this section is to explain the physical character of information, and 
so I will address the idea of the informational universe by looking at two strictures that 
quantum gravity theory imposes on information: the existence of horizons, and the 
need for background independence. Constraints due to the universe being a closed 
system, and due to the physical nature of information, are related. For example, limits 
to representation of detail due to complexity might somehow be avoidable if the 
universe were not a closed system.  
2.4.5.1 Background independence 
The marked improvement of relativity theory over Newtonian physics is that the 
mathematics does not require any absolute background of points with fixed locations 
in space or time. This is indeed where “relativity” gets its name. Two separate events 
that are simultaneous for one observer will not be so for another observer moving with 
reference to the first. And there is no criterion for judging who is “right”. 
In describing gravity in terms of quantum physics, it would seem to be an 
advantage if the latter were also formulated in a way that is independent of any 
absolute background, and where everything is therefore defined in terms of 
relationships. This is the position of theories of quantum gravity such as Causal Set 
Theory (Dowker 2003) and Loop Quantum Gravity (Smolin 2000), both of which 
postulate a universe made up of relationships between quantum elements at the Planck 
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scale. Indeed, recent interpretations of Loop Quantum Gravity go so far as to say that 
particles may be “tangled plaits in space-time” (Castelvecchi and Jamieson 2006). 
This is perhaps the purest form of informational universe theory, in that it does away 
with the traditional idea of the physical altogether, in favour of an explanation using 
relationships. 
Can we make my earlier definitions of entropy, time, and so on, background 
independent? One can picture energy, entropy, gravity, time, space and information in 
terms of the roles they play in constructing phase space. 
- Time refers to the phenomenon of change among spatial relationships. 
- Energy refers to the potential for change to propagate. 
- Entropy refers to the probabilities that determine how change propagates, 
according to statistical mechanics. 
- Gravity provides the energy to sometimes allow order to become more 
probable than disorder, within limited areas. 
- Information refers to measurement of the specific changes that occur, at a 
given location. 
To achieve background independence, the landscape of phase space cannot be 
thought of as existing apart from the relationships that it describes. Its form is 
generated in the process of change. 
In any case, we should take from theories of the informational universe the 
lesson that it seems possible to describe the universe entirely in terms of relationships, 
with the actual elements that define those relationships being reduced to a very 
abstract status. Above, discussing quantitative measurement of information, I said that 
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the only question that could be answered by a single bit was, “Change?”, if that bit 
were truly considered in isolation from its context, apart from the previous bit, of 
course. (Without the previous bit, we could not even answer that minimal question.) 
The great informational richness of the world we observe comes from context – that is 
to say, from relationships. Discussion of that point must wait for the next chapter, 
however. 
Background independence is the hallmark of a truly closed system. The closed 
nature of our universe has another consequence for the nature of information: 
imposing horizons on observers within it. 
2.4.5.2 Horizons 
Horizons are a consequence of the physicality of information. “Horizon” comes 
from the Greek for boundary or limit. The most obvious horizon is the one that is due 
to the curvature of the Earth, which is a limit to sight. This horizon is not too hard to 
overcome: one could climb a hill, which would push the whole horizon back a little, or 
simply move towards what one wished to see, dragging the horizon along. But not all 
informational horizons can be breached, although some can be pushed back. As 
physicist Sunny Auyang puts it, “Finitude is a human condition that cannot be 
obliterated by science…we can never step out of our horizon to attain God’s position” 
(Auyang 1995:113). 
2.4.5.2.1 Location 
Above, I defined information as the measurement of propagation of change 
through a system, at a particular location. What is a location? Is it a minimally-sized 
point in space-time? That is the definition of the present, in relativity, but this does not 
seem to cover the possibility of measuring change in terms of patterns. Ultimately, 
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however, measurement will be based on change intersecting at such minimal points, if 
we choose to take up a theory that reifies something termed “points”. 
Speaking more broadly, location is where the measurement and processing (a 
pattern of measurement over time) of information takes place. The definition of 
“location” will vary according to the method of measurement: that is, according to the 
definition of the boundaries of the system being discussed. This is a subjective choice 
made according to the purposes of the observer of the system. “A system is not 
something presented to the observer, it is something to be recognized by him” 
(Skyttner 1996:35). A location will have an associated measurement horizon, and one 
could perhaps define “location” in terms of this horizon. The divergence of this 
definition of location from the definition in relativity theory gives a hint of difficulties 
in defining “the present”, which will be addressed in the chapter on consciousness. 
2.4.5.2.2 Types of horizons 
One could divide horizons into two categories. One type is due to the closed 
nature of the universe, and the fact that we are observers within that closed system. 
This leads to apparently immutable horizons such as the speed of light, the uncertainty 
principle, and the holographic bound. Lee Smolin uses the slogan, “One universe, seen 
by many observers, rather than many universes, seen by one mythical observer outside 
the universe” (Smolin 2000:48). In other words, “the universe cannot be described 
from the point of view of an observer who exists somehow outside of it. Instead there 
are many partial viewpoints, where observers may receive information from their 
pasts” (Smolin 2000:178). 
The other type of horizon is due to entropy, that is to say, probability. The 
strength (as one might call it) of this type of horizon varies widely according to the 
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probabilities of the situation. Solid objects form an effective horizon to our sight, but 
we can overcome this horizon by moving the objects, walking around them, etc. At the 
other extreme, a black hole provides an extremely strong horizon, and we can be sure 
we will never have detailed knowledge of what is going on within it. This second type 
of horizon, which could be termed an entropic horizon, arises from the actual facts of 
information transfer. The arrow of time is due to both closed-system horizons (the 
speed of light and the uncertainty principle) and entropic horizons (due to the collision 
between entropy and complexity).  
2.4.5.2.3 The speed of light 
It seems that the speed of light provides an immutably fixed horizon. Even 
theoretical situations involving quantum entanglement of two separated particles 
cannot overcome this limit (von Baeyer 203:180). We cannot receive change from 
areas so far away that light from there has not yet reached us; and we cannot influence 
such areas. 
The limitations imposed by the speed of light require a system of logic with 
outcomes of not only truth and falsity, but indeterminacy. “Not only can an individual 
observer only see light from one part of the universe; which part they can see depends 
on where they find themselves in the history of the universe… So we must conclude 
that the ability to judge whether a statement is true or false depends to some extent on 
the relationship between the observer and the subject of the statement.” (Smolin 
2000:28) One such logic, used by cosmologists and quantum theorists, is topos theory. 
Topos theory is capable of dealing with the existence of informational horizons, as 
well as allowing background independence, and so is applicable to a closed universe. 
“This cosmological logic is also intrinsically observer-dependent, for it acknowledges 
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that each observer in the world sees a different part of it” (Smolin 2000:31). 
Coming from the field of algebraic geometry, topos theory is related to the study 
of mathematical landscapes. It is a way of categorising relationships between points 
and their neighbourhoods. It can also be used to categorise mathematical and logical 
systems. Physicists Chris Isham and Jeremy Butterfield have been using topos theory 
in an attempt to deal with quantum uncertainty (Matthews 2007). It seems to me there 
is a connection between topos theory and entropy, since the former determines the 
ways in which points on a landscape can communicate with each other, and this in turn 
determines the ways (Boltzmann’s “W” term) in which change can propagate. 
2.4.5.2.4 The uncertainty principle 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is formulated and understood in many 
different ways. One can view it is a consequence of the closed nature of our universe. 
“Heisenberg’s insight can be understood in terms of the problem of self-reflexivity. 
Since observer and observed are mutually implicated in the same system, knowledge 
of the object is conditioned by the subject… Knowledge, therefore, is relative to the 
multiple perspectives from which it is constituted. This multiplicity of perspectives 
cannot be reduced to a single angle of vision that is true for all observers.” (Taylor 
2001:115) Even without the problem of entropy, quantum uncertainty would provide 
an immutable horizon, due to the nature of information measurement. 
We cannot get exact information on both the position and momentum of a 
particle. The question remains whether these properties of the particle really both have 
exact values, although we cannot know both at once. Here we run into the same 
question that cropped up in section 2.3.1.2.3, regarding quantum decoherence. There 
seems little point talking about the properties one would measure if one measured 
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something immeasurable. However, we can ask whether the universe is entirely 
deterministic, and it seems that although we do not know either way, it could be, at 
least according to physicists such as Nobel Prize winner Gerard ‘t Hooft (Merali 2006). 
I will give one or two reflections on determinism in the course of this thesis, although 
it is not strictly relevant to my conclusions. 
2.4.5.2.5 Complexity 
Complexity is a factor in entropic horizons. Too much complexity, together with 
the flow of probability, make many things resistant to measurement. (Complexity is 
defined in terms of the number of relationships between different elements of a given 
system.) 
Complexity creates horizons when our measurements reach a limit with regard 
to the level of detail of change that they can capture. This depends on the system being 
used to perform the measurement, but in any case, such horizons will exist. They may 
come about through great disorder, which cannot be compressed. They may appear 
when measuring relatively ordered states that contain a very large number of 
relationships. Generally speaking, one can say that such horizons are made possible by 
the existence of nonlinear processes in our universe, in which the number of 
relationships jumps exponentially as the complexity of the system increases. Chaos is 
generated through nonlinear feedback, under certain conditions, for example. One can 
glimpse the power of nonlinearity to increase complexity by facing two mirrors 
together. 
One can push against these horizons by increasing accuracy of measurement and 
complexity of processing, although one cannot eliminate them. Even if we did not run 
up against the uncertainty principle, which stops us measuring the universe in perfect 
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detail (due to its closed nature, descriptions of the universe must stay within the 
universe, and so a perfect description would be paradoxical), many everyday 
phenomena (which are open systems) are simply too complex to be detailed, 
especially as they change over time. 
2.4.5.2.6 Randomness 
Randomness is related to horizons. Increased uncertainty indicates proximity to 
an informational horizon, as our measurement of the previous chain of causation 
reaches its limit. For example, the lottery draw on television is highly random: forty or 
so plastic balls are blown around by air turbulence (turbulence being chaotic in both 
senses of the term) for some time; then one by one they are ordered by a mechanical 
scoop. Even if the system were entirely deterministic, we would never be able to 
measure the instantaneous position of the system accurately enough to work out the 
backwards chain of causation. Again, when we speak of “random accidents”, there is 
an entropic horizon very near, in the form of the massive complexity of our 
environment. 
But everything is at least a little bit random to any observer, thanks to the 
inevitability of the various horizons. This minimal randomness is quickly smoothed 
out into the ocean of quantum decoherence. Hans von Baeyer calls this a blanket of 
noise, in the sense of a blanket of snow (2003:127). He goes on to say, “Without noise, 
the measurement or observation of a single physical quantity would require an infinite 
memory and an infinite amount of time – it would overload all our circuits”, and noise 
is “the preserver of our sanity”. Wittgenstein draws attention to the problems with 
imagining the opposite of the phrase “every rod has a length”, compared with “This 
table has the same length as the one over there” (1953:s251). To imagine that there 
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could be such a thing as perfect information, transcribable given infinite space and 
infinite time, is to imply that the universe is not a closed system, and therefore to give 
a misleading impression of the nature of information. Perhaps von Baeyer is just 
writing for effect, but his imagined picture of a world of infinite measurement is 
unhelpful. All the more so since, in the natural world, information measurement and 
processing starts at a very crude level, and only adds complexity when it has the means, 
motive and opportunity to do so. 
It should be noted that randomness is not the same as disorder. (However, 
disorder will eventually lead to an informational horizon, when its complexity 
overwhelms measurement, and so disorder can generate randomness.) A random 
number generator (perhaps one making use of the uncertainty principle by using 
photons and a beam-splitter) might generate only ones, and no zeros, for a given period 
of time. That would represent order, and so randomness cannot be the same thing as 
disorder. But in the long run, that limited chain of order would not be part of any bigger 
pattern, if the generator is working properly. Degrees of randomness merely describe 
the uncertainty of predictions of the result, and so degree of randomness is in the eye of 
the beholder, according to the specific flow of information to that location, and the 
associated horizons. 
2.4.5.2.7 Holographic theory 
I would like to briefly mention one last form of horizon, holographic theory, 
which was originated by Jacob Bekenstein, and led Steven Hawking to his idea of 
Hawking radiation, for which he won the Nobel Prize. Holographic theory is an 
important component of informational universe theories. 
Holographic theory started from Bekenstein’s investigations of the entropy of 
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black holes. Lee Smolin describes the principle that Bekenstein came up with as 
follows. “With every horizon separating an observer from a region which is hidden 
from them, there is associated an entropy which measures the amount of information 
which is hidden behind it. This entropy is always proportional to the area of the 
horizon” (Smolin 2000:86). This led Louis Crane to deduce that “quantum cosmology 
must be a theory of the information exchanged between subsystems of the universe, 
rather than a theory of how the universe would look to an outside observer” (Smolin 
2000:175). Holographic theory is compatible with the closed nature of the universe, 
including horizons and background independence. 
Entropy, being related to the ways things can be arranged, can be used to 
measure complexity. Complexity can in turn be measured in terms of the amount of 
information that would be required to describe the system. Complexity also provides a 
limit to the patterns of information a system can generate. In terms of my own 
definition of information, this is expressed in terms of the difficulty of measuring the 
changes that the system can produce. The output of screen with four pixels, governed 
by a simple piece of software, is easier to measure than one with a million pixels, 
showing the output of a modern computer game. 
It is an advantage of my definition of information in terms of change that there is 
naturally a correspondence between the surface area of the system and the changes it 
can make on its environment, given that the surface is where the system can touch its 
environment, and that the surface area also determines the maximum possible 
complexity of the system. (This latter rule is enforced through the collapse of 
sufficiently large systems into black holes.) The holographic theory links my 
definitions of entropy and information, providing the correlation between the two 
which is found in many different scientific domains, and is therefore to be expected if 
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my definitions are to hold up. 
Holographic theory gets its name because a flat hologram seems to us to be 
three-dimensional. From certain angles, a hologram can mimic the information output 
of (for example) a sphere, even though the hologram is flat. Holographic theory tells us 
that we cannot get more information on a system than can pass through the surface 
area of the system. The holographic horizon dispenses with one dimension, at least as 
far as the observer is concerned (and how real would an unobserved dimension be, 
anyway?). This has led some theorists to speculate that, in terms of scientific 
investigation, it may turn out not to matter if we describe our universe as having four 
dimensions of space and time, plus gravity, or if we describe it as having three 
dimensions, without gravity. The existence of gravity may be just a matter of 
perspective (Maldacena 2005).  
2.4.6 More on measurement 
Can measurement only be performed by conscious observers? Here we return to 
the topic of decoherence and the uncertainty principle. In this thesis, I wish to define 
measurement much more broadly, in a way that is consistent with my earlier 
definitions of entropy, time and information. 
I have defined information as measurement of change at a particular location. 
What is changing, according to relativity theory, is spatial relationships. Patterns exist 
in all four dimensions of space-time. Even an “instantaneous” spatial relationship is 
judged as such from a particular location – time is relative. The simultaneity of events 
elsewhere is defined from a frame of reference. Furthermore, the measurements that 
establish the “instantaneous” spatial relationship are necessarily carried out in a 
temporal context. 
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Measurement requires change – the fact that systems are able to affect one 
another. At the most basic level, measurement means somehow specifying the effects 
of change, for a given system. At the quantum level, this is the sense in which 
decoherence results from measurement by the environment. Thanks to the potential for 
order to increase, measurement can form a chain that becomes relevant to the 
perpetuation of relatively ordered patterns.  
Measurement comes with horizons, and we can push back at many horizons by 
increasing the complexity of the system through which we measure. We can use a 
magnifying glass, or a telescope, to capture more information and convey that 
information to our retina. Just shining a bright light can give us more information to 
work with, by introducing energy into a system and causing increased change. A 
camera defeats an entropic horizon (due to complexity) by recording a complex 
situation from a particular location, and such a recording might prove decisive in a 
court case to determine what has happened in the past. 
Horizons such as those due to the speed of light and the uncertainty principle are 
directly related to the closed nature of the universe. Entropic horizons are indirectly 
related, but unlike the previous two types of horizon, can be “pushed back”, offering 
“resistance” in accordance with the complexity of the system being measured. The 
larger and more disordered the system, the more work will be required to overcome 
entropic constraints. Greater detail requires greater effort to measure. 
Information describes measurement of a system, in terms of the effects of 
change reaching a location from that system. Measurement is the specific way in 
which that change occurs. Measurement is the process, and information is the product. 
I have information that Rodney King was beaten by LAPD officers during the Watts 
Riots, and I got that information through video recordings. The two terms, information 
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and measurement, are useful ways of talking about descriptions of change, but one 
would not make sense without the other. Information should be discussed with 
reference to the means by which it is transmitted: as with Marshall McLuhan, the 
medium (measurement) is the message (information). My memories of the Rodney 
King incident and my beliefs regarding it can be characterised as information, but 
depend on a ongoing process of measurement, in the context of the present activity of 
my brain. (McLuhan’s emphasis on the precise form of information transmission 
makes sense if one recalls the physicality of information.) 
In section 2.4.5.2.1, I defined processing as a pattern of measurement. To be 
more specific, processing is a chain of measurement across time. Information moves 
from one form to another, is summarised, correlated, and so forth. We speak of 
information persisting, from the video camera to the television station to my television, 
and finally to my memory, for example; but strictly speaking this is a chain of 
information generation, with new information arising constantly in the course of the 
flow of energy and time. We judge the information to be “the same” in a practical 
context, but change is constant. 
2.5 Complexity 
I have already defined complexity in terms of difficulty of compression. Other 
approaches might involve intricacy (detail) or irregularity. In other words, an intricate, 
irregular object is difficult to describe, thanks to constraints due to the physical nature 
of information. Irregularity is obviously a sign of disorder, and so it is difficult to 
precisely describe a cloud of hot gas; though it may be very easy to describe it roughly. 
Ordered intricacy can be found at the boundary of order and disorder. Systems that are 
neither strongly ordered nor strongly disordered can contain great detail within a 
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limited space, and they may be highly ordered, yet not uniformly ordered. Such 
structures are often found at the boundaries between attractors. 
2.5.1 Order and disorder 
Order and disorder are relative terms. Given the nature of observation, it is hard 
to imagine absolute extremes of order or disorder for the universe as a whole. The 
existence of an observer to judge that either extreme had been reached would 
(paradoxically) imply less than optimal order or disorder, since consistent observation 
over time requires at least some order, to allow memory, and some disorder, in the 
form of change. 
Judgements of order and disorder are made from a particular location. Even 
within a cloud of gas in space, one should be able to find regularity in the relationships 
of some gas molecules, through pure chance. It is difficult to make a final judgement 
that no possible order could exist within a given system, no matter the situation in 
which it were observed. We are prevented from making such final judgements by 
informational horizons. What seems relatively ordered to one observer may seem 
relatively disordered to another. 
Should we speak of a highly disordered state, like a cloud of hot gas, as having a 
pattern? I can think of no compelling reason not to say that every system has a pattern, 
which is judged as relatively ordered or disordered when compared with other patterns. 
Of course, any system can be broken down into smaller systems, or included in larger 
ones, according to the situation of the observer, until horizons due to the closed nature 
of the universe are reached in each direction. (The ability for systems to be made up of 
smaller systems is sometimes called “emergence”). Order and disorder are relative 
terms, and so background independent, being on a continuum. Definition of the 
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boundary between order and disorder is also a relative judgement, and will change 
according to the system being described. This boundary is sometimes called “the edge 
of chaos”, a term first used by artificial life expert Chris Langton (1990). I prefer to use 
the term “the edge of disorder”, since the usual usage causes confusion with chaos 
theory. Mathematical chaos can only occur on the edge of disorder, because of the 
viability of feedback in such an environment. Chaos, in the sense in which I have been 
using the term, is a result, not a cause, of the edge of disorder. 
The edge of disorder is, obviously, not maximally disordered. The term 
describes an environment with a particular mix of order and disorder, and the term “the 
edge of order” would be equally appropriate, since order and disorder are relative 
terms. 
Order and disorder describe relative states of patterns, describing their observed 
regularity from a location. A pattern should be specified together with the location 
from which it is observed. This implies a caveat to the general tendency of entropy to 
result in increased disorder. From a minority of locations, one might observe order 
increasing as (for example) a hot stone heats cold water, perhaps as a few molecules 
fall by chance into a relatively regular pattern. But from the vast majority of locations, 
disorder will be observed to increase. This is a component of the probability that the 
system is moving towards disorder. 
2.5.2 Feedback 
When a system changes and those changes propagate out into the environment, it 
is possible for a chain of changes (causation) to return to the system in some form. The 
probability and other features of this process are determined by the “landscape” of the 
environment in terms of the degree and arrangement of order and disorder. In empty 
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space, the radiation emitted by a star, for example, is unlikely to be reflected or 
otherwise cause changes that make it back to the star. In contrast, activity within the 
star includes feedback between different regions, giving rise to regular variations in 
solar activity. It is much more amenable to patterning of various levels of regularity 
than radiation streaming into space on diverging paths. Of course, the radiation 
emitted by a star in a nebula of gas may cause a shock front, and so trigger the 
formation of new stars. This more disordered environment may well allow feedback to 
reach the original star, and the system as a whole evolves in accordance with 
complexity theory. Feedback can be observed from the galactic scale to the subatomic 
scale. The surface and even the crust of the Earth provide an excellent environment for 
feedback to occur. Our environment is in a suitable zone of order and disorder.  
The nonlinearity permitted by feedback will result in complexity increasing 
relatively rapidly, compared to simple linear increases in the size or disorder of a 
system. Feedback is behind the jump from the relative simplicity of space and 
cosmological phenomena to the extreme complexity of living things and other systems 
on the surface of the Earth. 
Feedback also allows a system to measure itself: for example, one can check 
one’s reflection in a mirror. Infinite regress due to the inherent nonlinearity of 
self-measurement is avoided through natural restrictions due to the capacity and 
organisation of information processing (the physical nature of information).  
An ongoing chain of repeated feedback allows measurement to be directed over 
time to improve the degree of relevance. It also permits error correction. These are 
important topics for engineers designing control systems and otherwise working with 
feedback. (Directed measurement is possible due to self-organisation. 
Feedback between a group of systems may involve mutual adjustment, with 
80 
certain changes in one system leading in a predictable, ordered way to changes 
elsewhere. The size of a system made up of mutually adjusting sub-systems will be 
restricted by physical information constraints: hence the constant competition in the 
semiconductor industry to find better materials for processors. Chip makers are even 
experimenting with biological materials in an attempt to reduce physical constraints 
on processing, taking advantage of the design work of Darwinian evolution. 
2.5.3 Nonlinearity 
Feedback can give rise to nonlinearity, as in the example of the reflection of two 
mirrors. This ordered intricacy is one of the main sources of complexity in the natural 
world. A nonlinear system such as the weather, in which feedback between small 
changes in temperature and cloud cover (for example) can result in a large storm, 
while very complex, nonetheless possesses a certain degree of order that is somewhat 
amenable to modelling. 
Nonlinear phenomena are best modelled by nonlinear means. For example, 
setting up a chess set on a board displays nonlinearity, in that very many combinations 
of these elements are possible. However, all these combinations can be modelled using 
a simple notation system, that is also nonlinear. 
A chess set can be set up very many ways; there are around 10120  possible 
positions. These can be represented in a branching tree structure, and chess-playing 
computers make use of this fact (Shannon 1950), running through all the possibilities 
in a linear fashion. Nonetheless, the chess set is relatively simple, compared to the 
Chinese game of go. The number of possible combinations in go is so high that no 
computer program based on searching its tree structure can play beyond the level of 
advanced beginner (Hendler 2006). The 361 board positions can each have three 
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possible states, though not all positions are legal. It is impossible to calculate 
completely accurately the number of legal combinations, since there are so many. 
Such artificial games pale in comparison with the nonlinearity of an ordinary 
natural system. Luckily, we do not have to process information regarding the exact 
state of these systems. We can use nonlinear forms of representation to approximate 
their relevant features, thanks to the order that is present in their intricacy. This is why 
humans are still able to beat computers at go, as well as manage all the more complex 
nonlinear situations we constantly encounter, whether driving to work or playing 
tennis. 
The branching structure of possible moves used by programmers of chess 
computers is a common feature in nonlinear phenomena. From actual botanical trees 
to tree-like grammars found in music and language, these forms are easy to find. This 
tree structure is one possibility for what is called the “network topology” of the system 
- the way its elements are connected or separated. It is the topological similarity 
between, say, a map and a road system that allows us to use the former to navigate the 
latter: one illustrative example being the famously distorted map of the London 
Underground system (Gribbin 2005:97). 
2.5.4 Fractals 
The idea of a fractal intersects many concepts in complexity theory. Related 
issues include feedback, thresholds, attractors, and the relationship between 
mathematics and the physical world. (I will note here, however, that mathematics must 
be instantiated physically in some manner, due to the physical nature of information.) 
It touches on topics in the Relevance Category, including stability and the probability 
of information propagation. It is a useful topic for discussing the distinguishing 
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features of concepts in the Signal Elements Category. One such point relevant to the 
topic of fractals is the ability of mathematics to describe idealised systems that are not 
subject to restrictions due to the physicality of information or the closed nature of the 
universe; another is the fractal structure of the memes that make up the Signal 
Elements Category. 
2.5.4.1 What is a fractal? 
The term “fractal” initially comes from modern geometry. The term was coined 
by mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot, by analogy with a shattered stone (the Latin 
fractus) (Gribbin 2005: 83). This concept led to several advances in mathematics, 
including new ways of defining the concept of dimension. The most precise definition 
of “fractal” is in terms of its dimension, but here I will be giving priority to 
Mandelbrot’s looser definition, “a rough or fragmented geometric shape that can be 
subdivided in parts, each of which is (at least approximately) a reduced-size copy of 
the whole” (Mandelbrot 1977:4). 
2.5.4.2 Complex dynamics 
Gaston Julia and Pierre Fatou are considered to be the founders of complex 
dynamics (Alexander 1994:1). The topic of describing directions of attraction using 
iteration arose in that same period of scientific advancement around the time of the 
invention of the steam engine (which included thermodynamics, relativity and 
quantum physics), the mid- to late 1800s. 
Complex dynamics uses calculus, the mathematical method of describing 
change which flourished after 1700, and has proven useful in both science and 
engineering. The calculus concept of integration, to which Pierre Fatou’s doctoral 
supervisor Henri Lebesgue contributed, is one commonly used technique. 
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 Complex dynamics makes use of the complex plane, which is a way of 
describing complex numbers. Complex numbers are so named because they are made 
up of two parts, in the form a + bi, with i being the square root of -1. Iterations using 
complex numbers, plotted on a plane, proved to be a useful way of describing the 
dynamic evolution of systems mathematically, due to the presence of this extra 
parameter. 
After the turn of the century, Julia and Fatou introduced concepts such as Julia 
sets and Fatou petals. These are ways of mathematically describing the boundaries 
between areas between attractors, where the direction of attraction changes. A Julia set 
is defined by a formula, namely  f -1 ( J ( f ) ) = f ( J ( f ) ) = J ( f ). Iterations of the set on 
the complex plane result in various complicated, self-similar shapes. These represent 
mathematical descriptions of changes of direction at the boundary of attractors. They 
rather resemble ridges at the top of sand dunes, except that they are far more 
complicated. A grain of sand on the ridge of a dune will eventually fall down one side 
or the other. 
Benoît Mandelbrot mapped the various possible Julia sets, distinguishing 
between the two topologically distinct categories for Julia sets, which are either 
dust-like (made up of independent points) or wholly continuous. The result was the 
famous Mandelbrot set, a group of complex quadratic polynomials that is mapped as a 
shape with infinite complexity and a Hausdorff dimension of 2 (Shishikura:1998). 
2.5.4.3 Dimension 
The idea of dimension is an abstract one, and not directly relevant to this thesis. 
Initially, dimension referred to the number of coordinates needed to define a location: 
a point on a line requires one number, a point on a plane requires two, a point in a space 
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three, and a point in four-dimensional space time requires four coordinates, including 
one for time. 
Henri Lebesgue and others extended the idea of dimension to include more 
complex shapes, using intersections at an arbitrary neighbourhood boundary of a point. 
This topological dimension was challenged by the discovery of extremely complex 
shapes, such as a curve made up entirely of changes in direction (the Peano curve) 
(Goodman 2005:18). Calculating the topological dimension of these shapes gave 
results that seemed intuitively wrong. For example, the Peano curve is a line, and so 
should have a dimension of one; but it touches every point on a plane which has a 
dimension of two. 
To cope with this difficultly, new kinds of dimension were invented. One new 
way of defining dimension, often used for fractals, is the Hausdorff dimension. This 
defines dimension in terms of complexity. One can quantify the shape of a tree, for 
example, by working out how many spheres of what size would be required to capture 
all of the detail of its shape, and then compare the result with a different tree, using 
logarithms, to determine which is more complex. This allows a technical mathematical 
definition of fractals, namely “a set for which the Hausdorff-Besicovitch dimension 
strictly exceeds the topological dimension” (Mandelbrot 1977:15). However, we have 
no need here to pursue this definition in more detail. In this discussion we are using 
fractals as a convenient topic to look at attractors, feedback and complexity, and so the 
less precise, more limited definition from the start of this section is sufficient.. 
Many shapes are fractal according to the strict mathematical definition of the 
term. For example, one can use the Hausdorff dimension to quantify how rough a 
carpet is (Xu 1997). However, most interest in the study of fractals has focused on the 
interactions between attractors, which often results in intricate shapes with a high 
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degree of self-similarity, and power-law characteristics. This is the root of chaos theory, 
and is an important topic in the study of complex dynamic behaviour. 
2.5.5 Attractors 
There has been some discussion of attractors already. Attractors describe the 
probability of evolution of a system. A practical example is a pendulum under the 
influence of gravity. If given a push, the pendulum will swing back and forth and 
eventually come to rest at the lowest point. A swinging pendulum also influenced by 
three magnets (extra attractors) has an overall strange attractor that can be represented 
by a chaotic, fractal shape (Lesmoir-Gordon & Rood 2000:49).5 
The boundaries of attractors often provide complex chaotic or self-similar 
shapes, as mentioned in the above discussion of Julia sets. Perhaps the most famous 
strange attractor, the Lorenz or butterfly attractor, describes a system that moves from 
one attractor to another, chaotically. The attractor can be described deterministically in 
mathematical terms, but the evolution of systems having approximations of this ideal 
attractor in the natural world is impossible to predict, due to magnification of any 
errors in measurement by the complexity of the attractor (as mentioned above). The 
Lorenz attractor came out of meteorology, when Edward Lorenz noticed that small 
differences in data given to a model of atmospheric behaviour resulted in widely 
varying outcomes. (Gribbin 2005:56).) 
Such strange attractors are found at the boundary of simpler attractors, and when 
sufficiently stable, persist and develop in natural systems. We can find countless 
examples of this feature of the particular dynamics of the boundary between order and 
                                                     
5 Although we say things like “a whirlpool is an attractor”, it should perhaps be noted that the word is 
used to describe behaviour over time: it is an “emergent” property from a certain temporal perspective, 
not an object – unless it is a “mathematical object”. 
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disorder in our universe, from weather, to fluid dynamics, to the patterns on the skins 
of animals and insects. I have already spoken of systems with weak feedback 
interaction and thresholds, in the discussion of self-organised criticalities. A 
“threshold” is a loose way of describing an attractor. At some point, the system moves 
from one state to another, in some relatively clear way – such as a rock coming loose 
from a mountainside. 
In mathematics, attractors can be modelled using complex numbers, or more 
precisely, the geometry of complex algebra. Mathematics using the square root of -1 is 
very apt for the statistical mechanics of state transitions. Particle physics makes a lot of 
use of this capability, as enthusiastically described by Roger Penrose in The Road to 
Reality (2004). However, it is worth noting again that where mathematics can be 
completely precise, actual observation is always probabilistic. Attractors, and their 
boundary behaviour, as observed by us in some physical form, are too complicated to 
model perfectly, as well as ultimately being subject to the Uncertainty Principle. But 
the mathematics of complex dynamics and fractals gives us a much better 
understanding of how complexity in the physical world can be generated through 
statistical mechanics. It therefore makes an important contribution to physicalism. 
While fractals in mathematics can be infinitely complex, through infinite 
iteration of a formula, this is obviously not the case for natural shapes that approximate 
those fractals, such as the leaf of a fern. Natural systems (as opposed to mathematically 
defined systems, which can disregard constraints such as those due to the physicality 
of information) do not need infinite complexity to find uses for chaotic and self-similar 
attractors. For example, they cover area efficiently, which is useful for trees that need 
to capture maximum light, or blood vessels that must reach throughout the body, or for 
lungs that need to maximize uptake of air in a limited space. They can be used for 
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compressing relevant information, as in DNA, or for providing a way of randomly 
searching a space such as the visual field. 
In many cases, taking a probabilistic approach is actually an advantage. There 
may be only a very few details of some phenomenon that are relevant to an observing 
system, and simplification in representation makes processing the relevant 
information easier. 
2.5.5.1 Attractors and energy 
A system that has come to rest in an attractor, like a pendulum in its lowest 
position, can be shifted out of that state by the introduction of energy. Introduce a great 
deal of energy, and the pendulum might end up broken on the floor – an attractor that is 
not inside the normal sphere of operation of the system. 
Within an appropriate environment that permits complexity and stability (such 
as the surface of the Earth), open systems will be using energy to enter and leave 
attractors, and to push other systems into and out of attractors. Introduction of energy 
to open systems allows the flow of probability (entropy) to be managed, and so it is a 
valuable resource. 
Acquiring more energy resources may introduce new attractors into the 
phase-space of a system that were previously unavailable. For example, the 
appearance of a new food source might allow an animal to traverse a 
previously-impassable mountain range. Energy allows the threshold to be crossed, and 
a new range of possibilities open up. 
2.5.6 Modelling 
Modelling can be said to require topological similarities between two different 
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systems, with “different systems” being defined as such on some functional basis. In 
other words, the information flow of the two systems is comparable. For example, 
there is some way in which chess resembles a battle: the concepts of infantry, cavalry, 
fortification and leadership are replicated after a fashion. Modern videogames can 
model the experience of war so well that they are used to train American troops. There 
is an implication in the term “modelling” that the topological similarity of information 
propagation is being used for a purpose, or could potentially be so used. However, the 
precise physical instantiation need not be specified in defining the term. 
Behaviour resulting from feedback across boundaries of attractors can be 
topologically similar across very different scales. For example Alfred Lotka developed 
equations in the 1920s to model a chemical reaction that proved very useful to 
population dynamics. The equations were arrived at independently by Vito Volterra, 
working in biology (Schnell et al. 2007:135), and are now known at the Lotka-Volterra 
equations. 
2.5.6.1 Multi-scale modelling 
 Modelling is the heart of science (of course). The advent of computers has 
brought on a great leap in the complexity of scientific modelling. Besides the models 
of global warming that are often in the news, or the weather forecasts produced by 
supercomputers, computers are also used in areas such as particle physics, 
astrophysics, and biology. “Trees branch, fish grow scales, bacterial colonies form 
dendritic patterns, birds flock, tumours invade organs, grasses colonize a bare 
riverbank… New tools are helping us see the regulatory and adaptive properties that 
characterize all biological phenomena” (Schnell et al. 2007:134). 
New opportunities bring new problems. These complex models are highly 
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sensitive to the data they are given. The reliability of one model will be affected by the 
quality of whatever procedure is used to generate that data. This is especially the case 
if the model is receiving feedback, which is often the case in biology. This calls for 
multi-scale modelling, where important interconnected systems are modelled in 
context. 
However, this approach is affected by the physical nature of information, 
because feeding back information between different complex models is extremely 
nonlinear. Not only are their limits due to computing speed; when a model is extremely 
complex, it can become too sensitive to apply generally, or very difficult for us to 
understand and work with. 
2.6 Stability 
The final category to mention in the Physical Category is stability. Indeed, this 
section can serve as a conclusion to the Physical Category, since stability is related to 
all the other topics covered, from entropy, gravity, time, and information to complexity. 
Open systems are noteworthy because they provide unusual stability. The energy 
required is ultimately derived from either gravity itself, or processes that would never 
have commenced were it not for matter coalescing from diffuse gas clouds into more 
ordered forms such as stars, thanks to gravity. It is stability that allows information to 
be relevant or irrelevant. Stability usually arises in a system thanks to feedback among 
its elements. And without stability, there would be nothing worthy of the name 
“system”, and indeed we would not be here to name anything! Stability refers to a 
system staying in some relatively ordered range of states (a stable attractor) within its 
phase space. More properly, this is called metastability, since a maximally disordered 
state can also be considered stable. However, in the following discussion I use the 
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word “stability” to refer to metastability, since this type of stability is what is of 
interest.6 
As can perhaps be seen from remarks above on W. H. Zurek’s idea of Quantum 
Darwinism, stability is basically a matter of survival. In evolutionary theory, fitness 
comes from survival of a particular pattern, often involving a genotype and phenotype 
in their environment. Evolution is not directed from the outside (except in cases such 
as animal husbandry); it is simply that if a pattern fails to survive, it can no longer 
participate. This principle can be generalised beyond biology, to many persistent 
systems that make use of feedback. All sorts of attractors that allow persistence in a 
state above maximum disorder are obviously possible, and such attractors will usually 
rely on the boundary interactions of many component attractors. 
Mathematically, stability theory uses both the algebra of complex dynamics, and 
thermodynamics. Thermodynamic analysis of stability in self-organising open 
systems is an important topic in systems ecology, as pioneered by H. T. Odum and 
others. Such analysis quantifies the propagation of energy in terms of the appearance 
of order and disorder. 
Stability is statistically unlikely, in absolute terms, because it includes some 
measure of order. While stability can arise spontaneously in the case of very small 
systems, on larger scales it must be provided by an open system, which creates greater 
disorder than order, while taking in and giving out energy. This is a requirement of the 
second law of thermodynamics for our closed-system universe. For example, a brick 
wall must be assembled by workers. A brick wall is metastable, in that the ordered 
                                                     
6 It is perhaps worth noting that metastability can have other meanings besides the sense of a system 
persisting in a non-equilibrium state. J.A. Scott Kelso defines metastability in terms of the ability of a 
system to display varying degrees of internal self-organisation at different times. “In the so-called 
metastable regime of the coordination dynamics, the tendency of the parts to express their own 
autonomy and the tendency for the parts to work together coexist all at once.” (1991:369) 
91 
pattern is persisting despite being statistically unlikely. There are more disordered 
combinations of the elements of the system than ordered. The creation of the relatively 
ordered wall required disordering in the form of food consumption, heat dissipation, 
etc. 
We can create stable systems by directly arranging various parts so that feedback 
between them results in persistence over time. Most of the artificial objects that we are 
surrounded with have this type of stability, which we might call organised stability. (A 
chair is stable within a certain range of pressure, distributing weight through its 
structure.) However, many systems in the natural world, and many “abstract” systems 
that arise in the course of human interaction, achieve stability without being 
deliberately arranged in some form intended to be final. We might call this type of 
stability, which involves dynamic equilibriums, self-organising stability. 
2.6.1 Organised stability 
Feedback between attractors is a quick route to complexity for natural systems; 
often this complexity has some kind of power-law structure. However, while this is a 
useful technique for biological systems in particular, it is evolved or “grown” from 
some initial state, rather than directly organised, because of this very complexity. We 
see many more power-law shapes in the natural world than in artificial objects. 
(However, power-law shapes can be found in many more abstract areas of human 
activity, especially networks and systems that possess some kind of grammar.) 
The feedback between silicon dioxide atoms in a glass bottle is rather simple, 
and a bottle can be made quickly. The wine which fills it is created using a more 
complicated feedback process, and we must wait for micro-organisms to perform their 
task of fermentation, for example. Leave the fermentation too long, and the nonlinear 
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process will get out of control, leading to an undesirable result. 
For many purposes, we cannot “grow” what we need through some iterative 
feedback process. Such processes have disadvantages, even though they produce 
results of great complexity. When such complexity is not required, or no iterative 
process is available, it is better simply to construct whatever is needed. Therefore we 
grow food (making use of self-organisation), but build houses (organised stability). 
Iterative processes are well suited to activities where physical constraints are not such 
an important factor, such as language, music and other areas that might be called 
“culture”. While we do not grow houses, the idea of a house mutates as time passes. 
2.6.2 Self-organised criticalities 
The underlying mechanics of systems with self-organised criticalities have 
become much better understood over the last twenty years, thanks to the 
groundbreaking work of scientists including James Lovelock (2000) and Stuart 
Kaufmann (1993). Self-organised criticalities are found in systems consisting of many 
elements that can move between different attractors, with a certain degree of feedback 
between each element, as already mentioned in the example of a slope prone to 
avalanches. This results in a fairly robust form of self-organised stability, which takes 
the form of nonlinear interaction that obeys a power law. The Richter scale for 
earthquakes is one well-known example. The relationship between size and frequency 
of earthquakes is not linear: “Double the energy… and an earthquake becomes four 
times as rare” (Buchanan 2001:44). 
The details of the power law found in the phase transitions in systems with 
threshold-bearing elements on the edge of disorder depend on the topology: that is, on 
the way information flows between the elements in the system. The power law 
93 
emerges from just a few characteristics relating to the size of the system and the way 
its elements connect, and so it is easy to create simulations of real systems that are 
many degrees of magnitude simpler than the phenomenon they simulate, yet can 
nonetheless give insight into the behaviour of that system, since the statistical 
distribution of change will obey the same power law. The scale invariance of power 
law behaviour is so useful that different topological categories are called “universality 
classes” (Buchanan 2001:135). More broadly, the study of the specific physics of scale 
invariance is called “renormalisation”, a term that initially came from quantum 
physics (Penrose 2005:676). 
Earthquakes, forests prone to fires, financial markets, avalanches, traffic flow, 
flocks of birds in flight, and many other natural and cultural phenomena tend to move 
spontaneously back towards a SOC when disturbed. When the system leaves this 
attractor, the complexity of the phase space means the degree of change that will 
propagate through the system cannot be predicted in practice (although over time its 
distribution will be covered by a power law). The criticality is self-organising because 
the system will then move back towards the attractor through internal feedback 
processes. 
2.6.3 Self-organisation and homeostasis 
A simple system with a single self-organised criticality is relatively easy to study, 
although its precise behaviour is impossible to predict in practice. But much of the 
self-organisation we come across is more complicated. It consists of a number of 
smaller systems (defined as such by function or topology) in nonlinear interrelation, 
including feedback. These subsystems have become interrelated, usually by gradual 
evolution, in such a way that the system as a whole displays a stability that can be 
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highly robust and flexible. 
One example of such a system is homeostasis, which has been called “the 
foundation of all modern physiology.”(Martini 2006:11). Homeostasis achieves 
dynamic equilibriums, stability that persists by responding to change. In the case of 
bodily homeostasis, bodily systems (such as the nervous system, the endocrine system, 
and other organs) send and receive information, monitoring each other and the 
environment. This is nonlinear: “Any adjustments made by one physiological system 
have direct and indirect effects on a variety of other systems.” (Martini 2006:14).  
For example, the hypothalamus receives information representing temperature 
from receptors in the body. Given enough stimulus, the hypothalamus can produce 
information (propagate change) to bring more blood to the surface of the skin, and to 
cause sweat to cool the skin by evaporation. This helps keep body temperature in a 
range that is compatible with the survival of various other bodily subsystems.7  
High temperature (too much energy) is just one threat that can push these 
systems out of their stable attractors. Disease and injury are two other obvious 
examples. Attempting to negate some change and return to equilibrium is called 
“negative feedback”. Another category for classifying feedback is (of course) 
“positive feedback”. “In positive feedback, an initial stimulus produces a response that 
exaggerates or enhances the change in the initial conditions, rather than opposing it.” 
(Martini 2006:14). In the human body, examples include blood clotting and giving 
birth. 
Positive and negative feedback differ functionally, but in probabilistic terms 
they resemble each other as looping attractors, with boundaries that could be described 
                                                     
7 Human bodily homeostasis takes some time to become “fine-tuned” after birth. For example, a baby 
cannot maintain temperature stability so well as an adult. 
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using complex dynamics. For example, Alan Turing’s theory of morphogenesis 
(described in Gribbin 2005:118) postulates “actuators” and “inhibitors” (positive and 
negative feedback using chemicals) to produce, among other things, the patterns found 
on animals and plants. This can result in fractal patterns like those from Julia set 
mathematics. A description of the mathematics behind patterning can be found in 
Rabinovich et al. 2000. 
In its broadest sense, homeostasis refers to systems receiving information and 
responding to change, and thereby preserving stability. It needs an environment on the 
edge of disorder, due to the requirements of information propagation in feedback and 
response. Homeostasis requires an open system that is taking in and giving out energy. 
It either will arise through evolution (gradually falling into the pattern of attraction 
through statistical mechanics) or be organised directly by some living thing (a person 
building a thermostat, for example). 
A relatively early book on the mathematics of self-organisation was The Origins 
of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution by Stuart Kaufmann (1993). 
Another good summary can be found in Camazine et al. 2001. 
2.6.3.1 Gaia theory 
It is hard to imagine genuine homeostasis on a scale greater than that of 
relatively compact astronomical objects of the size of planets or perhaps stars, due to 
the difficulty of evolving rapid and flexible feedback mechanisms through outer space 
(with its great distances and barren environment). At the planetary level, we can see 
mechanisms that seem to have achieved homeostasis over the millions of years since 
the Earth’s atmosphere and surface settled down into their current stable state. 
The term “Gaia” was coined by James Lovelock (1979) to suggest a similarity 
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between biological homeostasis, and dynamic equilibriums maintained on the surface 
of the Earth between living things and processes such as weather. Gaia theory is 
sometimes called geophysiology or Earth systems science. Lenton and van Oijen 
define Gaia as “as the thermodynamically open system at the Earth’s surface 
comprising life (the biota), atmosphere, hydrosphere (ocean, ice, freshwater), dead 
organic matter, soils, sediments and that part of the lithosphere (crust) that interacts 
with surface processes (including sedimentary rocks and rocks subject to weathering). 
The upper boundary of the system is at the top of the atmosphere, with outer space. 
The inner boundary is harder to define and can be taken to depend on the time-scale of 
processes under consideration.” (2002:684). 
One of Lovelock’s most famous examples to illustrate Gaian homeostasis is 
“Daisyworld”, which uses the mathematics of complex dynamics to model a planetary 
system that is able to regulate its temperature (Gribbin 2005:206). In its simplest form, 
the model accomplishes this by postulating feedback between populations of white 
and black daisies. The energy reflected and absorbed by the different daisies feeds 
back with their populations, and so can keep the overall temperature of the model 
stable. 
The actual surface of our Earth is obviously much more complicated. It contains 
many systems of the sort that exhibit self-organised criticalities and power-law 
behaviour; and these attractors feed back information (change) with each other and the 
rest of the environment, resulting in highly complex attractor boundaries. Gaia does 
not have a single critical state, due to this complexity. It seems to be a self-organising 
system with dynamic equilibriums (Lenton and van Oijen 2002:694). Lovelock has 
suggested that positive feedback, such as a loop between melting icecaps and 
increased energy absorption, could push the surface of the Earth out of its homeostatic 
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attractor, with unfortunate consequences (2006). However, it is difficult to predict such 
problems precisely, due to the complexity of the attractors involved. 
2.6.4 Stability and chaos 
Some feedback patterns move a system towards a steady state, while others may 
result in disorder increasing until the system cannot function, and disappears. Still 
others may result in moving between various equilibriums, whether in response to 
change or simply as an intrinsic feature of the dynamics of the feedback pattern.  
As already mentioned, chaotic attractors can result from particular arrangements 
of feedback. Biologist Robert May discovered one of the early examples of chaotic 
transitions between equilibriums in his study of the mathematics of population, which 
of course uses iteration (1976). In the mathematical model, a population increases to 
the limit of the environment to support it, then drops back. After a certain period 
depending on the reproductive success of the population, it begins to climb again. 
Some values for the parameters of the model end in a fixed population, if the limits of 
the environment are not reached; others result in a steady oscillation between a limited 
number of population levels. But other values will result in the system moving 
between equilibriums in a chaotic fashion, following a strange attractor. A graph 
showing whether particular growth parameters lead to a regular or chaotic sequence of 
population levels, known as a bifurcation diagram or Feigenbaum diagram, displays 
fractal self-similarity of infinite complexity (Gribbin 2005:76). This mathematical 
discovery has provided a neat example of a chaotic attractor within the application of a 
simple iteration. 
2.6.5 Conclusion 
The discussion of stability brings to an end my explanation of the Physical 
98 
Category. I hope to have given sufficient explanation of the physical processes that 
allow stability to appear. Once we have stability, we have a means for distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant information, and so can proceed to the next category, 
the Relevance Category. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, my intention has 
been to provide a physical basis for questions of relevance, and so open up the 
possibility of moving on to moral philosophy and philosophy of consciousness. 
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3. The Relevance Category 
It has been pointed out by Boltzmann that the fundamental object of 
contention in the life-struggle, in the evolution of the organic world, is 
available energy. In accord with this observation is the principle that, in the 
struggle for existence, the advantage must go to those organisms whose 
energy-capturing devices are most efficient in directing available energy into 
channels favourable to the preservation of the species. 
Alfred J. Lotka (1922:147) 
 
It is fitting that Boltzmann, who defined entropy in terms of probability, should 
have pointed out the importance of energy to open systems. Energy gives open 
systems control over probability, allowing for persistent stability, and for a system to 
move itself (or other systems present in the environment) from one attractor to another. 
This may involve increasing order (building a brick wall) or increasing disorder 
(eating lunch). As Lotka says above, the motivating principle is survival (persistence). 
The energy that permits the existence of open systems ultimately requires the 
organising influence of gravity, as discussed above. Open systems themselves come 
about in the process of statistical mechanics, thanks to feedback. Systems can 
eventually fall into probabilistic attractors whereby interaction between elements of a 
system results in the limited appearance of order, given the right conditions, and 
enough time. One thing that is helpful to this process is the great intricacy that can 
arise from nonlinear feedback, thanks to the complexity of behaviour at attractor 
boundaries. 
It seems possible that the statistical interaction of the elements that make up our 
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closed-system universe goes all the way down to the quantum level, according to 
Zurek’s idea of Quantum Darwinism, already mentioned. However, the surface of the 
Earth is particularly apt for the evolution of open systems, consisting as it does of 
varied elements (mostly formed by earlier stellar processes) and a vast variety of kinds 
of molecules, all in steady but mild gravity, with plentiful solar and geothermal energy, 
protected by an atmosphere that facilitates feedback between air, water and land (all 
three of which are made up of interconnected elements that can develop self-organised 
criticalities). These conditions allow for feedback patterns over distances that are 
relatively short, through channels that permit a high degree of intricacy and order. 
The extreme complexity of the flow of probability on the surface of the Earth 
gives rise to new patterns, described by areas of science such as biological evolution, 
and game theory. While one may speak of say, a radiation shock front being “relevant” 
to the formation of a star, since it contributes to the persistence of a metastable system, 
it is on the surface of the Earth that relevance really gets going. 
The Relevance Category is a subset of the Physical Category. There is always 
some physical instantiation for even the most abstract formal scheme, even if the 
scheme itself does not attempt to model limits such at those from the physicality of 
information. However, the Relevance Category is distinguishable as a subset of the 
Physical Category due to topological features, which allow new “ways of talking”. 
These topological features ultimately result from nonlinear interaction on the edge of 
disorder. 
The issue of consciousness becomes a problem at this point. Does it make sense 
to say consciousness is physical? 
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3.1 Systems theory: energy versus entropy 
Systems theory tends to examine open systems from the perspective of energy. H. 
T. Odum developed a system for diagramming energy flow called “Energy Systems 
Language” (Odum 1994). He also introduced terms such as “emergy”, or embodied 
energy, and empower, which is the flow rate of emergy (1995). 
This focus on energy is due to the influence on systems theory of energetics. 
Energetics is another discipline coming from the period after the mid-1800s, when 
calculus met the steam engine, which we should perhaps call “the thermodynamic 
revolution”! It is one way of distinguishing between useful and useless energy. 
Energetics could be considered a common ancestor of systems theory and information 
theory (Angrist & Hapler 1967:28). Lotka introduced ideas from evolution into 
energetics (1922). 
Energetics focuses on energy, as the name implies. There is even a “maximum 
power principle”, again coined by Odum, which he states as: “During self organization, 
system designs develop and prevail that maximize power intake, energy 
transformation, and those uses that reinforce production and efficiency.” (Odum 
1995:311) 
I think that for philosophy it is much better to change the focus from maximising 
energy to managing entropy (the flow of probability) instead. It is certainly true that, 
for an open system, intervening in the flow of probability requires intake and output of 
energy. Once we have grasped that point, however, I think the most interesting topic 
for philosophy is the properties of the tasks (alterations in the flow of probability) that 
are thereby accomplished. Accordingly I will introduce the term “entropy 
management” in this chapter. 
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3.2 Relevance and stability 
The Relevance Category is concerned with survival. In biology, survival 
requires the feedback process known as genetic reproduction. One of the great insights 
of Darwin was that this process is “blind”, using trial and error rather than foresight, as 
explained by Richard Dawkins (1986), etc. This carries over into survival in general, 
not just survival as biological reproduction. Time passes, and statistical mechanics 
plays out. Some systems can be said to persist over time. Failure to survive means that 
the system has disappeared. If we ask why we observe some systems and not others, 
one answer is simply that those are the systems that have appeared, but not yet 
disappeared, in statistical mechanical progress of the universe over time. 
Survival implies metastability: attractors other than maximal disorder. (Nothing 
could “survive” in maximal disorder since by definition the term implies constant 
change.) The ultimate physical basis for relevance is the possibility of statistical 
mechanics on the edge of disorder. This is the broadest sense of relevance: information 
that influences metastability. Without metastability, there could be no basis for 
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information. There would be nothing 
but constant change. 
Open systems allow for a more limited definition of relevance. They are 
interested in some kinds of metastability, and not others. The existence of an open 
system implies entropy management, since such systems are too ordered to persist due 
to random chance. Morality involves relevance to entropy management; but this 
limited type of relevance is contingent upon the broader phenomenon of metastability. 
I will return to this topic in section 3.4.3. 
An open system need not refer to a biological organism, of course. But here I am 
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particularly interested in self-organising open systems, because of their complexity. 
The development of a certain level of complexity is necessary for the term “morality” 
to be meaningfully applied. (Moral questions would not arise in an empty universe!) 
3.3 Entropy management 
It is a requirement of survival of open systems that they actively manage 
probability. The degree of order in an open system implies an attractor (or dynamic 
system of attractors, more precisely) that is difficult to reach. An open system must 
inhabit the edge of disorder, and so makes use of both order and disorder (order 
requiring the creation of disorder somehow, in any case). Movement out of the 
attractor that permits survival is all too easy, but practically speaking, this is an 
inevitable consequence of the flexible environment required for open systems to 
appear in the first place. 
There are innumerable possible illustrations of these principles, since there are 
so many self-organising open systems. For example, a monkey provides the energy 
and chemicals to keep bodily homeostasis going by eating fruit, maintaining order in 
its body while disordering the fruit (and the fruit tree). It will fight to protect itself by 
inflicting wounds on a rival or predator. One may analyse any activity performed by an 
open system in terms of its effects on order and disorder (probability). 
We may see the need for entropy management as unfortunate. Many of the 
actions we perform to influence probability can seem pointless, a waste of time. But 
we could never eliminate entropy management altogether. We might wish to become 
rich, so as to avoid the more mundane aspects of entropy management. But no matter 
what resources we acquire, we will still have some purposes, and engage in action to 
bring them about. Purpose must always be somehow related to entropy management. 
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Not only must an open system engage in entropy management to survive, due to 
the need to preserve its ordered state, but entropy management is the raison d’être for 
open systems. Even the infinitely powerful gods postulated by theologians are 
described as having desires that they act to accomplish. The alternative case is 
unimaginable: one cannot even say “all desires would be achieved instantaneously”, 
because there would be no reason for desires ever to have formed. One can imagine 
asking a genie to grant a wish that one would never want for anything again; and 
accordingly being struck dead, that being the only possible state compatible with such 
a request.  
3.3.1 Entropy management and time 
One writer begins an explanation of research into the arrow of time by Vahe 
Gurzadyan in the following way: “You wake up one morning and head into your 
kitchen, where you get the distinct feeling that something strange is going on. A swirl 
of milk separates itself from your coffee, which seems to be growing hotter by the 
minute. Scrambled eggs are unscrambling and leaping out of the pan… Apparently, 
you conclude, time is flowing in reverse.” (Gefter 1995). 
But there is something very odd about this thought experiment. How could I, the 
observer, be separated from this reversal of statistical mechanics? How could 
information make its way to me? And if the arrow of time had reversed for me also, 
then I would not notice anything unusual. For the observer, time is revealed in the flow 
of probability. The requirement for open systems to engage in entropy management 
fixes the arrow of time for such observers. 
Allahverdyan and Gurzadyan propose a “curvature anthropic principle”, which 
states that conscious life could only evolve in a universe with negative curvature, 
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which, according to the authors, gives a natural tendency towards disorder (2002). 
Regardless of whether their hypotheses regarding the curvature of space are borne out, 
I do believe that one could formulate an “entropy anthropic principle”. That is, our 
presence as observers requires time asymmetry, probability, and metastability (thanks 
to a general tendency towards disorder which can be overcome).8 
We should not view the arrow of time, horizons to information due to complexity 
or other factors, the probabilistic nature of observation within a closed system, and 
other such phenomena as unfortunate limitations. Rather, they are the foundation of 
observation: they make observation possible; without them, there would be no need 
for any activities, including the receipt and processing of information. One might say 
that “everything would happen at once”, without these horizons and limitations; but 
this would be an unusual sense of the word “happen”, which implies development in 
time. Time, and the world, exist for us because of the need for entropy management. 
3.3.2 Entropy management and morality 
Being so closely linked to purpose, and having a clear basis in the eminently 
physical realm of probability, entropy management would seem a promising candidate 
as the “currency” of a physicalist Utilitarian-type morality. By currency, I mean 
“utility” or whatever else may be stated as being worth maximizing or minimizing in a 
Utilitarian theory of morality – such as pain and pleasure, for example, in Jeremy 
Bentham’s theory (1789). Entropy management would seem to fit well with our moral 
intuitions, which I would go so far as to say exist in all human societies, and even 
perhaps in some ape societies, regarding aiding or harming others.9 
                                                     
8 I suppose it is possible to imagine a universe where order was somehow more likely than disorder, and 
the inhabitants had to focus on keeping order under control, rather than disorder. If so, this would still be 
a form of entropy management. 
9 A believer in “fate” might propose absolute indifference to benefit or harm, hypothetically at least. A 
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Of course, things are not so simple as plugging entropy management into 
Bentham’s Utilitarianism. We have to take various questions into account, and look for 
answers that are compatible with constraints due to the closed nature of the universe, 
the physicality of information, etc. Three important questions for any attempt to 
construct a theory of morality that includes entropy management are: 
Who are the players? Entropy management can be performed by insects and 
computers, but we don’t normally think of these open systems as having status in the 
moral game. 
How do we balance aid and harm? In other words, how much weight should be 
assigned to particular purposes in the ongoing calculation? 
How can we be sure we are right? This requires some theory of truth. 
Such a theory should also be able to cope with the traditional question in 
Western moral philosophy of the nature of free will and its relationship to moral 
responsibility. The rest of this chapter will address these questions. 
If a theory of morality is going to be compatible with the physical nature of 
information, it has to accept some constraints to knowledge, and find ways to work 
around them. We have limited knowledge about the future, limited knowledge about 
others’ experience, and indeed our most detailed knowledge of the simplest systems 
eventually must become probabilistic, at the quantum level if not before. There must 
even be a limit to self-knowledge, because such recursion cannot go on forever. 
I believe the problem of balancing purposes, knowing others’ experience, and 
responsibility can be solved by game theory. The question of “who can play” is in the 
domain of neuroscience and philosophy of mind. 
                                                                                                                                                      
thoroughgoing proponent of such a belief would soon die of thirst, however. 
107 
3.4 Game theory 
Game theory provides a way of quantifying purpose in a situation of limited 
information, and therefore is very useful as part of a theory of morality that is 
compatible with informational horizons. 
According to Dimand & Dimand (1996), game theory is descended from 
economics (Cournot 1838), political theory (Dodgson 1884), military tactics 
(Lanchester 1916), and the mathematical analysis of games such as card games (Borel 
1921). Game theory is usually said to have been founded by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern. “Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (1944) made great advances in the analysis of strategic games and 
in the axiomatization of measurable utility theory and drew the attention of economists 
and other social scientists to these subjects.” (Dimand & Dimand 1996:142). Von 
Neumann, colleague of Albert Einstein, Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing, is said to have 
proposed a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union before it could develop nuclear weapons 
(Macrae 1992), which may be an example of the dangers of relying too much on 
theory. 
Iteration plays an important role in game theory. It is an exploration of phase 
space probabilities for competing systems with limited knowledge of each other. It 
examines equilibriums that become established over time as the strategies employed 
by these systems undergo nonlinear feedback through information propagation. Game 
theory is a modelling technique that can be attempted anywhere that open systems are 
set up in competition this way. One notable application is its incorporation into the 
biological theory of evolution, by scholars such as John Maynard Smith (1982). Its 
application in evolution extends game theory to simple trial and error situations where 
foresight is not taken into account. However, evolution in the algorithmic sense is still 
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found in models including anticipation of the behaviour of competing systems, as the 
system as a whole drifts around dynamic equilibriums as iterations progress. 
The best-known example from game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma (Dresher 
1961). Two prisoners, held separately, are offered rewards for differing levels of 
cooperation; with the proviso that their reward also depends on the action of the other 
prisoner, of whose choice they cannot be sure. Iterating a mathematical representation 
of this game results in equilibriums that shift over time (Axelrod 1984). In this 
example, each player is only concerned with its own payoff; adding further layers of 
concern for the purposes of other systems, and the mathematics becomes very 
complicated. 
We are adept at judging game-theoretic situations (and indeed we seem to gain 
pleasure from this activity, given the popularity of soap operas and television 
programs such as “Big Brother” and “Survivor”). For example, mathematical 
questions topologically replicated as social questions are sometimes easier to solve 
(Cosmides 1989). There is some evidence that language and other aspects of 
consciousness evolved as a result of their evolutionary advantage in managing large 
groups (Dunbar 1996). Perhaps it was the need to cope with complicated game-theory 
calculations that originally kick-started our rather amazing ability to deal “intuitively” 
with nonlinear technological and cultural systems, the precise details of the 
organisation of which often escape us. 
3.4.1 What is a game? 
Wittgenstein talks about defining games at the start of Philosophical 
Investigations. “What is common to them all? – Don’t say: ‘There must be something 
common, or they would not be called ‘games’’ – but look and see whether there is 
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anything common to all. – For if you look at them you will not see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.” (§66). 
However, it is still possible to talk about what sorts of things the word “game” refers 
to: “And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
of detail” (ibid.). Wittgenstein is using topological terms; I will look at the topological 
characteristics of signs like words in the next chapter. For the time being, we can still 
look for similarities in things called “games”. Wittgenstein discusses games from 
chess to patience to ring-a-ring-a-roses. 
In my view, one similarity between games is lack of full knowledge and full 
control. Probability is involved somewhere, either in making a choice or perhaps just 
observing the flow of statistical mechanics. A baby could be amused (for a short while) 
by a game which played out exactly the same way each time; but for a baby, such an 
example of exact regularity would be a novel experience. 
Wittgenstein broadens the usual definition of games to include “language 
games” that include speech and other related actions. The term “is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of 
life.” (§27). Similarly, the hunt for a criminal might be called “a game of cat and 
mouse”. When people liken business, war or love to a game, usually they are 
emphasising the use of strategy and the presence of competitors (although perhaps also 
making light of outcomes). In game theory also, lack of perfect knowledge, 
competition, and strategic decision-making are stressed.  
Following such usage, I think there is a sense in which one can say that morality 
is a game. This usage should not be taken as downplaying the importance of morality, 
of course. Rather, it should be seen as emphasising the importance to morality of 
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informational horizons, decisions based on probabilities, and competition and 
negotiation in the course of entropy management. This underscores the importance of 
concepts shared by morality and games, such as aid and harm, trust, cooperation, and 
deterrence; as well as the practical, material character of moral actions. (“Talk is 
cheap”, but most entropy management is expensive.) Morality would be a 
non-zero-sum game, since many moral outcomes involve gains for all parties. 
3.4.2 “The moral calculus” 
It is possible to postulate a mathematical Utilitarianism, where purposes are 
assigned numerical values on criteria of entropy management or some other basis. For 
example, loss of an article of clothing could be given a value of one, and death could 
be given a value of 100; and this would indicate that one should use one’s shirt as a 
tourniquet if that would prevent someone’s death, which fits with our moral intuition. 
This would result in what might be called a “moral calculus”, perhaps with the results 
of the outcomes of various events plotted upon some landscape, with higher points 
representing better outcomes. This would be modified in some way according to the 
status of the participants, with humans getting more points than insects. 
However, an understanding of limits to information due to complexity, etc., 
means that we cannot for a moment take this “calculus” to have some kind of 
physically-instantiated existence in its own right. Rather like a fractal, we can take a 
look at some isolated area of the theoretical map of outcomes, if calculated 
approximately using arbitrary values, and plotted in some way. But the “moral 
calculus” itself does not exist, any more than the infinitely complex Mandelbrot set 
could be completely instantiated in our finite universe. Rather, it is a formal scheme 
devised to a certain purpose, to aid practical action. It uses simple elements in 
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combination to explore a nonlinear space. 
We can compare actual outcomes with imagined alternatives, and judge them 
better or worse. In such a case we presume perfect information, with regard both to 
actual and imagined events. This assumption of perfect information is a consequence 
of modelling; but we should not confuse the model with that which is modelled. It is 
much less complex, being a formal representation indicating assumed general 
probabilities. 
This point is often ignored in moral philosophy, especially when it comes to the 
use of hypothetical examples, which are naturally very common in this (relatively) 
practical field. Hypothetical examples can be useful to check a theory for 
contradictions, using our well-honed ability to analyse the logic of human interaction, 
mentioned in the previous section. However, the selection of how much detail to put 
into any hypothetical example is an extremely loaded one. One ends up saying, 
“Would it be moral to assassinate Hitler, all other things being equal?”, but of course 
things never are. Founding a moral theory on such examples is a perilous business, and 
prima facie indicates a lack of understanding of the difference between a theory that 
can presume perfect knowledge, and the reality to which the theory is applied. 
Game theory, which assumes limited knowledge, provides a way to avoid this 
problem while still permitting some form of quantification of morality. Balancing of 
different purposes takes the form of actual negotiation between players. Evidence of 
some kind, even if only very broadly probabilistic, is required in this process. There is 
no “eye of God” instantiation of all possible outcomes of the situation; and even 
knowledge of the physical situation quickly hits informational horizons, especially 
those due to time and complexity. So in balancing, for example, our own interests with 
those of an animal, we can only do our best to understand how much the animal’s 
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purposes “matter” to it, continually reviewing what seems to us as evidence, and not 
assume that such a question can ever be answered to an infinite degree of precision in a 
“moral calculus”. 
The same principles apply to questions involving presumed future purposes, 
which might arise in discussion of abortion or environmental problems, or ethical 
questions regarding thwarting the immediate desires of children or drug addicts. Game 
theory provides a practical way of balancing interests in such cases of limited 
information. As long as evidence can be provided that such purposes may arise, they 
can be taken into account. 
It would seem to be a logical conclusion of this kind of Utilitarianism that it is 
better for players in this moral game (human beings, for instance) to exist than to not 
exist, if too much pressure on resources required for entropy management does not 
result: and this would fit with our moral intuition that it is better for humanity to have 
flourished over the millennia than to have remained as a few thousand individuals 
living hand-to-mouth on the African grasslands. 
3.4.3 Responsibility 
The topic of free will and moral responsibility of course has a venerable tradition 
in Western philosophy. But the question of whether something is done freely would 
not be nearly so interesting to philosophers except for the question of determinism. 
That said, one point worth noting, which does not touch on determinism, is Thomas 
Hobbes’ observation that “free will” does not mean the will has freedom, but that a 
person has freedom (1651:146). 
What sort of position should we take on free will and responsibility, if we take 
into account limits to information? It seems that the universe may be deterministic, 
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though we may never receive proof of that. One question is whether we should care at 
all if the universe is deterministic or not. On the one hand, if consequences do not 
proceed deterministically from actions, then it is hard to see what use the concept of 
responsibility could be. On the other, if actions are fully determined by the physical 
state prior to where we define the “action”, that would also seem to create difficulties 
for the idea of responsibility. 
How did the question of responsibility arise in the first place? Responsibility is 
needed to guide iteration, in game theory. If I do not somehow give you feedback on 
your actions, you will not take my interests into account. No matter what philosophers 
or scientists say about the doubtfulness of the idea of free will in a deterministic 
universe, it is unlikely that we will shut down the justice system as a result. The 
obvious benefits to entropy management of holding people responsible are just too 
great, being one element of creating the trust needed for ongoing cooperation. 
It is quite natural for a desire for justice to be one of our deepest instincts, given 
our evolutionary history in large groups of cooperating individuals. However, 
punishment or deliberate withholding of aid (which I will treat as similar) for reasons 
other than balancing entropy management is not moral for the Utilitarianism I am 
sketching in this chapter. Possible moral reasons for punishment include influencing 
future behaviour, fulfilling people’s wishes, or reducing potential future harm. If no 
similar entropy management considerations apply, it is not moral to punish. This is 
quite a different outcome from many religious moralities, perhaps because the latter 
are partly codifications of our simple instinct to enforce responsibility (which instinct 
is often morally justified, but not always). 
Putting responsibility in the context of game theory gets rid of any 
incompatibility between determinism and free will. In this view, free will becomes a 
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consequence of informational horizons that accompany observation in a closed-system 
universe. Insofar as observation by an open system permits entropy management, with 
limits to information about what is happening elsewhere and elsewhen, free will is 
inevitable. There is nothing intrinsically moral about punishing past actions; only 
present desires and future probabilities need be considered. Responsibility is a rule in 
the morality game, rather than something of intrinsic moral worth. The goal of this 
form of Utilitarianism does not go beyond balancing entropy management. 
Speaking of free will as arising from the nature of observation by open systems, 
within informational horizons, does not mean that the term itself is useless. The 
consequence of this type of concept of free will is to get rid of philosophical 
conundrums relating to determinism. However, statements such as “free will does not 
exist” become harder to understand. Free will is not a thing that could exist or not exist, 
in this interpretation. We cannot arrive at a perspective that discounts informational 
horizons, because these are inevitable outside of formal theory. 
 Raymond Smullyan captured the difficultly of an observer being able to tell 
whether free will “exists” in his essay “Is God a Taoist?” (Hofstadter and Dennett 
1982). On a related note, one might even note similarities between this question and 
the issue of the difference between tiān (the divinely ordained order of things) and rén 
(human purposes) in classical Chinese philosophy, discussed in Graham 1989. As 
Zhuangzi said around 300 BCE, “Knowing depends on something with which it has to 
be plumb; the trouble is that what it depends on is never fixed. How do I know that the 
doer I call ‘Heaven” [tiān] is not the man [rén])? How do I know that the doer I call the 
‘man’ is not Heaven?” (Graham 1981:84) 
One possible interpretation of the problems caused by determinism is by analogy 
to Bennett and Hacker’s idea of the “mereological fallacy” (2003), which will come up 
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in its proper context in the discussion on consciousness below. This is a fallacy of 
applying to parts descriptions which only apply to the whole. An example would be 
Hobbes’ remark that freedom belongs to a person, not to the will: purposes do not have 
freedom; rather, we have freedom to choose our purposes. Bennett and Hacker use the 
term to criticise philosophers of mind who speak of the brain seeing, for example, 
rather than the person. Likewise, one might say that freedom belongs to the observer, 
not to the process of statistical mechanics that plays out in the course of information 
propagation. A similar point might be regarding arguments against free will from 
neurological experiments such as those of Benjamin Libet (2004:123). 
3.4.4 Objectivity 
If information is always measured at a location, the traditional concept of 
objectivity is called into question. What is the difference between objectivity and 
subjectivity, in a closed system universe where any observer must experience 
informational horizons? This is obviously a difficult topic, and here I can only indicate 
the direction I believe is most fruitful. 
One situation in which the question of objectivity arises is when two observers 
must agree on some observation. Every observer has a location, and each will see an 
object from different angles, and receive information at different times according to 
factors such as distance and relative movement. Another example where the concept 
of objectivity will arise is when a single observer finds, over time, that observations 
cannot be relied upon: for example, the mirage of water in the desert caused by 
refraction of light. These are functional situations, and in my view, objectivity depends 
on functionality. Statements or beliefs are true for some observer, or group of 
observers, in a particular historical and temporal context, in the course of entropy 
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management. (As Wittgenstein says, “Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or 
hope for the space of one second – no matter what preceded or followed this second? – 
What is happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The surroundings 
give it its importance.” (1953:§583).) Truth is a matter of reliability, for a particular 
observer. 
Objective truth requires accumulation and comparison of evidence by an 
observer or observers. With regard to the truth of some proposition, two observers 
must first agree on prior definitions, and other “rules”. Even a single observer realising 
that an oasis is a mirage must understand what those terms mean, either linguistically 
or purely in terms of entropy management. With regard to the truth value of beliefs, 
which might never be put into language (such as a belief that a chair will support my 
weight), Wittgenstein gives a pithy answer: “The feeling of confidence. How is this 
manifested in behaviour? An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria. An 
expectation is embedded in a situation, from which it arises.” (1953:§579-581). 
It is not useful to search for a sense of objective truth by means of which 
something could “really” be true for all observers at all times. This is ruled out by the 
nature of information in accordance with the theory of relativity, the uncertainty 
principle, etc. It is even more misleading to speak of something being true regardless 
of observation. What is this “something” that is true, in such case? What example of 
such a truth could be given, free from all observational context? We need not always 
limit the term “observer” to open systems: one of W. H. Zurek’s slogans is “the 
environment as witness” (Ollivier, Poulin & Zurek 2004). However, information 
implies measurement of some kind. 
This approach to truth means that statements regarding morality can be 
objective: all judgements of truth must be made in a particular context, and despite 
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unavoidable limits to information, after all. It is possible to agree on criteria for moral 
judgements, just as it is possible to agree on criteria for saying whether the Statue of 
Liberty is in New York. However, that is not to say it will always be as easy to come to 
some common functional approach. The question of the location of the Statue of 
Liberty might be muddied by the presence of a smaller version in Paris; but moral 
questions are usually very complex, and involve judgements on the strength of others’ 
desires, to cite one factor that is particularly affected by informational constraints. If 
we say that moral judgements are “not as objective”, that is shorthand for the difficulty 
of agreeing on a reliable functional context that works for the observers involved. 
3.4.5 Policy 
This form of morality – a Utiltarianism based on entropy management that takes 
constraints on information into account – is not prone to producing statements such as 
“abortion is wrong”. Nothing is absolutely right or wrong: right and wrong come about 
through the specific purposes of the actual players in the game, over time. All 
consequences for all players (present and future) are relevant, and the resulting 
situation is usually far too complex to be reduced to such simple maxims. 
It is possible to talk in general terms about balancing “strength” of desires, in 
terms of entropy management. For example, one person’s desire to keep living ought 
to be stronger than another’s desire for a pair of sneakers, and so it is wrong for the 
latter to kill the former for that entropy-management purpose. However, here we are 
back in the realm of simplified hypothetical examples, which tends to lead to 
digression and confusion. 
The main focus of this form of morality, which uses game theory as a way of 
dealing with limits to information, should be on general mechanisms that allow 
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cooperation and balancing of desires over the long term. This gives this morality a 
very practical bent, focussing on aid, trust, negotiation, and other principles from game 
theory. This allows for natural processes such as discounting (in the economic sense) 
future interests to the extent that they cannot be guaranteed, for example. Game theory 
also provides a way of explaining why and how interests should be taken into account 
that are rather separated (in time or otherwise) from whatever matter is being 
discussed. It can provide a method of quantifying “social fabric” arguments. 
The strategies that this form of morality will tend to endorse are those that 
encourage transparency, trust, negotiation and fair dealing. This is because it can be 
shown using game theory that cooperation and trust tend to result in greater acquisition 
and exploitation of the resources that are required for entropy management. 
Furthermore, mechanisms to improve transparency and otherwise make relevant 
information available are needed to gather the evidence required for reliable balancing 
of purposes. Another principle of such a morality will be to promote understanding of 
how systems work, so that these mechanisms can be used effectively. 
The systemic structure of such strategies will promote flexibility, efficient and 
detailed collection of information, and feedback mechanisms for correcting errors. 
Specific examples would include representative government, private property, 
regulated markets, progressive taxation, freedom of speech, a politically-independent 
judiciary and police force, and so on. 
Of course, these are the features of democratic government since the 
Enlightenment, which, it seems obvious to me, is a more moral way to organise society 
than totalitarianism, precisely because of how well it is able to balance the purposes of 
its citizens using effective game-theoretic strategies. Power is still very unevenly 
distributed in such societies (not to mention between these states and less fortunate 
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ones), which of course distorts the game. Not only are resources needed for entropy 
management distributed less than optimally, but access to relevant information 
required to act effectively is also unequal. However, history has certainly shown that 
attempting to enforce order on a society by totalitarian means is not a preferable way to 
solve the problem of inequality of resources and information needed for entropy 
management. Rather, we should recognise the complexity of the systems that make up 
our societies, and attempt to order them through self-organisation, including game 
theory.10 
One possible consequence that could be taken from this form of morality is that 
it is wrong to harm the interests of legitimate players in an attempt to act on behalf of 
gods, spirits, or other entities whose existence seems uncertain. In particular, when we 
are asked to take into account the interests of an entity for which there is little or 
contradictory evidence, to the detriment of the interests of others whose existence is 
not in doubt; and furthermore, the interests of this alleged entity happen to coincide 
with the interests of the person making the unsupported claim, then we certainly 
should be very cautious that we do not act immorally. 
The same point would apply to any attempt to attribute intrinsic moral status to 
the nation state, for example: we have no evidence that a state (as opposed to its rulers 
or citizens) can have desires. And of course, assignation of moral weight on grounds 
unrelated to entropy management, such as mere possession of a certain skin colour or 
gender, are also ruled out. 
                                                     
10 However, we should be aware that such nonlinear systems must be “grown” slowly, because of the 
need for mutual trust to be established among a large number of players. Democratic institutions cannot 
be imposed by fiat, if such trust is missing. 
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3.4.6 Conclusion 
This sketch of a possible approach to morality based on entropy management 
has avoided one rather glaring question. Given that relevance relates to the survival or 
otherwise of metastable structures, to which structures should we give priority, and 
why? To some extent, game theory provides a way around this question. We simply 
recognise the status of other players in the morality game: and so the discussion above 
has been possible, dealing with broad issues and simple examples such as murdering a 
human being for the sake of a pair of sneakers. The question of whether someone 
should be considered as a moral agent or not is like any other question of objective 
truth: one accumulates and compares evidence until what is deemed an acceptable 
level of reliability is reached, according to the situation. Settling any question beyond 
all doubt, for all observers and for all time is not possible, thanks to informational 
limits. 
It is true that there will be borderline cases where we are unsure how much 
weight to ascribe to the purposes of some candidate for moral status: questions 
involving animals, the intellectually handicapped, or even artificial intelligences. In 
such situations we will look for theoretical guidance. Generally, however, we have not 
needed absolute agreement on a formal theory of morality in order to develop practical 
methods for balancing entropy management: especially when the presumed interests 
of supernatural entities are not considered. For example, the typical criminal justice 
system will weigh immoral actions on a practical scale that seems to conform to an 
entropy-management standard. Murder, which is a disruption of the entire open system 
to the point where it fails completely, is ranked at or near the top. At the other end of 
the scale, we punish crimes where no actual harm may have been done, because of a 
recognition of the need for consistency in maintaining the certainty required for 
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cooperation – a game-theoretic principle. 
This is one of the most difficult topics found in philosophy, since it lies at the 
intersection of morality and philosophy of mind. The rest of this chapter will look at 
the question of where moral status comes from. However, I must introduce one more 
concept first, for the sake of this discussion, and also the discussion in the final chapter 
of this thesis: the term “meme”. 
Although the previous discussion on the possible connection between order and 
morality, and the performance of morality under conditions of limited information, has 
necessarily been rather brief, I hope that it has provided some food for further thought. 
3.5 Memes 
The term “meme” was coined by the biologist Richard Dawkins in The Selfish 
Gene, and has since become popular in philosophy (e.g. Dennett 1991, Blackmore 
1999), and has even made it into the Oxford Dictionary, with the origin: “Greek 
mimema ‘that which is imitated’, on the pattern of gene”. A meme is a “unit of cultural 
transmission”, in Dawkins’ original sense. “Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, 
catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as 
genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms 
or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to 
brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.” (Dawkins 
1976:192). 
The comparison of memes and genes has advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantage is that it draws attention to the way in which ideas evolve. This is very 
helpful in extending principles from systems theory beyond physical objects and into a 
more abstract domain. The disadvantage is that it encourages a tendency to think of 
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memes as “things” of a certain type. Daniel Dennett, for example, speaks of memes as 
parasites that “take up residence in an individual brain, shaping its tendencies and 
thereby turning it into a mind” (1991:252). Bennett and Hacker indicate some of the 
problems with this approach (2003:431-435). “The claim that human consciousness is 
a complex of meme-effects in brains that can best be understood as the operation of a 
von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of the 
brain is, we suggest, quite literally meaningless.” (2003:435). 
I would like to suggest a way of looking at the concept of memes that may avoid 
such problems, while retaining the advantages of the connection with genes. Memes 
are not analogous to genes, or at least the analogy seems somewhat problematic. 
Rather, both memes and genes are ways of describing probabilistic attractors. Instead 
of looking to genes to help understand memes, we should look at what the two 
concepts have in common, as ways of talking about probability. Similarly, evolution in 
general should be characterised in terms of probability: it need not always use a 
genotype/phenotype mechanism. Evolution of memes is potentially quicker and much 
more fluid than biological evolution. 
 A meme is a behavioural attractor. It gains this identity in some functional 
context that depends on the observer. It will be physically instantiated in some way, 
although its position in a nonlinear context means it shares in properties beyond its 
own physical ones. For example, there is a much higher likelihood that people will sit 
on a chair in a waiting room, rather than sing the chair a tune. However, a mentally 
disturbed person, or someone from some hypothetical isolated society, might interact 
with the chair in unexpected ways. Given this sense of the term, memes are not only 
encountered by humans; although our “meme environment” or “meme context” is 
vastly more complicated than that of simpler open systems engaging in 
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entropy-management behaviour, especially thanks to language and other nonlinear 
aspects of consciousness (and obviously no simpler systems use the word “meme” in 
abstract description of behavioural phenomena). 
Entropy management implies systems that must be managed. Open systems with 
similar purposes will tend to act with a given system in similar ways. However, this 
interaction is only probabilistic (although for simple objects such as clothing or a knife, 
the probability of particular types of interaction may be very high, across all cultures). 
As elements in an ongoing feedback process of entropy management, these attractors 
can evolve over time. 
When we teach someone how to read music (for example), we are not 
transferring a meme. Rather, we are adding to the contextual basis upon which that 
person interacts with memes. Now the person can sing from a sheet of music, write 
down musical notation, and so on. (Both actions can be considered as new instances of 
memes that can attract certain types of behaviour, such as singing along, or reading the 
written notation.) Often, we will teach others by demonstrating the appropriate types 
of behaviour on some instance of the meme, although some topologically related 
model (such as a picture or verbal description) can also be used. But often a person will 
come across a standard behavioural approach to a meme independently, through 
analogy with another meme, or simple trial and error. 
Memes require such a context in order to behave probabilistically as attractors. 
There needs to be some ordered process for which they have relevance. As such, 
memes should not be considered as existing independently of a behavioural context. 
The term provides a way of talking about patterns of behaviour. There is little point 
arguing over whether a butter knife is a different meme from a table knife: the 
distinction is a matter of convenience, depending on functional needs in the course of a 
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particular analysis. 
3.5.1 Fractal memes 
Since they are attractors, and can undergo feedback quickly in a complex 
environment as they evolve, memes can take on a fractal character. That is, they can 
acquire a complicated self-similar internal topological structure that is capable of great 
flexibility and detail. A musical note may be called a meme, since it has a probabilistic 
effect on behaviour (touching the key of a piano, for example). But the wider meme of 
which it is one element, namely music, has a fantastically complex structure that can 
result in a great variety of distinct (yet related) forms of behaviour. 
It is one of the distinct characteristics of human beings that we make use of such 
fractal memes, with two of the most obvious examples being language and music. 
Others might include fashion, art, mathematics, or ritual. Fractal memes can provide 
for flexibility of behaviour in the face of nonlinearity: in use of tools, for example. In 
particular, they can be used to describe extremely complicated situations; and they are 
therefore very well suited to communication of relevant information between open 
systems. I will return to this topic in the next chapter. 
3.6 Consciousness 
Everything from our useless appendix to the weak backs we have through 
standing upright should remind us that evolution is not a process of 
inevitable perfection; in fact, evolution is a process of Heath Robinson 
make-do, a series of compromises by which we attempt to do the best we can 
with a set of incompatible goals.  
Robin Dunbar (1996:193) 
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The topic of consciousness is a difficult one. D. J. Chalmers refers to the 
problem of why there should be consciousness at all (in the sense of our lived 
experience of the world) as “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1995). It seems that there is 
something about (for example) the colours we see or the moods we feel that cannot 
adequately be captured by words, and which we cannot imagine sharing fully with 
anyone in quite the same way as we experience it. There is something which one might 
call “private” about our consciousness, although the term seems not quite to fit. On the 
one hand, we can talk about our sensations and moods quite well, and when we feel 
that we can’t express exactly what we mean, often we are not quite sure we understand 
ourselves what we want to say. On the other hand, it does not quite make sense to 
speak of something being “private” that can never be shared. We can imagine 
trespassing on private land, but it is hard to imagine how one could share the 
experience of seeing a colour, needing no confirmation by verbal or other means to be 
sure that the experience was shared. 
There seems to be a clear problem here with informational horizons due to 
complexity: “the human brain is the most complex object we are aware of in the 
universe” (Glynn 1999:7). To fully model a working brain could well result in the 
creation of an artificial intelligence, while leaving us none the wiser as to the 
conscious experience of that intelligence. However, consciousness is rather an unusual 
subject, and “the hard problem” does not just result from complexity. Two interesting 
topics related to this point are the mereological fallacy, and neurophenomenology 
3.6.1 The mereological fallacy 
M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker argue that there is a great deal of conceptual 
confusion in this area. Taking an approach influenced by Wittgenstein, they suggest 
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that “misunderstandings concerning the concepts of inner and outer, direct and 
indirect, privileged access and introspection, subjectivity and privacy, collectively 
support a wholly misguided picture of the mental” (Bennett and Hacker 2003:97). 
The reason for such misunderstandings is what Bennett and Hacker term the 
mereological fallacy: “a fallacy of ascribing to a part properties that can be ascribed 
intelligibly only to the whole of which that part is a part” (Bennett and Hacker 
2003:111). This is a warning not to carelessly use psychological terms with reference 
to the brain rather than the mind. When this fallacy is committed, “like Cartesianism, 
contemporary neuroscience conceives of mental events, state and processes as 
occurring, obtaining or going on in a human being - in particular, in his brain - rather 
than conceiving of mental states as states of the person, of mental acts or activities as 
acts and activities of the human being, and of mental processes as processes undergone, 
gone through or engaged in by a person” (Bennett and Hacker 2003:112). 
Explaining the “why” of the mind rather than the brain requires a description in 
another domain. “These descriptions will cite multitudinous factors: past and 
prospective events that in given circumstances may constitute the agent’s reasons for 
action; the agent’s desires, intentions, goals and purposes; his tendencies, habits and 
customs, and the moral and social norms to which he conforms” (Bennett and Hacker 
2003:365). This is certainly not to say that the mind does not depend on the brain, or 
some other equally complex physical pattern of feedback processing. It is rather an 
attempt to avoid a particular type of confusion that can arise from injudicious use of 
words.  
One might even say that the reason “the hard problem” is considered to be a 
problem that needs solving is due to the mereological fallacy. I will return to this topic 
in section 4.3. 
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3.6.2 Neurophenomenology 
A topic which seems to me to be closely related to Bennett and Hacker’s 
distinction between the mind and the brain is the concept of neurophenomenology 
(Laughlin et. al. 1990, Varela and Thompson 2003). The key concept for Varela and 
Thompson is embodiment. Consciousness relies on an underlying complex system, but 
there is no particular reason to define hard limits to this system at the edges of the brain, 
the nervous system, or even the body: “the processes crucial for consciousness may cut 
across the brain-body-world divisions, rather than being limited to neural events in the 
head” (Varela and Thompson 2003:279). 
The complexity of the brain and the rest of the nervous system means that it must 
be doing a lot of the work that makes consciousness possible. However, taking into 
account the mereological fallacy, we need not limit the physical system underlying 
consciousness to neurons. Other physical components (such as spindles of muscle 
fibres (Cotterill 2003)) may be able to play a role, if the topology permits. 
Neurophenomenology certainly seems to be compatible with Bennett and 
Hacker’s approach: “no neural process per se can be “the place where consciousness 
happens”, because conscious experience occurs only at the level of the whole 
embodied and situated agent” (Varela and Thompson 2003:281). 
3.6.3 Nonlinearity and consciousness 
One of the most important methods in the scientific study of the relationship 
between brain and mind has been cognitive neuropsychology, which attempts to track 
down the specific machinery required for different aspects of consciousness. One 
approach has been to study the effects of various injuries to the brain (Glynn 
1999:310), but such methods have been supplemented by new ways of measuring 
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brain activity (such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, which monitors blood 
flow and oxygen consumption in the brain). 
The physical modularity indicated by such methods seems to fit well with our 
experience of consciousness. One way of illustrating the connection might be the 
strange experiences we have when brain functions are disassociated when falling 
asleep, intoxicated, concussed, etc. Another example could be William James’ idea of 
the “specious present” (1891), the conscious sensation of the “now” as an ongoing 
flow of experience, despite the fact that the underlying neural events may not be 
simultaneous (the so-called “binding problem” (Glynn 1999:412)). 
However, perhaps the clearest illustration of the nonlinearity of consciousness is 
our ability to make associations. Any conscious sensory experience can be 
accompanied by other modalities of consciousness: memories, emotions or moods, 
verbal descriptions, awareness of number, and so on. It is difficult to say exactly how 
these different modalities are associated, in conscious terms: they simply seem to arise 
together. Although we might say, “I associated his face with that comedian, and felt 
amused”, the perception, memory and emotion might well have all come up at the 
same time, as far as we can consciously tell.  
We can also “prompt” these kinds of conscious associations through interior 
monologue, or simply by the right kind of attention. We can observe any kind of object 
or scene, and attempt to “conjure up” associations, which then arise in consciousness 
spontaneously. We cannot be sure whether we will experience a memory, think of 
some other object, or even become aware of some piece of music. This ability is very 
useful when engaged in some creative activity, such as storytelling. It is also useful for 
analysis. In his discussion of polysynthetic languages (in which verbs contain a lot of 
extra information on the subject, object, etc.), Mark Baker gives the example of how to 
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say “I am a student” in Mohawk – katerihwaiénstha’ (Baker 2001:88). This is a single 
word that literally means “I habitually cause myself to have ideas”. 
It seems to me that failure to discard weak associations may be implicated in the 
paranoia suffered by schizophrenics, etc. Dreaming seems to make use of relatively 
free associations. (The precise purpose of dreaming is still debated, although 
disruption of dreaming seems adversely to affect memory.) One might speculate that 
the brain makes many associations, then filters them on some probabilistic basis, with 
only those that seem useful appearing in consciousness. In the case of dreaming or 
mental illness, this filtering may be weaker than normal. However, overly strict 
filtering might result in lower levels of creativity, due to failure to find unexpected 
connections. 
In this section I wish to focus on three points that I think are particularly helpful 
in understanding the role of nonlinear association in consciousness: synaesthesia, 
evolution of memes (particularly as influenced by language) and new social pressures. 
3.6.3.1 Synaesthesia 
The condition termed synaesthesia was named by Francis Galton in 1880, but 
has only become a popular subject for neuroscientists recently. “There have been 
approximately 157 peer-reviewed synaesthesia papers published in the past 25 years; 
of these, 75% have been published within the past five years and 35% within the past 
18 months.” (Simner 2007:27). 
In synaesthesia, “the normal barriers keeping the sensory modalities apart are 
absent, allowing spectacular crosstalk between sight, sound, taste, touch and smell.” 
(Lehrer 2007:48). Synaesthesia results in unusual associations between words, letters, 
numbers, musical notes and aspects of sensory consciousness. Associations may even 
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involve attribution of personality or gender (Simner & Holenstein 2007). Estimates of 
frequency among the population range from 1 in 2000 to 1 in 20 (Simner et. al 2006). 
The frequency is difficult to pin down because associations across modalities are 
common, even among those who do not qualify as syanaesthetes: “If asked which of… 
two figures… is a “bouba” and which is a “kiki,” 98 percent of all respondents choose 
the blob as a bouba and the other [spikier shape] as a kiki.” (Ramachandran and 
Hubbard 2006:59). 
Synaesthesia “is thought to arise from a neurodevelopmental tendency to 
preserve or develop atypical interactions between brain regions that normally do not 
communicate” (Simner & Holenstein 2007:694). Synaesthetes perform well at finding 
targets in jumbles of words and letters, if they are able to associate colours to them, for 
example (Ramachandran and Hubbard 2003a). This unusual case demonstrates 
something we take for granted, and even perhaps find difficult to notice at all, because 
it seems so natural: the nonlinear association in consciousness of a variety of very 
different modalities. A synaesthete sees letters as coloured, or can perform 
mathematical calculations by visualising numbers arranged in three-dimensional 
space, which can be very useful in certain circumstances. However, the role of 
association of different modalities is also important in the activities that seem 
characteristic of consciousness, such as remembering, imagining or analysing. 
Of particular interest is the recent emphasis by researchers on the importance of 
linguistic features to synaesthesia (Simner 2007, Rich et. al 2005). Language, and 
particularly linguistic association, seems central to consciousness. 
3.6.3.1.1 A note on associations 
Any particular modality can be described as background independent. For 
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example, my optician tells me that my eyes are different sizes (my vision is fairly poor, 
naturally). It seems to me that my left eye sees objects as redder than my right. There is 
not really any sense in which I could say that one of them had more “accurate” colour 
vision than the other. A modality does not require absolute measurement, but rather 
differentiation. It is differentiation that allows functional applicability: the ability to 
deal with probabilities. What counts is the topology, the possibilities of information 
flow. Synaesthetic association between simple categories such as letters, colours, 
numbers, tones, scents, tastes, spatial positions, and so on, is no doubt permitted by 
their similar topologies. 
3.6.3.2 Early social pressures helping the evolution of language 
One possible connection between game theory and nonlinear complexity in 
consciousness is what psychologists call “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen 1995). 
Theory of mind refers to one’s understanding of others’ awareness. We can be aware 
that others know we are aware of what they are thinking (at least after the age of four 
or so) and so the loop goes, until it becomes too complex to keep track of. 
Behaviour of open systems has a particular “energy signature”, due to the 
presence of statistically-unlikely levels of order. In the woods at night, one would have 
a greater reaction to the sound of regular footsteps than to the sound of a running 
stream. It is important to keep track of the behaviour of other open systems if one is to 
avoid being preyed upon; and one must recognise when other open systems are aware 
of one’s presence, to be an effective hunter. Further iterations allow deception, whether 
conscious or instinctive (as in the case of a Killdeer plover behaving as if wounded and 
giving distress signals to lure predators from its nest). Such strategies provide 
game-theoretic pressure for evolution of the ability to represent nonlinear relationships. 
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Theories of the influence of game theory on the evolution of the mind are sometimes 
called “Machiavellian intelligence” theories (Byrne & Whiten 1988). 
The need for game-theoretic entropy management may be behind the evolution 
of language, and consciousness in general. According to anthropologist Robin Dunbar, 
the impetus for developing language arose when environmental pressures forced the 
apes from which humans descend to the edge of the African forests. Grooming, the 
process by which apes and other primates manage social interaction, became too 
time-consuming for the large group sizes needed for survival in this more hostile 
environment. The solution was to replace direct grooming with vocalisations. 
“Language… allows us to reach more individuals at the same time; it allows 
us to exchange information about our social world so that we can keep track 
of what’s happening among members of our social network (as well as 
keeping track of social cheats); it allows us to engage in self-advertising in a 
way that monkeys and apes cannot; and last but not least, it seems to allow 
us to produce the reinforcing effects of grooming (opiate release) from a 
distance.” (Dunbar 1996:192) 
Dunbar has found a connection between the group size for various primates and 
the size of the neocortex, the most recently-evolved part of the mammalian brain 
within the cerebral cortex (1993). (It seems to be the cerebral cortex that is responsible 
for our ability to make associations between different conscious modalities (Glynn 
1999:212).) As group size increases, possible social relations increase combinatorially. 
The need to balance entropy management within larger groups (Dunbar proposes a 
figure of 150, according to the size of the human neocortex and other evidence) might 
have resulted in evolutionary pressure for more complex representation. 
Of course, creating models of social interaction is an important activity still: “To 
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get some idea of how important gossip is, we monitored conversations in a university 
refectory, scoring the topic at 30-second intervals. Social relationships and personal 
experiences accounted for about 70 per cent of conversation time. About half of this 
was devoted to the relationships or experiences of third parties.” (Dunbar 1992:31). 
Awareness of the purposes of others surely makes up a large proportion of the contents 
of consciousness over an average day, from anticipating traffic flow to watching the 
television news. 
3.6.3.3 The later evolution of language and other memes 
According to Julian Jaynes, “Because language must make dramatic changes in 
man’s attention to things and persons, because it allows a transfer of information of 
enormous scope, it must have developed over a period that shows archaeologically 
that such changes occurred.” (1976:130). Although language may have started out 
with vocalisations to coordinate small groups, the earliest examples of nonlinear 
memes involving symbolic representation11 do not appear around thirty to sixty 
thousand years ago (Stringer, C and MicKie, R. 1996; Mithen 1996). One can perhaps 
assume that before this time, language was very simple. Small hunter-gatherer groups 
have neither the need nor the means to develop very complex language: the number of 
possible functionally distinct referents was small, and only oral or ostensive forms of 
teaching were possible, restricting the spread of innovation. While knowledge of 
plants, animals, hunting techniques, and so forth, may be advanced, language relating 
to technology, complex social organisation, and other topics will necessarily be 
limited: not least because the possible extent of non-linear combination will be 
relatively small. Even cave paintings and incised decoration are not highly nonlinear, 
                                                     
11 According to Ian Watts, inference of symbolism in early populations requires “evidence for repeated 
patterning and intentionality” (1999:113). 
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although they are amenable to evolution through copying and combination, and 
presumably were accompanied by increased complexity of language.  
Language, considered as a behavioural attractor, becomes highly complex with 
the invention of writing, which arose from the use of pictograms in formal labelling 
systems. Pictograms can be used to help construct complex memes in this way, but are 
restricted by lack of detail in representation. “Once symbol became sign around 3700 
BC, graphic art began to ‘talk’... A picture of an ox had originally meant only ‘ox’, 
prompting one to say the word aloud. With the new rebus principle, one began 
pronouncing sounds that no longer conveyed only the graphic image.” (Fischer 
2001:34). The rebus principle is the move from pictorial to phonetic representation in 
writing.12 This allowed much more accurate symbolic representation of language, and 
much increased the possibilities for evolution and feedback among a wider population. 
Writing certainly enabled the construction of complex memes that gave 
advantages for social organisation, such as laws and detailed contracts. While we can 
assume low levels of literacy in early civilisations, the rebus principle greatly reduces 
the number of signs that must be learned, while greatly increasing the grammatical 
complexity that can be represented. What is more, the durable nature of written 
description ought to have permitted feedback between language and other memes. 
Descriptions developed for one purpose could be applied to another. 
3.6.3.4 Social pressures and consciousness 
The transition from hunter-gatherer groups to settlements based on agriculture 
                                                     
12 Chinese writing has a slightly different history. Chinese writing probably came out of pictograms 
used for divination, before the first millennium BCE. Chinese characters often have phonetic elements, 
and also are nonlinear in that they tend to be made of several components. Many elements are not 
derived from pictures. A character usually stands for one concept or name, or group of such, related 
functionally or by historical accident. It is also possible to use Chinese characters phonetically, as in 
transliterations of Buddhist terms from Sanskrit, or of foreign proper names. (See Norman 1988). 
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somewhat preceded the advent of writing. Large settlements increase the possibility of 
meme propagation, feedback, and persistence, and this probably helped in the 
independent discovery of the writing attractor in Mesopotamia, China, etc. 
The establishment of large settlements resulted in great game-theoretic pressures, 
which needed to be dealt with through new memes. One obvious candidate is religion, 
which (in its game-theoretic implications) rather resembles Jeremy Bentham’s idea of 
the Panopticon, a prison that he proposed at the end of the eighteenth century, in which 
the prisoners may always be being watched (1995). Religion has the advantage of 
making use of our evolved tendency to follow dominant individuals, making it much 
more easily available as an attractor than nonlinear memes such as democracy. 
There is some evidence that even in the early stages of civilisation, subjective 
consciousness as we know it may not have existed. In the somewhat controversial (yet 
certainly thought provoking) view of Jaynes, at this time the associations between 
language and sensory modalities were not yet well integrated (1976). Language, and 
the meme environment in general, had not yet evolved to anywhere like its current 
level of complexity. Language still served a largely social function, being used for 
commands, requests, and the simple descriptions thereby required. The earliest form 
of the integration of language with other modalities, according to Jaynes, involved 
auditory hallucinations of such commands. This contributed to the establishment of 
religion for purposes of organising and controlling large groups: people heard the 
voices of gods or spirits giving them instructions, and indeed could invoke such 
hallucinations for functional purposes using the preserved bodies of leaders, or images 
and statues. 
Whether in the course of external pressures such as war or drought, or simply in 
the course of meme evolution, many large theocratic states organised on this basis in 
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China, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Mycenae, and the Indus Valley eventually collapsed, 
giving rise to the civilisations of what Karl Jaspers called the Axial Age (1962). In this 
period, from around the start of the first millennium BCE, language became more 
integrated with other modalities, and auditory hallucinations became less common, 
becoming the domain of professional mediums and oracles. This was accompanied by 
the development of formal religion and complex political systems, and the beginnings 
of science. 
While religion remained a source of taboos and superstitions, there was a general 
reduction in highly impractical or counterproductive religious practices such as human 
sacrifice and ritualised warfare. Questions arose as to the efficacy of religious ritual, 
not in terms of results (the success or failure of a particular ritual or performer) but in 
terms of the underlying logic of ritual itself.13 Religion became more philosophical as 
its organisational function was partially taken over by new technological and cultural 
developments. Art began to address more everyday subjects, becoming less entwined 
with religion, with one notable trend in many cultures being a movement away from 
depictions of simplified faces with grossly oversized eyes, which Jaynes believed were 
more conducive to generating hallucinations. 
The Axial Age was not a time of transformation into any kind of modern 
scientific mindset, which only becomes recognisable after the Renaissance. However, 
noting that the Indo-European root of the word “science” is related to the Greek 
schizein and the Latin scindere meaning “to split”, and the Sanskrit chyati meaning 
“he cuts off”, one may say that science took its first steps during the Axial Age, in the 
sense of the creation of bodies of systematic knowledge based on an analytical process 
                                                     
13 Awareness of ritual as different from other actions is a mark of the rational mindset. Bourdieu (1977, 
1990) and, earlier, Wittgenstein (see Tambiah 1990) argue that rituals need not be rationally aimed at 
achieving a goal, but can be instinctual or habitual actions that “make sense” without additional abstract 
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of dividing up and classifying phenomena into abstract schemes.14 
Whether one accepts all the details of Jaynes thesis or not, it was during this 
period of civilisational transformation that highly nonlinear memes first appeared. It 
seems that requirements for this process were a large, stable, relatively prosperous 
population to help meme propagation, the game-theoretic pressures of organising and 
controlling such populations, and the increasing sophistication of language and 
writing that accompanied this enriched meme environment. Following Jaynes, a 
further factor may have been the gradual integration of this more sophisticated 
language with other modalities, perhaps even thereby giving rise to subjective 
consciousness. Certainly there does not seem to be a great deal of evidence in literature 
for phenomena such as introspection15 before the Axial Age (Jaynes mostly discusses 
literature of the Near East and Greece, but see Fingarette 1972 for a discussion of lack 
of introspection in the Analects of Confucius). 
3.6.4 Consciousness and morality 
Certainly we seem to give more weight to the purposes of our fellow humans 
than animals, plants, computers, and other open systems. I do not believe this is simply 
“species-ism”, an unfounded prejudice in favour of those who are similar to ourselves. 
We have a sense that fulfilment or frustration of purposes matters more to humans. 
Spilling a glass of water on your laptop is not an act with the same moral consequences 
as murdering someone (although it does have some moral consequences, if desired or 
undesired). This is a difficult question, and I cannot hope to give a fully satisfactory 
answer here.  
                                                                                                                                                      
explanation. 
14 Astronomy and other forms of measurement had already been practised for centuries, but in a very 
practical fashion, rather than as an abstract discipline with its own internal logic. 
15 I take introspection to be paying attention to and describing one’s conscious experience, with implicit 
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In my view, the moral weight we recognise as accompanying conscious purposes 
results from the extreme nonlinearity of conscious associations. This results in what 
can perhaps only be called deeper suffering or happiness than less-complex open 
systems, particularly due to the integration of very detailed memory and imagination, 
which comes with its own emotional content. Another factor is our behavioural 
integration with extremely nonlinear memes, which provide further levels of 
association and range of possible desires. 
For humans, morality is concerned with freedom: what we want and don’t want. 
Humans are capable of wanting more, and wanting it more deeply, than other open 
systems: of having desires that are more detailed and complex, involving memories of 
the past and imagination of other potential alternatives, in an environment that is much 
richer. Our entropy management encompasses choices and possibilities that other open 
systems cannot begin to be aware of. In the end, however, it seems to me that this point 
is not something that can be proven; it is something that is recognised. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Relevance was initially defined in broad terms as information (change) that is 
relevant to the survival of metastability. I then presented a very quick sketch of a 
possible basis for moving from this physical sense of relevance to a theory of morality 
applicable to human purposes. The good in this theory revolves around entropy 
management, which permits the application of game theory for the purpose of 
balancing the good. This has various advantages in coping with unavoidable 
informational limits that might otherwise trouble a formal theory of morality. 
I also introduced a new way of looking at the concept of memes: 
                                                                                                                                                      
or explicit acknowledgement that it represents a particular perspective or standpoint. 
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physically-instantiated probabilistic attractors for the behaviour of open systems. This 
avoids some of the “mereological” problems of situating memes “within” 
consciousness. 
Thirdly, I discussed some points relating to consciousness: the need to avoid 
confusion between brain processes and thought processes when doing philosophy; the 
importance to consciousness of associations between different modalities; and some of 
the social and meme pressures that may have led to the evolution of language, writing, 
and perhaps even consciousness itself. 
3.7.1 The subjective character of consciousness 
We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his 
master will beat him to-morrow. Why not? 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953:§650) 
Recent studies of synaesthesia emphasising the role of language (reviewed in 
Simner 2007), together with Jaynes’ suggestion that conscious linguistic modalities 
only became fully integrated relatively recently, suggest to me a way of helping to 
explain the character of consciousness. Perhaps consciousness arose as a means of 
integrating topologically-simple sensory and emotional modalities with other, 
nonlinear ones such as language, which evolved more recently as society, culture and 
technology took off with the advent of agricultural settlements. 
As language followed its feedback path to nonlinearity, in tandem with other 
complex memes such as art and commerce, and with the increasing complexity of 
social relations, integration may have required a new “arena” of comparison in the 
mind. This would have allowed phenomena such as interior monologue to help tease 
out the social structure of a large group, or verbal self-interrogation to recall memories 
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or meme techniques, as well as helping to organise and classify elements of the 
increasingly complex meme environment. Before this, language would have still been 
closely related to vocalisation: a practical tool for giving orders and signalling 
immediate states. Consciousness would have resulted from a co-opting of language to 
help deal with the increasing complexity of the social and meme environment. It 
permits information-sharing between modalities that are topologically quite distinct, 
especially in terms of complexity. 
What we call consciousness would be the subjective “space” that permits such 
associations. One possible explanation for why language might have the ability to 
open this “space” could be found in a remark of Lev Vygotsky: “A word does not refer 
to a single object but to a group or class of objects. Each word is therefore already a 
generalization. Generalization is a verbal act of thought and reflects reality in quite 
another way than sensation and perception.” (In Sacks 1989:48). This conscious 
“space” itself has no direct entropy-management purpose (though it permits more and 
“deeper” desires on the part of the conscious subject). This could help explain the 
confusions that can arise in philosophy through describing consciousness using 
language developed to talk about things. This point brings us to the final, and shortest, 
chapter of this thesis: the Signal Elements Category. 
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4. The Signal Elements Category 
I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. 
It is correct to say “I know what you are thinking”, and wrong to say “I 
know what I am thinking.” 
(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.) 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953: 222) 
 
The third category of topics which I wish to propose as useful to the systems 
approach to philosophy is the Signal Elements Category. The title of this category is 
intended to emphasise that the memes we use for deliberate transmission of 
information (for purposes of cooperation, competition, and other reasons) are made up 
of discrete elements organised in a way that can be described using a grammar or other 
formal system of categorisation, which may have a nonlinear character. 
All human activity involves entropy management, by definition. Expending 
energy will result in an alteration of probabilities. One can classify aspects of activity 
in various ways; one is in terms of a basic physical aspect and a signalling aspect. The 
signalling aspect will make use of some kind of grammar: a topologically nonlinear 
arrangement of elements, chosen from among other possibilities, in order to evoke 
associations or some other reaction. 
One may find any number of examples simply by glancing about. Books are 
designed physically to be read in good light, their pages to remain in a certain order, to 
have a certain level of resistance to damage, and so on. These are the more basic 
physical aspect of the human activity that the book represents. Books also have images 
on the cover, a choice of typefaces, perhaps a photo of the author in a particular pose, 
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and of course their main raison d’être, their meaningful contents. A building is built of 
various materials so as to stay stable while being partly permeable to light, air, those 
people or animals who use it, and so on. It also has a certain architectural character, 
will be decorated in a particular style, and may have the name of the occupant or a 
description of its purpose posted somewhere on its exterior. A dance requires 
expenditure of energy in movement, the right footwear, a space for performance, 
adequate lighting, and so on; and it is designed to express certain emotions or ideas. 
Possible examples are endless; although not all activity need have a signalling element, 
of course. 
The Signal Elements Category is a subset of the Relevance Category: the aim of 
communication is still to create order or disorder. However, it merits standing alone 
due to its particular nonlinear structure, and the type of uses to which it is put. In 
physical terms, a painting hanging in a gallery is a relatively ordered structure, created 
for purposes that will ultimately be instantiated through variations of order and 
disorder, whether earning money or changing the emotional state of the viewer. But 
there is a lot more that one can say about a painting! 
There is a great deal that could be said on the precise topology of nonlinear 
memes that are used for communication, of course, from art to music to logic to 
fashion. Guerino Mazzola gives a detailed analysis of the topological grammar of 
music in The Topos of Music: Geometric Logic of Concepts, Theory, and Performance 
(2002) for example. Here I simply wish to make a few remarks about such memes as 
attractors, and cover three points regarding the consequences for such memes of the 
nature of information. 
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4.1 Grammar 
Memes are attractors for behaviour; however, they vary in complexity. Looking 
at examples of the most complex memes, we can determine rules that govern their 
generation, although conscious awareness of these rules may not be needed for that 
generation. This property has obvious advantages: memes can be generated very 
flexibly, to direct behaviour in precise and subtle ways, yet the ability to produce such 
memes can be easily taught or picked up. 
Categories of grammars have been formalised by Chomsky (1956, 1986) and 
others on a topological basis. This has brought a mathematical precision to the 
long-recognised branching structure used to analyse phrases and sentences, and helped 
make grammar a topic in computation theory. It is interesting to note that the 
expansion of one type of grammar, context-free grammar (the rules of which are 
simpler than those of natural languages (Shieber 1985)) has proven useful in 
modelling the fractal topology of plants (Prusinkiewicz and Aristid 1990) and 
sea-shells (Meinhardt 1995). 
There is a broader sense of grammar, by which we say that advertisements or 
cartoons or even “no smoking” signs have their own grammar. As Wittgenstein says, 
“Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar).” Grammar 
requires differentiated elements (such as English words) that can be organised in a way 
that can be described using rules (such as English syntax) – but differentiation is also a 
form of relation 
4.1.1 Parameters 
Chomsky introduced the concept of “parameter” to linguistic grammar. A 
parameter is “a choice point in the general recipe for a human language.... an 
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ingredient that can be added in order to make one kind of language or left out in order 
to make another kind.” (Baker 2001:57). For example, it is possible to add a phrase to 
a new word in order to make another phrase; and the phrase will either go before the 
new word (as in English) or after it (as in Japanese). This choice defines the “head 
directionality parameter”. Parameters provide a way of giving simple explanations as 
to how languages differ. One or two differences in parameters will lead to great 
variation in the final structure of the utterances produced by two different languages, 
due to the nonlinearity inherent in the rule-based generation process. These parameters 
could be viewed as defining attractors in the phase space of the language: one is even 
called the “verb attraction parameter”, which decides whether verbs are attracted to the 
position of tense auxiliaries, or vice versa. 
4.1.2 Universal Grammar 
Another of Chomsky’s contributions to linguistics is the concept of Universal 
Grammar, which looks for connections between common elements in languages (such 
as parameters) and language acquisition. Cook and Newson write that “The physical 
basis of UG means that it is part of the human genetic inheritance, a part of biology 
rather than psychology”, and go on to quote Chomsky: “universal grammar is part of 
the genotype specifying one aspect of the initial state of the human mind and brain” 
(Cook & Newson 1996:186). Discussing systematic and complete historical changes 
in grammar due to changes in parameters, Baker writes that “it seems more plausible 
to think that parameters reflect natural regularities of the human mind, born into all of 
us, rather than the results of cultural decision, whether conscious or unconscious.” 
(Baker 2001:203). 
Viewing grammar in terms of probabilities and attractors provides a possible 
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route for escaping the need to explain regularities between languages (and other 
complex memes such as types of music) entirely in terms of genetics. It might be 
possible to give a probabilistic account of the mutual influence of different generative 
rules on the overall phase space of the grammar, and map that either to neuronal 
hardwiring after birth, or even to leave it in the realm of the likelihood of particular 
physical instantiations of the meme. 
A complex-dynamics approach might make Universal Grammar less “universal” 
and more probabilistic – but on the other hand, it might provide a way to incorporate 
unexpected features such as supplementing linguistic grammar with prosody in the 
Pirahã language of Brazil (Colapinto 2006) or gesture in Tasmanian languages 
(Lévy-Bruhl, 1985:179). 
4.1.3 Lexical semantics 
It seems to me complex dynamics might also have some application to lexical 
semantics, the study of the relationships between word meanings, “perhaps the most 
problematic and least-developed area of contemporary linguistics.” (Baker 2001:204). 
Word meaning can be fluid, because “meaning is constrained by both the sentence 
structure as a whole and the meaning of the other words around it.” (ibid 205). 
However, words can be organised into semantic networks on the basis of logical 
relationships. Polysemy (fluidity of meaning) being a key topic in areas such as 
Deconstruction and Semiotics, it is perhaps possible that some concepts from complex 
dynamics could be of use in these areas. However, I do not have enough knowledge of 
these fields to pursue this suggestion further here. 
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4.2 Escaping the physicality of information 
Memes used for communication, since they arise from the activity of open 
systems, are affected by constraints such as the physicality of information in terms of 
their actual instantiation. For example, it is impossible to precisely plot a fractal shape 
that has infinite complexity, and likewise we cannot graphically represent a point or a 
line except by means such as drawing a shape on paper or on a computer screen, which 
will have more than the one or two dimensions it technically should have. 
Multidimensional or extremely nonlinear phenomena may be very difficult or even 
impossible to represent: in some cases, complex phenomena can be shown to be 
impossible to model due to unavoidable constraints on computation such as the 
lifespan of the universe, or the amount of matter available therein to represent 
whatever is being modelled. 
The very need to make this point implies that the internal logic of certain memes 
can avoid representing constraints due to the physicality of information, the nature of 
observation in a closed-system universe, and so on. It is possible to assume perfect 
knowledge, or infinite detail, or conflate knowledge with its object – whereas 
information actually received physically cannot be said to be “the same” as whatever 
originally caused it to propagate; and indeed the implication that information requires 
measurement, along with problems such as quantum indeterminacy, makes pinning 
down an ultimate “source” of information propagation very problematic. 
In Three Roads To Quantum Gravity Lee Smolin gives an interesting account of 
the danger of failing to represent such constraints, in the history of quantum gravity 
theory (2000). During the development of Loop Quantum Gravity, Smolin and 
colleagues encountered problems trying to reconcile relativity theory (which Smolin 
argues is background-independent (Smolin 2007)) with string theory. They were able 
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to proceed by taking into account constraints to information due to the nature of 
observation, which has been called the “relational approach” to quantum physics 
(Crane 1994). Carlo Rovelli says with regard to this approach, “The notion rejected 
here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system; equivalently, 
the notion of observer-independent values of physical quantities.... by abandoning 
such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion of state – and values of physical quantities 
– relative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense.” (1996:1637). 
This point need not be restricted to quantum physics. Any formal scheme comes 
out of a particular context, and is used for given purposes. Because this is unavoidable, 
it cannot be considered a criticism of formal modelling or analysis to make this 
observation. Still, the implications of the physical instantiation of formal schemes, and 
the inevitable simplification that modelling implies, ought to be kept in mind. 
McCluhan’s analysis of the effects that physical media can have on the message 
being transmitted is related to the point that representation must be physically 
instantiated somehow. The related observations of some “postmodernist” writers such 
as Jean Baudrillard on the social effects of communication, and the relationship 
between sign and reality, are also relevant in this regard (1994). 
Pierre Bourdieu’s description of the “synoptic illusion” may also be pertinent 
here (1977:97 ff.). Anthropological analysis has a tendency to create synopses, to 
abstract what seem to be the important features of belief systems, to organise things 
into a regular order, and then to hold the hidden assumption that the people whose 
beliefs are under examination are actually aware of such synopses, and act accordingly. 
However, the lived reality of beliefs and practices does not necessarily require an 
awareness of any particular overarching abstraction or map representing the system. 
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4.2.1 This thesis as communication 
These points naturally apply to the current thesis. The observations herein are in 
the form of typical Western academic “discourse”, for example. There is undoubtedly 
some lack of clarity at certain points regarding the distinction between the “natural” or 
the “physical” and “representations” or “models” thereof. There are two solutions to 
such problems. One can tie oneself into linguistic knots, inserting qualifiers upon 
qualifiers, without really improving matters; or one can be content to accept that in 
practical terms, the distinction is clear enough for the purposes of this thesis. 
The realm of the physical is that to which informational horizons apply. The 
realm of representation is the formal world of the model. The physical form of this 
thesis belongs to the former (the Physical Category), while the content falls into both 
the Relevance Category (being submitted as part of the requirements for academic 
assessment, for example) and the Signal Elements Category. It is very hard to avoid 
confusion arising from such distinctions when talking about topics in the Physical 
Category, in particular. Werner Heisenberg quotes Einstein as saying, “Whether you 
can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which 
decides what can be observed.” (Bethe 1989:39). 
I have tried to keep in mind, in writing, the probabilistic nature of truth, due to 
the necessity that information be observed; and so to use phrases such as “can be 
described as”, and so forth. Indeed, the classification of the chapters of this thesis into 
three “categories” is intended to emphasise that this thesis represents a way of looking 
at things, of dividing up modes of observation. Perhaps the most one can say is that 
there is a certain topological resemblance between the topics in each category, as 
mentioned in section 1.4.5. The title of this thesis, “Using Systems Theory To Do 
Philosophy”, should also be taken in this spirit of acknowledging context and purpose. 
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4.3 The primacy of consciousness 
The question of the consequences of determinism for free will arose in section 
3.4.3. It seems appealing to say that a deterministic universe would mean we have no 
free will; but we cannot say whether the universe is fully deterministic or not, and it is 
difficult to imagine what difference it would make to morality if we were somehow to 
find out tomorrow that it were. If we did discover that the universe were deterministic, 
and decided that no-one “really” had any moral responsibility for anything, there 
would be the difficulty of describing what it would mean for someone to “really” have 
responsibility. When one cannot explain what the contrary case would be, it becomes 
doubtful if there is really a problem. 
There is a somewhat similar issue in the question of communicating the 
subjective nature of conscious experience. We would like to say that there is 
something about the smell of coffee (to take an example from Wittgenstein) that 
cannot be expressed in words; but we have no practical difficulties in talking about the 
smell of coffee, and it is hard to pin down what would be the contrary case that solved 
this “problem”. 
The question of “what something is like” is a rather pernicious one in philosophy. 
It is simple to talk about whether one thing is like another (compare them) using 
words; and certainly conscious experiences are differentiated (we can tell coffee from 
whiskey) – but comparing things by verbal description is not the same as having two 
different conscious experiences. The phrase “what something is like” has the potential 
to mislead. If a friend were to say, “Seeing the look on his face was like winning a 
million dollars”, we would be considered rather pedantic if we responded, “But you’ve 
never won a million dollars, and even if you had, how could you be sure you were 
remembering the experience properly when you made the comparison?”. 
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Sometimes philosophers use the term “qualia” as a way of talking about “what 
something is like”. The number of different qualia must be enormous, since there is 
one for every differentiable conscious experience. The term is so broad as to make it 
very difficult to say anything about how qualia are related. The main effect of the word 
seems to be to turn an experience into an object. To quote Wittgenstein again, “The 
decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that 
we thought quite innocent.” (1953 §308). An object is identified in the course of 
entropy management on some basis of relevance, but the experience of recognising an 
object is not necessarily itself an object. Some of the further problems with this way of 
putting things are detailed by Bennett and Hacker (2003:261 ff.). 
In section 3.7.1 I suggested that language might play a role in generating 
consciousness, which could be described as a “space” in which different modalities 
can be associated. Oliver Sacks gives some support for this way of looking at 
consciousness in his accounts of deaf children who, for some reason, were never 
taught any form of language, including sign language (1989:37ff). Sacks describes 
such children as having great difficulty in understanding references to times other than 
the present, hypotheses or possibilities. They find it hard to imagine, reflect, or plan. 
Wittgenstein likewise writes “Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have 
mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this 
complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it 
has no application to beings that do not write.)” (1953:174). But it is not a paradox for 
language to be necessary for consciousness while at the same time being something 
different from conscious experience. 
Wittgenstein says, “Words are also deeds.” (ibid:§546) and “Language is an 
instrument.” (ibid:§569.). Consciousness is not a deed, but one way in which purposes 
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are determined. In a way, it has “primacy” over language: there would be no need for 
language if there were no observers. Language can be used to create nonlinear models 
that are extremely useful. But it is a tool used for particular purposes. Purposes 
themselves arise in the probabilistic flow of metastability. 
4.3.1 Physicalism and morality 
A related point touches on the argument one sometimes hears along the lines of 
“If the physical universe is all there is, then we are just random collections of matter 
and energy, there is no meaning, and nothing matters”. One would hope that this 
argument would only be used as reductio ad absurdum, since the speaker must intend 
to say something meaningful in making it. However, one sometimes comes across this 
kind of statement accompanied with a touch of fear or dread, or even awe. 
The main problem with this kind of statement is the pejorative use of the word 
“random”. As I hope to have shown in this thesis, physicalism does not insist that 
things are random, but can explain how order arises, and from order, relevance, 
meaning and morality. Furthermore, there seems to be here another version of the 
problem encountered in the discussion of free will, and in the discussion regarding the 
expression of “what something is like”: namely, that it is hard to specify how the 
introduction of the non-physical would help matters. Statements that “nothing 
matters” if there is no “plan” for the universe are particularly confusing. A plan is 
simply a way of talking about purposes, and it is unclear why a plan for the progress of 
the universe as a whole should permit morality, while the purposes of those of us 
within it cannot. 
Statements such as “nothing matters” or “everything is meaningless” are absurd, 
if taken literally rather than poetically. The contradiction of trying to make a 
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meaningful statement that denies meaning betrays a grudging recognition that 
meaning requires observation (that is, a context that determines relevance) and at the 
same time, a failure to fully appreciate the implications of that point. Similarly, an 
Internet search for the phrase “from the point of view of the universe” gives 
half-a-million results. But the universe does not have a point of view, beyond that of 
observers within it. 
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5. Conclusion 
In the course of this thesis, I have tried to address H. T. Odum’s claim that 
“General systems theories are a way of reuniting the fields that seek to generalize 
knowledge.” (1995:368). I have attempted to show connections between a large 
number of different approaches to science and philosophy, and to argue that 
philosophy ought to take account of some of the findings of these areas of science. I 
see the incorporation into philosophy of new theories of information (such as the 
relational approach to quantum physics) as being compatible with Wittgenstein’s aim 
in philosophy, “To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.” (1953:§309). That is, to 
understand what it is to be an observer, and not to be misled by language and other 
forms of communication, which need not take account of the nature of information for 
observers in a closed-system universe. 
I also hope to have given some indication of a way of founding a theory of 
morality, which can explain why some things are right and others wrong, upon a 
thoroughgoing physicalism. Although there has not been room here to give a great 
many examples of how one could apply this theory to various hypothetical moral 
dilemmas, in any case I believe such an approach is rather overused in moral 
philosophy. More important is discussion of practical game-theoretic mechanisms that 
can help reliably balance competing purposes. 
Entropy management is one topic that recurs throughout this thesis. There are 
two reasons for this. One is that probabilistic change can be found throughout the 
universe, from the quantum scale to clusters of galaxies. The other is the possibility of 
metastability, which permits relevance, and the existence of open systems. 
Analysis of probability and its management by open systems is relevant to a very 
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wide range of topics in science, philosophy, and other areas of enquiry. I hope to have 
shown that an understanding of the implications of the closed-system nature of the 
universe and the physicality of information for observers is useful for explaining ideas 
as diverse as time, order, meaning and free will, just to name a few of the subjects 
covered in this thesis. 
5.1 Entropy management and consciousness 
I should make one final point regarding the applicability of entropy management 
to consciousness. It might be argued that entropy management is not relevant to 
explanations of consciousness, because of Bennett and Hacker’s mereological fallacy: 
applying scientific descriptions that rightly apply to the objects of consciousness to 
consciousness itself. This argument might also be applied to the use of “entropy 
management”, “purpose” and “desire” as interchangeable at certain points. 
However, Bennett and Hacker acknowledge that consciousness depends on a 
physical system for its existence, and this certainly would be hard to deny from the 
changes to conscious experience that arise from illness, intoxication, injury, sleep, 
death, and other changes affecting the nervous system. I am not trying to claim that 
entropy management is all there is to conscious purposes and desires; only that the 
latter depend on the former. Fulfilling some purpose will require entropy management. 
My stress on the role of entropy management is not intended to preclude philosophy of 
purpose or will, but rather to indicate some areas in which such philosophies may have 
to take the scientific findings into account if they wish to remain compatible with 
physicalism. 
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5.1.1 Being and Time 
One philosophical program which I believe gives an account of consciousness 
and the will which is compatible with physical constraints to information, and other 
topics discussed in this thesis, is that of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962). A 
few examples include Heidegger’s concepts of being-there (Dasein), care (Sorge) and 
the hermeneutic circle (Hermeneutische Zirkel). 
Dasein can be compared with embodied or situated consciousness – 
being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein). Care seems to me to resonate with the idea of 
purpose as based on entropy management by an open-system observer in a particular 
context.16 The hermeneutic circle has similarities with the idea that meaning always 
requires a context: the circle arises because “there can be no interpretation (and so, no 
understanding) that is free of pre-conception, and… this is not a limitation to be rued 
but an essential precondition of any comprehending relation to the world” (Mulhall 
1996:87). According to Heidegger, “The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the 
structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential 
constitution of Dasein - being in the world” (Heidegger 1962:195). 
Dasein must always be present in its world, and has no choice but to care about 
this world. This echoes the idea that entropy management is unavoidable. Mulhall says 
that “the conditionedness of human existence… [is] fundamentally a matter of being 
fated to a self and to a world of other selves and objects about which one cannot choose 
not to be concerned” (Mulhall 1996:112). Chapter VI of Being and Time is entitled 
“Care as the Being of Dasein”. According to Heidegger, “Dasein is an entity for which, 
in its Being, that Being is an issue” (Heidegger 1962:236). This is because Dasein is 
                                                     
16 Dasein’s being is “being-in”, and examples of “being-in” that represent Sorge include “having to do 
with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of 
something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, 
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aware of possibilities and potentials, which connects Dasein and care with time, 
characterised as a horizon. 
Many other examples of possible connections between Being and Time and the 
relationship between entropy management and consciousness could be given, such as 
the distinction between objects being “ready-to-hand” (zuhanden) and 
“present-at-hand” (vorhanden), or the distinction between Dasein and objects, which 
avoids the mereological fallacy: “Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing 
or item of equipment would, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding 
space would themselves just define that space spatially. Dasein takes space in” 
(ibid:419). 
However, Heidegger’s approach to ethics has little connection with my proposed 
“Utilitarianism of entropy management with physical constraints to information”. The 
ethics of Being and Time is rather impoverished. It consists largely of a preference for 
“authenticity” (Eigentlichkeit) over the “they” (das Man), which implies not being 
aware of one’s situation as an embodied consciousness, but following conventions like 
a sleepwalker. While inauthenticity may be aesthetically unappealing, Heidegger does 
not provide any grounds for thinking it immoral. This does not stop him discussing 
such topics in an admonitory tone (use of words such as “must”, referring to “our 
constant task”, etc.) throughout the book, which I believe to be a weakness of the text. 
5.1.2 Chan 禪 Buddhism 
Another area which I would suggest is very apt for philosophical interpretation 
compatible with the ideas presented in this thesis is the literature of Chinese Chan 
Buddhism, in particular the “records of sayings” (yulu 語錄) literature from the 
                                                                                                                                                      
considering, discussing, determining” (Heidegger 1962:56). 
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Classical period (around 765 to 950 CE). 
Chan literature is concerned both with the nature of conscious experience and 
the proper uses of language. It possesses an extremely rich technical vocabulary for 
discussing these topics. Being also a practical pedagogical tradition, Chan also 
contains many examples of misunderstandings of the nature of observation and 
communication, and methods for remedying such misunderstandings. 
One may also say of Chan that it does not include a formal theory of morality. 
However, being part of Buddhism, it does deal with topics such as compassion, which 
are relevant game-theory concepts such as aid and harm. 
So-called “mystical” traditions such as Chan have had very little intersection 
with Western philosophy (the influence of Daoism on Heidegger, described by 
Reinhard May (1996), is one exception). I believe that a better understanding of the 
topics discussed in this thesis would perhaps enable more dialogue between these two 
areas in the future. 
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